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ABSTRACT
Purpose and the Construction of Experience: A Theory of
Volition and Its Implication for the Release of Human
Potential. (July 1973) Patrick William Conway, B.A.,
University of California, Santa Cruz, 1969.
Directed by: Dr. Daniel C. Jordan
This dissertation undertakes two main tasks. The
first is to develop a conceptual framework sufficiently
adequate to integrate the diverse range of theoretical and
empirical perspectives on the nature of purpose and its role
in the release of human potentialities. The basic theo-
retical principles are derived from the organismic process
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. These foundational
principles, in turn, provide the basis for a critical analy-
sis of literature pertinent to the problem of purposive
activity. The results of this analysis are synthesized into
a general theory of volition which holds major implications
for educational planning, particularly in early and middle
childhood. Volition is defined as the process by which
conscious purpose emerges and determines the structural and
functional aspects of human experience. The theory then
analyzes volition in terms of three component processes;
attention, goal - sett ing , and will--each of which constitutes
successively more specialized modes of purposive activity.
The second task is to extract educational objectives
from the developmental trends identified and suggest proto-
typical learning experiences to facilitate the growth of
volitional competence.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most distinguished living biologists, Julian
Huxley, makes the claim that "Evolution on this planet is a history of
the realization of new possibilities by the stuff of which earth (and
the rest of the universe) is made--life [Huxley, 1960, p, 13]." In
the case of the human species, the process of evolution has reached an
intensity which far surpasses that of any other known form of life.
This is due, in large measure, to man’s volition; his capacity to en-
vision potentialities yet unrealized, to develop ideals, and then to
translate those ideals, those potentialities, into concrete expressions.
By so doing, he becomes the chief agent in his own evolution. However,
this power brings with it great responsibility. It can be a blessing
and a curse. History provides numerous examples of the disasters that
result when the vision is misguided (genocide, war, racism) to mention
a few. Yet, to retreat in the face of such hazards would be to forfeit
any investment in the future of evolution. As Huxley puts it,
It is as if man had been suddenly appointed managing
director of the biggest business of all, the business
of evolution. Whether he wants to or not, whether he
is conscious of what he is doing or not he is in point
of fact detemining the future direction of evolution
on this earth. That is his inescapable destiny and the
sooner he realizes it and starts believing in it , the
better for all concerned (Ibid.).
What all this means is that our continued survival, collective
as well as individual, depends on the fullest realization
of man's po-
tentialities. And since the capacity to envision and actualize
unrealized possibilities is the dine qua non of the
release of human
potential, it deserves the careful study of all those
whose business
concerns human development
,
particularly in the fields of education and
mental health.
A cursory glance at the statistics of pathology; the incidence
and recidivism, of mental illness, alcoholism, drug addiction, and im-
prisonment reveals that vast resources of human potential are not being
realized. Many of these truncated individuals find themselves unable to
change behavior patterns which are detrimental to the achievement of
their ultimate aims. A similar problem exists for large numbers of the
so-called normal population though to a lesser degree. Winter, et al.,
(1968)
,
offer evidence that many persons seem unable to conceptualize
goal possibilities which go much beyond their immediate situation.
These same individuals demonstrated a corresponding incapacity for self-
directed change. Consequently, it would seem that an important function
of education and mental health would be to foster within each individual
the capacity to manage his own destiny.
Much of the research and theory in modem psychology has em-
phasized the role of environmental and somatic determinants in human
development with a relative neglect for the study of intrinsic psycho-
genic sources of motivation. As a result, the concepts of volition and
will have fallen out of fashion within many circles of academic psycho-
logy. It should be added, however, that this falling out was not com-
pletely arbitrary. One of the outstanding contributions of Freud was
that he cut through the rather self-deceptive and naive notion of
Victorian will-power, the omnipotent faculty by which men made reso-
lutions and purportedly directed their lives down the impeccably lational
path. As Rollo May concludes,
xiii
The view that emerged was of man determined-
-not driving
but driven. 'Man is lived by the unconscious' as Freud
put it. 'The deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom
and choice is unscientific and must give ground before
the claims of a determinism that governs mental life'
(1970).
Skinner, too, in his most recent book indicts the notion of
man as an autonomous free-agent whose behavior is determined by inner
processes that are purportedly independent of direct environmental in-
fluences. Working from within his conceptual system of operant control,
his powerful argument leads him to assert,
An experimental analysis shifts the determination of
behavior from autonomous man to the environment- -an
environment responsible for both the evolution of the
species and the repertoire acquired by each member.
Environmental contingencies now take over the function
we once attributed to autonomous man (Skinner, quoted
in Psychology Today
,
September 1971 )
.
Skinner's polished, well-reasoned argument masks a crucial
weakness in his position. As can be seen, Skinner's system shifts the
source of control to environmental selection. But nowhere does he
clearly delineate those conditions which constitute the environment. If
environment is qualified in terms of those elements which evoke responses,
then clearly the environment includes the inner experience of one's
thoughts, feelings and fantasies. Without a doubt, these have important
roots in exteroceptive stimulation, but ideas also involve the integration
of traces of past stimulation with the feelings and sensations in the
present into a unified experience. Insofar as the process of integration
is enacted by the organism then the organism in part determines his en-
vironment. All this is merely a roundabout way of saying that the in-
dividual exercises a measure of self-detexmination in shaping his
actions.
xiv
Skinner's failure to make a qualitative distinction between these levels
of experience which characterize the organism's environment thus leads
him to make deceptive conclusions about the nature of freedom and the
self
-directed control of behavior.
Because ideas are important sources of data for human be-
havior, the belief one holds about this issue of self-determination
will greatly influence the way in which educators and counsellors ap-
proach their tasks. For this very reason, it is vitally important that
the conceptual scheme underlying empirical and speculative efforts be
adequately formulated with respect to comprehensiveness (adequacy of
scope), logical consistency, and coherence.
Thus, a preliminary aim of this dissertation is to concep-
tualize the nature of those processes by which an individual self-
determines his experience; specifically, how one's ideal aims and pur-
poses are expressed in one's activity. It has been nearly half a cen-
tury since American psychology has attempted to formulate a comprehen-
sive theory of volition and in the interim a wide range of relevant
empirical evidence has accrued. Consequently, a renewed attack on the
problem and a new integrative effort, such as is attempted here, seems
appropriate.
Because the concept of volition relies so heavily on the ac-
ceptance of purposive causation and because there is sharp controversy
over the scientific status of teleological (purposive) explanations,
many experimental psychologists have been moved to discard volition al-
together. Chapter One thus seeks to clarify and resolve this contro-
versy on a very fundamental level of analysis. The organic philosophy
xv
of Whitehead provides a basic interpretive framework within which the
structural and functional role of purpose can be understood. This
framework then serves both as the focal agent for the integration of
various contributing data sources and the foundation on which the
theory is constructed. Following this, each component process of the
theory is discussed in depth: In Chapter Two, "Attention"; in Chapter
Three, "Goal -Setting”; and finally, in Chapter Four, ,TWill." A three-
digit reference system is used to identify each chapter, main section
and subsection. The first digit designates the chapter number; the
second digit, the number of the main division within the chapter; and
the last digit signifies the particular section appearing under the main
division. The intention is to provide a clearer notion of how each
section is structurally related to the rest of the document and also to
aid in reference.
The second aim is to begin bridging the gap between theory
and practice. Specific implications are derived from the theoretical
model suggestive of ways in which an educator or counsellor can facili-
tate the development of each aspect of volitional competence. These ap-
plications are advanced as seminal ideas which should be accommodated
and expanded according to the exigencies of the curriculum. Many of
the techniques are not in themselves novel and although the scheme of
ideas may not at this point yield new techniques, the ideas neverthe-
less affect the perspective in which established techniques are applied.
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1.1 METAPHYSICAL BASIS
OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
1.1.1 MATERIALISM AND THE PARTITIONING
OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Among the many significant events in the history of western
thought
,
there is one which has particular importance for the purpose
of the present topic- -the divergence of philosophy and natural science
that began roughly around 1700 with the publication of Issac Newton’s
Prinoipia and Scholium. The tremendous import of these documents,
Whitehead observed, is that they constitute the clearest, most definite,
and most influential statement among cosmological speculations of man-
kind up to that time (Whitehead, 1925). At last, a scheme of prin-
ciples had been postulated against which all phenomena in the physical
universe could be analyzed, understood, and predicted. There was
nothing within the range of the known universe which could not be ex-
plained, at least in principle if not in fact, by these "laws." More-
over, the laws of force, gravitation, space, time, and velocity pre-
sented a vision of the universe which in no way required or admitted
the intervention of other kinds of explanatory principles. As such,
science was presumed to have no need for metaphysics, and universities
divided their courses of study into natural science and moral science,
the former concerned with explaining the physcial universe while the
latter dealt with the realm of ideas.
Although such a separation may have been beneficial at
that time to the advancement of science, it has produced unfortunate
limitations of thought on both sides. For science, the rejection of
2metaphysical introspection has deprived it of a means for critically
examining the assumptions and axioms upon which its methodologies are
based. At the same time, philosophy has ceased to be concerned with
speculating on the general implications of scientific knowledge in a
given field for other areas of human inquiry. Perhaps no science has
suffered more as a result of this partitioning than psychology. The
metaphysical framework underlying most of twentieth century American
experimental psychology can be traced to the materialist philosophy
rooted in Newtonian mechanics. But this has resulted in a curious
anachronism since the physical science model upon which this philo-
sophy was founded no longer holds in the light of more recent advances
in physics and chemistry. This state of affairs has led Sigmund Koch,
editor of the volumes entitled Psychology: The Study of a Science , to
write the following about the status of modem psychology,
Whether as a ’’science" or any kind of coherent discipline
devoted to empirical study of man, psychology has been
misconceived. . .
Indeed, the pooled pseudo -knowledge that is much of
psychology can be seen as a congeries of alternate- -and
exceedingly simple- -images, around each of which one finds
a dense scholastic clutter of supportive research theo-
rizing and methodological rhetoric (Koch, 1969).
Koch is only one among many thinkers who share this basic
perspective. The mere fact that psychoanalysts, Gestaltists and be-
haviorists, all of whose endeavers fall under the rubric of psychology,
seem to have little to say to one another, testifies to the fragmented
condition of psychological thought. For this reason we have chosen to
delve heavily into philosophical discussion. The only means by which
we can transcend the discordant polemics within the behavioral
3sciences to seek a more general scheme of ideas that will allow us
to unify the insights of various modes of psychological inquiry and
achieve a more coherent perspective. As Whitehead wrote,
We have to discriminate between weight to be given to
scientific opinion in the selection of its method and
its trustworthiness in formulating judgements of the
understanding. The slightest scrutiny of the history
of natural science shows that current scientific opin-
ion is nearly infallible in the former case and is in-
variably wrong in the latter case (Whitehead, 1925).
Before proceeding further with this line of thought the
writer wishes to draw attention to the specific anomaly which prompts
this metaphysical introspection.
1.1.2 THE CRISES OF MENTALITY
AND PURPOSE
American experimental psychology found its scientific iden-
tity in the behaviorist movement almost 60 years ago. In 1924 John
B. Watson wrote,
All schools of psychology except that of behaviorism
claim consciousness is the subject matter of psychology.
Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject
matter of human psychology is the activities of the human
being. Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither
definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another
word for the soul of more ancient times (Watson, 1924).
These well-known words heralded the systematic purging of
terms such as "mind," "thought," "idea," in fact, any reference to
mentality from the lexicon of experimental psychology. Also dis-
carded were terms such as "will," "purpose," and "volition." The ex-
tent of this purging can be seen when one searches through the
Psychological Abstracts
.
From the mid-thirties until the present,
there are only two or three entries under the headings of either
"will" or "volition." It is true that mentality is gradually working
4its way back into the concern of experimental psychology and, in fact,
the issue of purpose never did escape completely from the arena. This
was due largely to the efforts of Tolman and his theory of "purposive
behaviorism."
Tolman’ s system is known as "Purposive Behaviorism" because
he felt that some role for cognitive expectancy was required in a des-
cription of behavior. His emphasis upon the cognitive aspects of be-
havioral situations provided a stark contrast to Clark Hull and his
followers. But, when considered in a larger context, we see that even
the psychology of Tolman shared many of the same underlying assump-
tions as did the theories of Watson, Hull, Spence and Skinner. Two of
these major assumptions that have persisted stubbornly in the minds of
psychologists are (1) the principle of reductionism (defined in Section
1.1.3), and (2) the principle of dualism (discussed in Section 1.1.7
and 1.1.8). The argument developed in the following pages will demon-
strate how both of these epistemological schemes have in part allowed
psychologists to neglect the problem of will and volition and that
this neglect has proved suppressive to the growth of a meaningful and
adequate theory of human behavior.
The scope of scientific inquiry is largely determined by
the nature of one's basic assumptions about what reality is or ought
to be. "If one is drawn by unassailable scientific argument to the
conclusion that man is a cockroach, rat or do," wrote Koch, "that
makes a difference."
It also makes a difference when one achieves ultimate
certitude that man is a telephone exchange, a servo-
mechanism, a binary digital computer, a reward -seeking
5vector, a hyphen written within an S-R process,
a stimulator maximizer, a food, sex, or libido
energy converter, a utilities-maximizing game
player, a status seeker, a mutual ego-titillator
,
a mutual emotional (or actual) masturbator (Koch,
1969)
.
The point here is that the beliefs a man holds about him-
self and his fellows will indeed make a difference in the way he in-
terprets his experience. Since scientists are also human beings, they
are no more immune to such influences than anyone else. The difference
between laymen and scientists is that a scientist has formalized and
quantified a methodology by which to interpret his evidence, a tool
that works very efficiently within its chosen limits. The methods of
analysis used in studying human brainwave patterns, for example, do
not allow a physiologist to infer the difference between logical versus
illogical thought processes. This does not deny the possibility that
different brainwave characteristics may be correlative with either of
the two processes. But it does assert that such a differentiation can
be sought and made only because one first acknowledges such a dis-
tinction as real within one's experience. Such a differentiation, it
may be added, comes from outside the boundaries of physiological
method.
Likewise, reductionism and dualism, though enormously suc-
cessful for two centuries of technological and scientific advancement,
fail to illumine many important aspects of common experience which are
not easily contained within their limits. Moreover, psychology has,
by and large, stubbornly refused to admit even the existence of these
aspects as potential realities for investigation. No one has put it
6more succinctly than Whitehead when he once remarked,
We have here a colossal example of anti-empirical
dogmatism arising from a successful methodology.
Evidence which lies outside the method simply does
not count (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 15).
The issue in question is whether the conspicuous exclusion of concepts
such as volition and will from the field of experimental psychology
can be justified. For the moment, these concepts may be placed under
the category of explanation designated by Aristotle as types of "final
cause," causes attributable to the unrealized ends toward which the
event progresses. Presumably, in "efficient causes" no such reference
to ends is needed to explain the occurrence of an event.
Final causes do not imply, as critics have sometimes ccm-
plained, that future events which have no existence in the present,
somehow mysteriously govern the present. Clark Hull exemplified this
misconception when he said,
In its extreme form teleology is the name of the
belief that the terminal stage of certain environ-
mental -organismic interaction cycles somehow is at
the same time one of the antecendent determining
conditions which bring the behavior cycle about
(Hull, 1943, p. 26).
Such an account is very strange in that action may be done for a
purpose and yet that purpose may never be achieved. For example, it
has happened on a number of occasions that I have shouted at a stray
dog as he was scrounging in the garbage, with the purpose of frighten-
ing him away only to find that the dog pays no attention to my antics.
Yet, whether or not the goal was realized in no way invalidates the
explanation of my behavior in terms of the stated purpose. The con-
fusion arises from failing to distinguish what is potential, the goal
7in mind, from what is actual, the concrete result of the ensuing ac-
tions. Obviously, of the two, the former proposition is the only
logical and coherent meaning of purpose.
1.1.3 REDUCTIONISM
Reduction in general denotes the explanation of one set of
statements, "A" by another set "B" with explanation here referring to
the logical derivation of all the statements in the set "A" from the
set "B." This logical derivation may be effected in various ways,
thus yielding different types of reduction. Here, two senses of re-
duction must be distinguished, strict -reduction and empirical re-
duction (Boden, 1972, p. 53).
In the case of strict reduction, the two sets of statements,
A and B are totally equivalent. That is, A and B must be identical in
meaning, denote one and the same general domain and refer to the same
aspect of reality. To show that psychology is strictly reducible to
physiology would be to show that the meaning of every purposive state-
ment is contained within the meaning of a physiological statement.
Thus, when a behaviorist claims that purposive accounts are mere short-
hand for physiological ones, he implies that physiological accounts can
express everything that is expressed by purposive accounts. As Boden
points out, "The result is that a strict reduction of Science A to
science B renders the vocabulary of A logically redundant or superflu-
ous [Ibid., p. 54]. M
Empirical reduction, on the other hand, relies upon factual
rather than logical isomorphism between the two sets of statements
8concerned. This, in effect, means that the two sets of statements, A
and B, refer to the same spatio-temporal event but to different aspects
of that event so that the theoretical terms have identifiably different
meanings. Consequently, the vocabulary of "A" could not be dispensed
with once the reduction had been effected, without losing sight of the
descriptive properties and explanatory relations expressed by it.
A case in point is the explanation of a scientific theory or
a set of experimental principles (such as fluid mechanics) formulated
from some other more "basic’' domain. Thus, the laws and principles of
thermodynamics can provide a full description of the sufficient and
necessary conditions for the phenomenon described by the laws of fluid
mechanics, and in terns of causal conditions required, they can be fully
accounted for within the more basic domain. Put another way, all the
laws of the less basic science must be logically derivable from the
theoretical premises of the more basic science. However, the value of
the less basic science presumably lies in its power to explain in
greater parsimony the relations existing among various conditions
caused by activity describable in terms of the more fundamental science.
There are few psychologists left who would admit to being
strict reductionists, but empirical reductionism is a very common
characteristic of contemporary psychological theory. The critical
factor common to both versions of reductionism is their position on
the issue of causation: The causal principles of the more basic sci-
ence should he necessary and sufficient conditions to explain the
causally efficacious events observed in the categories of the less
basic science.
9With this rather abstract definition of reductionism in
hand, we can now proceed to examine its particular applications with-
in the field of psychology, i.e., the widely accepted notion that
psychological processes are in principle explainable in mechanistic
terms.
Nagel distinguishes the three general criteria for mechani-
cal explanation as follows:
(a) Its ultimate premises assert that the time rate
of change in the momentum of a physical system is a
function of the magnitude and direction of the forces
acting on it. (b) The direction of the change in
momentum of a body is along the direction of the im-
pressed force; and the direction of such a change
associated with several forces is along the direction
of the vectorial sum of the component forces, (c)
The forces are specified exclusively in terms of the
spatio-temporal magnitudes and relations of bodies, a
universal constant, and a number of constant co-
efficients (assumed to be listed exhaustively) whose
values depend on the individual properties of a given
system of bodies [Nagel, 1961, p. 170].
Obviously, the breadth of what may be included under
mechanistic explanations depends in part upon the kinds of force-
constants, and co-efficients allowed under the third condition. Ex-
planations appealing to force components specifiable in terms of
Newtonian equations and of various other functions such as mass, elec-
tric charge, magnetic flux, viscosity, can be included in this category.
For present purposes, as far as psychological theory is concerned, we
may accept Boden's summary that "The mechanist viewpoint maintains
that other scientific explanations are reducible to explanations that
are admittedly physico-chemical in nature [Boden, 1972, p. 38]." In
terms of the Aristotelian categories we might rephrase this statement
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by saying that the mechanistic view seeks to explain behavior complete-
ly in terms of efficient causes and in fact regards any reference to
final (teleological) causes as ipso faoto unscientific. As we shall
see, this postion implicitly denies the possibility of causal influen-
ces attributable to subjective psychological categories such as "con-
sciousness," "foresight," "purpose," etc., while the logical extension
of this is an irreconcilable dualism between mind and body.
Two theories representing the major trends in modem psych-
ology, namely, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, are both subject to the
criticism of effecting an "unwarranted reductionism" in theorizing that
for scientific purposes, mental processes can be exhaustively explained
in terms of their correlative physio-chemical processes. As Whitehead
muses on this incredible paradox,
Many a scientist has patiently designed experiments for
the purpose of substantiating his belief that animal
operations are motivated by no purposes. He has perhaps
spent his spare time in writing articles to prove that
human beings are as other animals, so that purpose is
a category irrelevant for the explanation of bodily
activities, his own activities included. Scientists
animated by the purpose of proving that they are pur-
poseless constitute an interesting subject for study
(Whitehead, 1929a, p. 16).
1.1.4 REDUCTIONISM IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis conceptualizes human behavior as primarily
motivated by unconscious drives, the specific modes of which are estab-
lished physiologically (or physico-chemically) in early childhood and
which determine resulting behavior throughout the individual’s life.
Freud’s materialistic bias was never more clearly stated than in his
first major theoretical work, Project for a Scientific Psychology
:
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The intent of this project is to furnish us with
a psychology which shall be a natural science; its
aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes
as quantitatively determined states of specifiable
material particles and so to make them plain and
void of contradiction (Freud, quoted in Shepard,
1972 ) .
v
Freud went on to explain that psychical processes were to
be considered as a quanta of energy which were subject to the laws of
motion and that the material particles were the "neurons" in the brain.
These neurons, each one of which Freud believed to be a distinct cell
devoid of connections with other cells, were the building
-block
,
functional units of the nervous system. The inherent character of
these cells is that they had a tendency to discharge energy. It was
from this basic character of neurons that Freud derived the notion of
primary and secondary processes. The primary function or process of
the neuronic system was the discharge of neuronic energy which had been
generated by the internal needs of the body; hunger, etc. Conversely,
there was also the need to store enough of this energy to meet the de-
mands of life- -hence, secondary functions and processes. These
secondary processes were seen as the prime mechanism of self preserva-
tion. Although later he eventually abandoned this attempt to directly
reduce psychology to neurology, Freud still relied on the same theo-
retical framework in his explanations. Lowry's review of some of
Freud's purely clinical speculations reveals that his analysis re-
mained physicalistic and retained a materialist metaphysical frame-
work; "libido" and "eros" were substituted in the place of "neuronic
inertia" but they were assumed to perform basically the same physio-
chemical function as the latter
.
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Although psychoanalysis is attributed with the vice of over-
statement, i.e.
,
extending a system of explanation beyond the relatively
narrow range of conditions over which its assumptions are met, Freud
himself tended to be quite modest in referring to the focus of his
theories, "I have always confined myself to the ground floor and base-
ment of the edifice called man [Frankl, 1969].” And elsewhere, "Psycho-
analysis grew on a narrowly restricted base [Peters, 1958].” In fact,
Peters (Ibid.) convincingly argues that Freud originally intended his
theory of the unconscious to be used only to explain instances of de-
viation from normal purposive actions.
1.1.5 REDUCTIONISM IN BEHAVIORISM
Behaviorism was predicated upon the assumption that behavior
of even the most complex order could be understood by reducing it to an
elaborate accumulation of reflex habits that have been stamped into the
central nervous system as a result of past instances in which such hab-
its were strengthened or reinforced through practice and/or some reward.
For example, according to the behavioristic model, a person's
actions should be totally explainable in terms of reflexes and variants
of these reflexes and should be directly and precisely traceable to the
particular characteristics of the external stimuli conditions. As
William James expressed it, the current of life which runs in our eyes
and our ears, is meant to run out at our hands, feet, and lips.
However, a problem begins to emerge when one tries to apply
this model to life as it is experienced. It turns out that the sensor)
data coming into the nervous system cannot by themselves explain even the
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simplest forms of emotional behavior (excluding of course the very
limited number of highly specific reflexes displayed by nearly all
physiologically normal humans), yet, many psychologists still maintain
that objects and stimuli are the primitive arousers of action. But
what are these "objects" and "stimuli?" James points out that the ob-
ject is the total situation on which the reaction of the person is made.
Thus it is not the stimulus hut the situation as conceived
,
and mainly
those elements in the situation that strike one at the moment as being
vitally important. As such, the total situation, far more than an ad-
ditive inventory of sense receptor impulses, is a product of one’s
goals and intentions as they relate to the immediate circumstances.
James furnishes the example of the bear advancing toward us. "The same
bear may excite us to either fight or flight," he says, "according to
whether our intention or idea is of his killing us or of us killing
him [James, 1920, p. 350]." The situation, then, is a function of
one's plans, desires, and purposes, elements irreducible to a col-
ligation of receptor-effector arcs.
1.1.6 MATERIALISM, AND THE FALLACY
OF MISPLACED CONCRETENESS
Returning to the original theme, both behaviorism and psycho-
analysis in their deeply ingrained reductionistic methods assume the
doctrine which Whitehead termed "scientific materialism,"
A doctrine which presupposes the ultimate fact of an
irreducible brute matter or material spread throughout
space in a flux of configurations. In itself, such a
material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It does
what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by
external relations which do not spring from the nature
of its being (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 8).
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Such an assumption, Whitehead maintains, is an example of
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness whereby deceptively abstract con-
cepts (such as inert universal matter made of solid, impervious atoms)
are erroneously regarded as concrete matters of fact. The result is
that the full richness of concrete reality as it is disclosed in dir-
ect experience is largely overlooked, thus prompting us down the path
of ultimate contradiction for our reasonings lack concordance with
the structure of reality. A critical examination of the basis of sci-
entific materialism from the perspective of the modem physical sciences
will be reserved for a later point in the present discussion.
The issue at present is the exclusion of the notion of final
cause by the materialist reductionist. Does this exclusion create an
impasse in the quest for adequacy of scientific understanding? The an-
swer can be posed quite simply in the form of a question: Why has the
trend of evolution been upward?
1.1.7 FINAL CAUSE AND MENTALITY
IN BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
"The universe as construed solely in terms of the efficient
causation of purely physical interconnections presents a sheer, in-
soluble contradiction [Whitehead, 1925a, p. 25] ." This is because the
laws and principles of physics and chemistry are bounded by the second
law of thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics state that the
universal tendency of energy systems is to progress from higher,
complex energy states to lower, simpler energy states, a tendency
exemplified in the slow decay of physical nature. Commonly referred
to as the "law of entropy," the principle is by itself absolutely
in-
capable of accounting for the appearance and evolution of the
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phenomenon of life, which by its very nature is a counter-trend to the
persistent entropy exhibited by non-living entities. Yet the orthodox
doctrines of physiology stipulate that the operation of living bodies
be explained solely in terms of the physical system of physical cate-
gories. Physiology has failed to explain within its own domain the
most fundamental properties of its subject matter: Life.
Here, then, is a crucial challenge to the logical, as well
as empirical adequacy of reductionism within biology, a science pre-
sumably much more successful than psychology in elucidating the physico-
chemical underpinnings of life-processes. An increasing number of bi-
ologists, among them Waddington (1962), and Wright (1967), recognize
the untenability of maintaining a reductionist approach, the principles
of which are based exclusively upon a physical system which is itself
internally inconsistent.
This is not to say that life disobeys the laws of in-
organic chemistry. No reactions between the material components of a
living body yet observed, infringe upon or contravene the physical
laws governing the processes of inorganic material. Rather, the dis-
pute is that such principles alone cannot account for the emergence of
highly complex organic systems exhibiting a tendency towards greater
complexity, contrast, improbability and, it should be added, greater
control over their environment. Whitehead concludes,
The moral to be drawn from the general survey of the
physical universe with its operations viewed in terms
of purely physical laws, and neglected so far as they
are inexpressible in such terms, is that we have omit-
ted some general counter-agency (Ibid.).
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On this very same point, Whitehead takes issue with 20^^
Century Darwinism which seeks to explain evolution of life in terms of
two principles
--summarized as follows,
What do we mean by twentieth-century Darwinism and
what do we mean by the synthetic theory of evolution?
I think its essence can be characterized by two pos-
tulates: 1) That all events that lead to the pro-
duction of new genotypes, such as mutations, re-
combination and fertilization are essentially random
and not in any way whatsoever finalistic, and 2) that
the order in the organic world, manifested in the
numerous adaptations of organisms to the physical
and biotic environment, is due to the ordering effect
of natural selection (Ernst Mayr, quoted in Waddington,
1962, p. 85).
The essential meaning of this theory is encapsulated in the
phrase, "survival of the fittest.” There is no quarrel with the ob-
servation that in the struggle for existence the fittest eliminate the
less fit; the problem is whether fitness for survival is identical with
what Whitehead calls "the best exemplification of the Art of Life" (or
the historical tendency of evolution to result in higher forms of life)
.
Whitehead points out that, in fact, life itself, especially the higher
forms, are increasingly fragile and comparatively deficient in survival
value. Inorganic matter endures for millions of years and the lowest
forms of life, micro-organisms such as virus, amoeba, and simple multi-
cellular organisms like hydra, moss and lichen exhibit far greater
abilities in adapting to adverse circumstances than do most higher or-
ganisms. Obviously, the struggle for existence and survival ability
has had something to say in determining which species manage to persist
and which finally perish. But this struggle in itself does not explain
the emergence of such complex organisims with fragile survival power in
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the first place. Put another way, survival of the fittest may be
necessary but it is not a sufficent condition to have occasioned the
evolution of life.
Whitehead cites another characteristic of life unaccounted
for by Darwinian theory. The upward trend of evolution has been ac-
companied not by an increase in the organism' s passive adaptation to
the environment but by a growth of the converse relation. The higher
forms of life demonstrate an increasing tendency to adapt the environ-
ment to themselves for their own purposes. Hence the appearance of
nest building in insects, birds and vertebrates, and the hunting be-
havior of higher animals. Rather than waiting for nutrients to enter
their vicinity, animals actively search out, chase, catch, and masti-
cate their food. This tendency to modify the environment has reached
its most pronounced expression in mankind and exhibits an extraordinary
degree of variety and novelty.
Whitehead's thesis is that the explanation of life's up-
ward trend and the associated increase in the capacity to modify the
environment is a three- fold tendency inhering in the impulse of life,
(i) to live, (ii) to live well, (iii) to live better .
In fact the art of life is first to be alive, secondly ,
to be alive in a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire
an increase in satisfaction (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 8).
The first condition accounts for the Darwinian platform as
described earlier, but the second and third conditions hold particular
significance for the present effort to ascertain the role of teleology
or final causation in the function of life. What these added con-
ditions imply, especially the third, is that life is self-creative,
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i.c.
,
its activities tend toward the production of novelty and that
this novelty is not random or anarchic but emerges within the order of
fom; ''form," Whitehead says, "realized in potential but not in fact."
The urge towards such forms and the refinement of activity
with respect to them is expressed in the various sorts of appetitions
(goal -directed tendencies) common to living organisms: such appetitions
exemplify final causation towards ideal ends which lie outside the mere
physical tendency. Whitehead provides the illustration, "In the burning
desert there is appetition towards water, whereas the physical tendency
is towards the increased dryness of the animal body [Ibid.]." Here,
then, is a most primitive manifestation of mentality- -the ingression of
an ideal yet unattained into the concrete functioning of a system. Un-
less one is willing to assert that the operations of a living body are
vacuous and indistinguishable from the processes of inorganic matter,
i.e., that there is no intrinsic difference between 150 pounds of car-
bon, oxygen, hydrogen, plus a few trace minerals, and a human being,
then each organism must be conceived as attaining an end for itself.
This mentality does not presuppose consciousness but it does
assert that each entity subjectively experiences and determines its com-
ponent processes of becoming in terms of some form which is its "sub-
jective aim" or purpose. An example of this appetition in the activi-
ties of the living plant is the elaborate mechanisms underlying the
tropistic responses of root and leaf systems. If a plant seedling is
turned horizontally, one may observe within a few hours that the growing
zone of the root bends until the root tip becomes directed vertically
downward, and the growing zone of the stem bends vertically upward.
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Other orientation responses are the curvatures of stems and other
organs of climbing plants in response to contact, and the growth of
roots toward moisture. Furthermore, when a plant is grown in the
dark, chlorophyll does not foim and the plant remains pale yellowish
white; the leaves remain small and rudimentary. But instead of
growth activity slowing down in this nutritionally deprived state, the
growth of inter -modal cells in the stem accelerates to a rate many
times more than normal so that the plant soon becomes very tall and
spindly. This process is called ’'etiolation” and is a response, the
function or purpose of which is to restore the normal pattern of de-
velopment (Ray, 1963). It enables a buried or heavily shaded shoot
to elongate rapidly unencumbered with bulky, and under the circum-
stances, useless leaves until it emerges and reaches the light. How
can this phenomena be understood without reference to the realization
of potential (ideal) ends towards which these processes are directed?
Yet, there are two basic arguments put forth by physio-
logists for their refusal to consider final cause as a legitimate
category of explanation (Boden, 1972; Whitehead, 1929a). The first
is that the question of teleology lies outside the scope of the sci-
entific method which involves tracing the persistence of physical and
chemical principles throughout the physiological operations. But as
Whitehead points out, it is absurd to limit a problem by reason of a
method of attack. The object is to understand the operations of a
living organism. Harry Harlow and Wolfgang Kohler, among others, have
shown there is clear evidence that certain activities of the animal
organism depend upon the foresight of ends and the conative disposition
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to attain them. The emminent geneticist and anthropologist Theodosius
Dobzhansky simply concludes that the adaptive value of foresight or
forethought is too evident to need demonstration (Dobzhansky, 1962).
The second reason for this aversion towards final cause is
that teleological explanations can, if caution is not exercised, lead
to facile explanations in which a problem is improperly dismissed by
merely assigning it a final cause. The fact that such hazards are a
real possibility, however, is insufficient reason for ignoring the
problem. "Even if heads be weak;, the problem remains."
1.1.8 METAPHYSICS OF SUBSTANCE: THE
BIFURCATION OF MATTER AND MIND
A satisfactory system of explanation must elucidate the inter-
weaving of final and efficient causation, for these two tendencies exist
together in the world. The arbitrary bifurcation of final and efficient
cause into two distinct, independent categories lies at the root of a
misconceived mind-body dualism. On the other hand, if one can success-
fully explain how the two modes of causation inter- link with one another
in the natural world, then perhaps a clearer perspective of the relation-
ship between mind and body can be achieved.
Descartes conceived the duality between mind and body in
terms of substances \ bodily substance and mental substance. These two
kinds of substances were presumed to be independent of one another in-
sofar as the operations of bodily substance were completely determined
by mechanical laws and contingencies while mental substance behaved ac-
cording to a parallel set of laws governing mental mechanics. This
absolute separation leads inevitably to a conception of bodily sub-
stances which possess no intrinsic value or qualities above and
beyond
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the inorganic material of which they are composed. Theoretically,
within such a system, there is no way to distinguish between nature
dead or nature alive, a distinction persistently at the forefront of
immediate experience. The logical extension of this substance-based
metaphysics ultimately leads to incoherence. Whitehead's observation
that incoherence arises from a contradiction in first principles would
suggest a critical analysis of the validity of substance as the ul-
timate irreducible reality of either the physical or mental universe.
The lineage of the substance notion is directly traceable to the ma-
terialist doctrine mentioned earlier, the severe limitations of which
Whitehead sharply criticized. Yet this doctrine of "continuous stuff
with permanent attributes, enduring without differentiation and retain-
ing its self-identity through any stretch of time however small or
large" has been fundamentally persistent in western metaphysics even
to the present, despite the fact that several major advances in modem
physics have decisively refuted its foundations. Referring to this
persistence, Whitehead summarizes.
The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining
persistent qualities, either essentially or accidently,
expresses an abstraction useful for many purposes of life.
But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement
of the nature of things, it proves mistaken. It arose
from a mistake and has never succeeded in any of its
applications. But it has had one success, it has en-
trenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and
in metaphysics (Whitehead, 1938, p. 146).
As was mentioned earlier, this root doctrine of material-
ism, that substance is the ultimate actural reality, was justified in
terms of classical Eighteenth Century physics. However, new evidence
has accrued during the last 60 to 70 years which shattered once and
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for all the classical notion of stable, immutable matter.
1.1.9 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATION OF 20th CENTURY PHYSICS:
SUBSTANCE REVISITED
The first direct challenge came from the work of De Broglie
and Bohr in their development of the quantum mechanical model of the
th
atom. In the late 19 Century, with the aid of the diffraction
grating, a device allowing spectral analysis of light, serious defic-
iencies were exposed in the classical planetary model of the atom.
The anomaly first appeared when the observed spectral characteristics
of hydrogen gas were unaccountable, in terms of the classical model.
The classical model predicts that (1) the hydrogen atoms are unstable
_o
(with half life of 10 sec.), and (2) that they emit continuous radi-
ated spectrums. However, the diffraction grating showed that hydro-
gen atoms are stable and that they radiate only at discrete frequen-
cies or wavelengths (Capek, 1961). Bohr's model, put forth in 1913,
did not include the wave nature of particles which was recognized in
1924 by De Broglie. It was De Broglie's stroke of genius to realize
that the electron moves around the nucleus in an integral number of
wavelengths. This insight, along with the "Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle," (which states that the location of extremely samll particles
in time- space, such as neutrons, electrons, and protons moving at high
velocities, can never be precisely determined- -only approximated), re-
quire a major redefinition of matter as a series of occasions, or vi-
brations, in which the unit of identity is the enduring pattern. These
patterns are resolvable into subordinate chains of successive activity
in which waves or periods of energetic activity, instead of
solid inert
matter, become the fundamental units.
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The metaphysical extension of these paradigmatic revisions
in the foundations of modem physical science is that the final reality
of things is their existence as a process: Specifically, process ex-
pressing foim--form as the structure or pattern which the process cre-
ates and recreates.
For the modem view process, activity and change are
the matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing.
Each instant is only a way of grouping matters of
fact. Thus since there are no instants conceived as
simple primary entities, there is no nature at an in-
stant. Thus all interrelations of matter of fact
involve transition in their essence. All realization
involves implication in the creative advance
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 146).
The redefinition of reality as process introduces the
factor of potentiality as an indispensible ingredient to the existence
of an actual entity. This is because process implies transition, con-
stant becoming: An actual entity is always in the process of becoming
something and that something is itself as potential yet unrealized.
Admittedly, the self-expression of a hydrogen atom is rather limited
and in large part merely involves a reiteration of the same form in a
new time- space context. But this picture of matter is a long way from
the old conception of inert corpuscular substance.
Further insights into the organismic properties of atomic
function and structure is afforded by the Pauli exclusion principle,
the implications of which are as far-reaching as De Broglie's dis-
coveries. This law describes the total atom in a way that cannot
conceivably be derived from laws concerning individual electrons and
asserts that no two electrons in an atom can have exactly the
same
quantum states; quantum states take into account the electron
s energy.
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angular momentum, orientation and spin (Barbour, 1966). Thus, when a
new electron enters a molecule, its functional character is influenced
by the presence of those electrons already within the system so that
the state of each one will be unique. This discovery makes even more
explicit the requirement of modem physical theory to analyze the
system of things as a whole. Margenau's assessment cuts to the core
of the issue.
The essence of mechanistic reasoning is seen to cluster
around two beliefs; first, that entities are divisable
into parts, and second that these parts are localizable
in space and time. . . . Prior to [the exclusion principle]
all theories had affected the individual nature of the so-
called ’'parts”; the new principle regulated their social
behavior. With respect to the single particle it had
nothing to say. . . . It is as though here, for the first time,
physics had discovered within its own precincts, a purely
social law, a law that is simple in its basic formulation
and yet immense in its collective effects. Mechanistic
reasoning, already far behind, has gone out of sight as
a result of this latest advance. ... In the Pauli prin-
ciple is a way of understanding why entities show in their
togetherness laws of behavior different from the laws
which govern them in their isolation. The emergence of
new properties on composition is a rather general phenom-
enon in modem physics and owes its occurrence to the
exclusion principle (Margenan, 1950, p. 442).
What are the metaphysical implications of these transformed
fundamentals in modem physical thought? Obviously, caution must be ex-
ercised in attempting to generalize patterns and relations from one
level of analysis to another. Failure to do so is sure to result in
the same kinds of erroneous overstatements that locked scientific thought
in the stifling grip of meterialism. For example, some psychologists,
among them McDougall, have seized upon the indeterministic implications
of quantum mechanics to bolster their claim that human action
is
indeterminant by the laws of physics. Along the same line, recent
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neuro-physiological research suggests that the response in individual
nerve cells to stimulation is stochastic, or indeterminate, in that it
requires statistical analysis in terms of probability of firing (Altman,
1965) . Any meaningful statement of the relation between an individual
neural response and a particular stimulus is thus impossible. The
indeterminacy rests on spontaneous random activity of the synapses.
But this argument, that indeterminacy at the quantum
physical level directly implies or is responsible for indeterminacy at
the psychological level, is patently untenable. For one thing, the
factor of quantal indeterminacy becomes insignificant when one is con-
sidering large populations of anything, whether it be atoms, or nerve
cells. Secondly, the argument is covertly reductioniStic in asserting
that psychology individuality can be accounted for and reduced to
indeterminacy at the level of physico-chemical processes. The fallacy
in this line of reasoning has led more perceptive writers such as
Boden to conclude, "The issue of indeterminism in physics is therefore
totally irrelevant to the psychology of action, unless there are reasons
for believing that physical indeterminacy may result in the upsetting
of specifically purposive behavior [Boden, 1972, p. 334]."
Unfortunately, Boden closes the books too early and it
took not a psychologist but a physicist like Barbour to see the more
substantive meaning:
Atomic indeterminacy and human freedom are not . . .
directly related to each other, and occur on very
different levels. They are both examples of "weak
causality" in which a set of potentialities is
determined .... Individual events display some
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unpredictability whereas exact laws are the result
of large numbers. Insofar as man is a collection of
particles, atomic indeterminacy is lost in statis-
tical regularities. But insofar as human experience
is an integrated event, it displays a new type of
unpredictability- -not derivative from atomic inde-
terminacy, but from its organization at a higher
level. Perhaps coordinated individual events, at
various levels, have multiple potentialities though
only at higher levels is there freedom (Barbour,
1966, p. 314).
In summary, there are perhaps three main implications for
metaphysics and psychology to be drawn from the study of modem
physics, 1) activity and process are the salient characteristics of the
world described by quantum physics, 2) this process exhibits definite
structure and tends toward the continual realization of forms or po-
tentialities, and 3) the nature of a system of process or entities is
such that the system as a whole constitutes an identity which governs
the participation of component elements or processes of the system in a
manner unique to the system and unpredicted by these components as in-
dividual events. Thus, the relationship between a whole and its parts
obliterates any meaning that might be attached to the possibility of
explaining an organismic whole in terms of its parts, a possibility
upon which the reductionist ultimately must base the validity of his
approach.
1.2 ORGANIC METAPHYSICS AND PURPOSE
1.2.1 ONTOLOGICAL STRATIFICATION:
A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF CAUSALITY
The intent of this somewhat involved excursion into selected
issues in modem physics and biology was to see whether a set of basic re
lationships observed within these fields might suggest a
general pattern
27
of analysis applicable to other fields of inquiry particularly the
problem of purpose in psychology. Although three such general prin-
ciples were offered in the preceding paragraph, the next important
task is to determine if these general observations can be formalized
into an abstract morphology that will provide some insight into the
counter- tendency which converts the downward decay of mere physical
tendencies into the upsurge of living nature; a counter-tendency
culminating in the purposive fabric of human life.
The work of Michael Polanyi, a physicist who came to
psychology with a deep interest in the pervasive issues and problems
that surround the personal activities of human understanding, is an
impressive response to this need. In terms of the present discussion,
there is one Polanyian notion that has particular relevance to the sub-
ject of final cause and purpose: The concept of boundary conditions
in the operation of hierarchical structures. Probably the easiest way
to grasp the idea is to provide an illustration of its application, in
this case the example of a machine:
My watch tells me the time. It is kept going by its
mainspring, uncoiling under the control of the hair
spring and balance wheel; this turns the hands which
tell the time. Such are the operational principles
of a watch, which define its construction and work-
ing. The principles cannot be defined by the laws
of nature. No parts of a watch are formed by the
natural equilibration of matter. They are arti-
ficially shaped and sagaciously connected to per-
form their function in telling the time. This is
their meaning: to understand a watch is to under-
stand what it is for and how it works. The laws
as inanimate nature are indifferent to this pur-
pose. They cannot determine the working of a watch
any more than the chemistry or physics of printers
ink can determine the contents of a book (Polanyi,
quoted in Greene, 1969, p. 153).
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Viewed as separate entities, the parts of the watch con-
tain no reference to the mechanical engineering principles coordinating
the interrelation of these parts as a device which records and cali-
brates the passage of time. Furthermore, these engineering principles
are not specified by the laws of physics, i.e.
,
they cannot be de-
rived from mere physical laws. However, at the same time, these prin-
ciples depend upon the physical laws for their operation. As Polanyi
explains it, "The particulars viewed in themselves are controlled by
the laws of inanimate nature; while viewed jointly, they are controlled
by the operational principles of the machine [Ibid., p. 154]." It is
important to emphasize that these sets of principles are quite distinct
from each other, yet they operate together in determining the opera-
tion of the watch. It is the nature of the interaction of these two
sets of principles which the concept of boundary control seeks to il-
lumine. The laws of physics expressly leave open certain variabil-
ities of the system. The range of these variabilities (or potential-
ities) constitutes the boundary conditions of physics. Now, the
operational principles of the machine control the conditions left
undetermined by the boundaries and so do not violtate the laws of
physics and chemistry which operate within these boundaries.
Polanyi cites the structure of speech as another instance,
quite different from the machine example, of the same idea at work.
The first and lowest level consists of phonemes, letters and sounds;
the second, the combination of phonemes into words; the third, struc
turing of words into sentences; the fourth involves the working of
sentences into a style; and finally, the fifth level, the composition
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of the text. Here again, the boundaries left open by each lower level
are determined by and operate under the control of the next higher
level, etc. For instance, the phonemes one utters are shaped by a vo-
cabulary; the vocabulary is formed into sentences according to the
rules of grammar; the sentences are in turn subjected to the dictates
of style. And style is subservient to the intensional meaning of the
ideas composing the text.
In this example, there are multiple (as opposed to just
two) levels of control determining the content under consideration
(speech). And again, the operations of the higher levels cannot be
accounted for by the laws governing the subsidiary levels. As Polanyi
indicates
,
You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you
cannot derive grammar from a vocabulary; a correct
use of grammar does not account for good style; and
a good style does not provide the content for a good
piece of prose (Ibid, p. 155).
This principle of stratified levels of boundary control is
easily transposed to the analysis of living beings. Every living or-
ganism relies, before all else, upon the laws of physics and chemistry
for its operation. But each successive advance upwards on the evolu-
tionary ladder introduces a new set of conditions which transform these
fundamental inorganic events into an increasingly complex, integrated,
and novel expression of the rising tide of life.
The vegetative function harnesses the entropy inherent in
inorganic chemical process to the end of constructing and duplicating
extremely large organic molecules. This function requires the accumu-
lation and utilization of vast quantities of potential energy
within
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the system. As was mentioned earlier, such a process cannot be
accounted for exclusively in terms of the principles of inorganic
chemistry. The highly complex, intricate and controlled series of
chemical reactions involved in respiration and photosynthesis ex-
plicitly demonstrate the control exerted by a higher set of principles.
In this case, there is the ingression of vegetable forms or potential-
ities over the unrealized possibilities left undetermined by inorganic
mineral processes.
Animal life adds on an additional set of boundaries or
dimensions to those possibilities left open by the boundaries of vega-
tative survival. The specialized forms of composition characterizing
animal life exhibit greater variability of functioning afforded by the
capacities of sense perception and muscular action. The principles
governing muscular action leave open their integration into innate
patterns of behavior which provide a corresponding increase in the
ability to manipulate and exploit the surrounding environment. In the
case of higher animals and particularly man, these innate patterns are
open to being shaped by intelligence and finally, the boundaries of
intelligent actions are molded by the conscious purposes and aesthetic
decisions of the individual.
The stratified levels referred to above are crude and in-
complete --there are many other possible modes of ontological strati-
fication, even within each level described; for example, the coordina-
tion of neuro-muscular activities, eyeball motion, lens adjustment, and
control of the iris when tracking a moving object. But such examples
are not central to the point, which is merely to emphasize that
such
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relations as are described by the principle of boundary control and
ontological stratification do exist and that "The higher principles
which characterize a comprehensive entity cannot be defined in terms
of the laws that apply to the parts themselves [Polanyi, 1964]."
The laws of physics and chemistry do not ascribe the genetic code con-
tained in the sequence of base pairing in the DNA molecule. In fact,
DNA can function as a code only if its order is not due to the forces
of physico-chemical potential energy.
Likewise, the genetic code fails to account for the trans-
mission of faculties such as consciousness, purpose and aesthetic in-
tuitions. As Polanyi puts it, "It is as if the faculty of vision were
to be made more intelligible to a person bom blind, by a chapter on
sense physiology [Ibid.] ." From this, he asserts that DNA evokes and
provides the foundation for higher , subtler levels of existence rather
than determining these levels:
Mind itself includes an ascending sequence of principles.
Its appetitive and intellectual workings are transcended
by principles of responsibility. Thus the growth of man
to the highest levels is seen to take place along a se-
quence of rising principles. And we see this evolution-
ary hierarchy built as a sequence of boundaries, each
aiming at higher achievements by harnessing the strata
below them, to which they themselves are not reducible.
These boundaries control a rising series of relations
which we can understand only by being aware of their
constituent parts subsidiarily, as bearing upon
the upper
level which they serve (Polanyi, 1969, p. 238]
.
At this juncture, we are in a position to consider
a
resolution of the problem of purpose and the
relation between mind and
body in terms of boundary conditions operating
within stratified
structures
.
1 . 2.2 MIND AND BODY IN
ORGANIC PROCESSES
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Whitehead also makes the observation that organismic processes
seem to possess a dual nature, but he approaches the problem from a much
larger frame of reference and thereby suggests a further clue. For
Whitehead, every occasion of experience is dipolar; it contains a mental
aspect or pole and a physical pole. He defines mentality as "The ex-
perience of forms of definiteness in their disconnection from any phy-
sical experience, but with an abstract evaluation of what they can con-
tribute to such experience [Whitehead, 1929a, p. 32]." Such forms
Whitehead likens to the Platonic ideals and the Medieval universals.
They can be expressed in more modem terms as the potentialities of
expression open to an organism.
In the real world, these potentialities or forms continually
ingress upon and determine the course of the process as constituted by
whatever physical data are involved. These forms provide continuity in
that the identity of the immediate occasion is linked with occasions
that are part of the organism's past and unrealized future. From the
standpoint of the various levels of ontological stratification found_in
the evolutionary hierarchy considered earlier, each new level adds
its
potential forms for realization to those of the lower level as a
new
set of boundary conditions. Thus, the boundary conditions
are equiva-
lent to the ideal potentialities of the system. By the
time we reach
the human organism the potential fornis of expression
are incredibly
vast so that novelty of expression becomes the
predominant activity.
Thus
,
the conceptual entertainment of unrealized
possibility emerges
as a major factor in human mentality. For the lower
forms of existence
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the realm of potential is more restricted and consequently mental ex-
perience is much less intense, becoming negligible among inorganic en-
tities.
But this does not mean that the higher levels of life are
altogether absent in the earlier stages of evolution. They may be
present in traces well before they emerge as prominent characteristics.
Along the same lines as Whitehead, Polanyi asserts that, "Evolution may
be seen then as a progressive intensification of the higher principles
of life. This is what we witness in the development of the embryo and
of the growing child, processes akin to evolution [Whitehead, 1925, pp.
148-149]."
Thus the notions of mind and body (efficient and final
cause) are no longer forever irresolvable, dismembered aspects of an
entity, but can now be seen as interwoven principles which operate
jointly in the advancing process of life. Mind and body are a way of
describing the characteristic relation between these two sets of
principles. Whitehead seems to suggest this pattern in terms re
markably similar to Polanyi when he writes,
The effect of physiology was to put mind back into
nature. The neurologist traces first the effect of
stimuli along the bodily nerves, then integration at
nerve centers, and finally the rise of a projective
reference beyond the body. . . .In biochemistry, the
delicate adjustment of the chemical composition of
the parts to the preservation of the whole organism
is detected. Thus the mental experience is seen
as
the reflective experience of a totality, reporting
for itself what it is in itself as one unit of
occurrence. This unit is the integration of the sum
of its partial happenings, but it is not their
numerical aggregate. It has its own unity as an
event.
This total unity considered as an entity for
its own
sake, is the prehension into unity of the
patteme
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aspects of the universe of events (Ibid., p. 147).
This relation of part to whole does not start with the
special case of higher organisms. The selected examples considered
earlier, of atomic structure and plant physiology demonstrate that
this relation reigns throughout nature. Mentality is the experience
of organic form determining the confluence of many component sub-
processes as a single actual expression of that potential form. It
is a relation which contrasts the principles governing a society of
events as separate occurrences against the additional principles
characterizing those events as they occur subsidiarily in the cre-
ation of a complex unity.
This interpretation completely transcends the division of
mind and body into two different kinds of entities, each functioning
in accord with its own set of laws with neither having any bearing
upon the other. The arbitrary division of mind and body was neatly
consistent with a materialistic science within which every object was
seen to involve no more or no less than the mechanics (Newtonian) of
inert matter, a science unable to recognize the gradations of in-
trinsic value within the living universe.
The organismic position also avoids the empirically un-
tenable claim of modem reductionism, that mind is merely the osten-
sible reflection of strictly physical principles governing
chemical
processes in the body. Most important, as Whitehead
affirms, "It ends
the divorce of science from the affirmations of our
aesthetic and
ethical experiences.”
By recognizing mental activity as not just a legitimate
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but a necessary ingredient in the creation and continuation of life we
have now an internally consistent view of reality which embraces pur-
pose as a coherent element in the construction of experience.
1.3 SUMMARY OF FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND PROSPECTUS
1.3.1 OVERVIEW
In the preceding sections, several issues connected
with the problem of purpose have been deliberately framed in broad
general terms. The reason for this manner of approach stems from our
conviction that an adequate understanding of a scientific problem is
first of all a contextual concern; that is, it depends vitally upon
how the wider metaphysical assumptions (whether implicit or explicit)
define the problem. With respect to the present topic, psycholo-
gists are certainly talking about purposes and the fact that it is a
topic of debate testifies to its status as a real issue. But a more
thorough grasp of its significance has been hindered because it is
fundamentally alien to reductionist mechanistic systems of explanation.
Teleological causes always had to be imported from outside the system
on an ad hoc basis in order to rescue scientific psychology from
making absurdly narrow statements about human behavior. Because final
cause and purpose are not coherent categories within the established
scientific framework, they are lame notions reflective of the sharp
discontinuity between experimental-physiological psychology on the
one hand, and humanistic psychology on the other. This discontinuity
and incoherence, which has severely limited the opportunities for co-
operative enlightenment, stems from inadequate and conflicting 1 irst
principles. The present chapter attempts a redefinition of some
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crucial first principles in terns of organismic philosophy, assisted
by the epistemological insights of Polanyi. Unfortunately, these
principles are often interwoven with specific arguments and issues
from which the principles themselves were developed, thus making it
difficult to abstract the theoretical scheme. The following section
attempts just such a consolidation, an explicit condensed statement
of the formative elements underlying an organismic psychology of
volition.
1.3.2 PURPOSE, POTENTIALITY AND CONCRESCENCE:
THE HIERARCHY OF BOUNDARIES IN PROCESS
1. The final reality of any organism cannot be understood
apart from its form in the process of evolution.
2. This process, which Whitehead calls concrescence, in-
volves the coming together, the unification of subsidiary elements in
the creation of a single novel whole.
3. The creation of this novel entity transmutes the
character of the component elements. In the philosophy of organism,
transmutation is the operation whereby an aggregate of many elements is
constituted not as an aggregate or many, but as a unity (Whitehead,
1929b) . In transmutation the component elements acquire and express
new attributes or potentialities unrealizable outside the integrated
form in which they participate. This novel expression can be seen as
the influence of a new set of principles restructuring the boundary
conditions left open by the functional principles of the components as
a democratic aggregate.
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4. The nature of this higher grade, unifying control is de-
fined by the forms or potentialities analagous to the constellated
physical occasion. The subjectively felt contrast between these
forms as pure potentials and the actual occasion as given in the im-
mediate present, generates the experience of appetition in which the
forms become the final cause or subjective aim of the concrescence.
Whitehead’s explanation is straight to the point,
The physical inheritance [of every organism] is
essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction
partly conformed to, and partly introductory of, a
relevant novel contrast, but always introducing
emphasis, valuation and purpose. The integration
of the physical and mental side into a unity of
experience is a self- formation which is a process of
concrescence (Ibid., p. 165).
Suggesting here a relation between efficient and final
cause, Whitehead poses a contrast to the effect that something is
"alive when in some measure its reactions are inexplicable by any
tradition of pure physical inheritance [ibid., p. 159]." (For
Whitehead, explanation "by tradition" is merely another phraseology
for efficient cause.)
Thus a single occasion is alive when the subjective
aim which determines its process of concrescence
has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be
found in the inherited data of its primary phase [of
the concrescence] (ibid., p. 158).
Thus the connection between efficient and final cause is
found in the nature of concrescence. This central principle of organ
-
ismic philosophy expresses the fundamental character of reality as a
process. In the opening chapter of Process and Reality , Whitehead
asserts, "It lies in the nature of things that the many enter
into a
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complex unity [Ibid., p. 32]." Concrescence describes this advance
from disjunction to conjunction. Casting the theme in somewhat more
vivid language he writes,
Nature is never complete, it is always passing
beyond itself. Thus is the creative advance of
nature. The ’creative advance’’ [concrescence] is
the application of this ultimate principle of
creativity to each novel situation which it origi-
nates. . . .The creative process is rhythmic: It
swings from the publicity of many things to the
individual privacy; and it swings back from the
private ideal to the publicity of the objectified
individual. The former swing is dominated by the
efficient cause which is actual. The oneness of
the universe, and the oneness of each element in
the universe repeat themselves to the crack of
doom in the creative advance from creature to
creature (ibid., p. 347).
Whitehead differentiates concrescence into five phases.
The first, most primitive is the phase of conformal feelings; second,
is the phase of conceptual feelings; third, simple comparative feelings;
fourth, complex comparative feelings; and finally, the "satisfaction."
For the purpose of the present discussion it is unnecessary to con-
sider these phases in detail, but it is important to grasp the general
characteristics differentiating the later phases from the earlier ones.
Occasionally, Whitehead himself dispenses with the origi-
nal five phases and simply distinguishes between two stages, the re-
sponsive stage, and the supplemental stage. The responsive stage in
voIves the mere reception of data (physical feelings) . These data are
"nothing else than the actual world itself presented to the entity."
The supplementary phases introduce a) the mental experiences of
form or
potentiality (mental feelings), and b) the subsequent contrast (re-
ferred to above) of physical feelings with mental feelings.
The final
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aspects of the supplementary stage involve even more complex integra-
tions of both mental and physical feelings and each higher level of in-
tegration adds its elements of novelty and the role of mentality, the
inner teleological cause becomes more prominent.
Since subjective aim inheres in the mental feeling of
forms experienced as pure potential, it emerges in the more advanced
stages of concrescence. Although this process is common to all organ-
isms, the effects of the advanced supplemental stages are negligible
for micro-cosmic processes such as electrons, atoms and even the lowest
forms of biological process.
This last observation recalls Polanyi's contention (See
Section 1.2.2) that the higher levels of life are not altogether absent
in the earlier stages of evolution, that these levels may be present in
traces long before they become prominent. His assertion that evolution
may be seen as the progressive intensification of the higher principles
of life is corroborated by Whitehead. Hence it becomes feasible to
account for the lowest levels in terms of efficient external causes.
Not until the higher grades of life do the advanced supple-
mental stages become significant in determining the organism's functions.
In the case of man, the conceptual entertainment of unrealized pos-
sibilities- -vision and purpose giving rise to activity- -become the
central feature in experience. Indeed, for Whitehead, "The life of
a human being receives its worth, its importance, from the way in which
unrealized ideals shape its purposes and tinge its actions [Whitehead,
1938, p. 27]."
1.3.3 PURPOSE: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In much the same vein as Whitehead, Dobzhansky also has
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observed,
[Man] is able to form mental images of things and
situations which do not yet exist but which may be
found, brought about or constructed by his efforts.
Man can create in his imagination worlds different
from the actual one and can visualize himself in
these imaginary worlds (Dobzhansky, 1962, p. 338).
But beyond this, Dobzhansky cites the extraordinarily creative thrust
characterizing the appetitions of mankind,
The human nervous system possesses ’curious* and
profound hungers for many objects which are neither
meat nor drink, nor satisfiers of oxygen nor of sex
need, nor of maternal need, nor of any other more
obvious visceral demand (Ibid., p. 214).
He sees these hungers as "curious" because they are unpre-
dicted by a strictly utilitarian view of evolution. In other words,
they transcend the boundary conditions specified by principles of mere
biological survival. The human condition introduces a higher level of
mental experience wherein the subjective aim is dominated by the con-
crescence or integration of aesthetic contrasts. Hence, one finds in man
a sensitivity to beauty, and making or doing things that seem "beautiful"
for no other apparent purpose.
Although the evidences of aesthetic appetition and the im-
pulse to create and apprehend beauty are most noticeable in man,
Dobzhansky cites several instances in which animals seem to display
some degree of aesthetic sensitivity. He refers to a series of studies
by Reusch (1957) which convincingly suggests the presence of "proto-
aesthetic" phenomena in some mammals and birds. The animals were
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offered for play, without reward, a choice of six pieces of white card-
board with one of several different patterns printed on each: sym-
metrical versus assymmetrical
,
with or without rhythmic repetition of
constituent elements, and steady versus faltering lines. The animals
consistently preferred symmetrical and rhythmical patterns, and chose
figures with steady rather than faltering lines.
As an anthropologist searching for the evolutionary con-
text of aesthetic purpose, Dobzhansky detects both a phylogenetic and
ontogenetic relation between aesthetics and the emergence of play ac-
tivities. Among higher animals and especially man, play is so vital
that when it is restrained, development is markedly impaired. Play is
difficult to define precisely because its very nature is the produc-
tion of variety and the experience of novelty. Like aesthetics, its
activity is intrinsically rewarding. With reference to the universal
prominence of play in the human species, Thorpe writes,
There is indeed good reason for thinking that the
prolonged childhood of the human species . .
.
[has]
been of prime importance in the process of freeing
appetitive behavior from the primary needs. This
and man’s growing mastery of his environment have
been the essential steps, not only for play, but for
all those activities which transcend mere maintain-
ance and which underly the mental and spiritual
development of man; activities which though origi-
nating in play, have produced real advances in
knowledge and comprehension of the scheme of things,
and which may for all we know offer vistas of ad-
vance in the millenia to come compared to which our
present understanding will seem puny and infantile
in the extreme (Thorpe
,
1956)
.
In case it appears that the discussion has strayed some-
what from the original issue, i.e., the causal role of purpose in
human action, let it be emphasized that the anthropological observation
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on play and aesthetics illustrates a profoundly significant point
about the transcendant nature of human appetition. It is empirical
testimony of the human spirit's tendency to reach beyond the world as
given to transform the world as given. Such purposes cannot be speci-
fied by the boundary conditions of biological survival and they cannot
be reduced to a complex extension of neurophysiological tensions.
Rather they arise from the concrescent interfusion and contrast of the
actual real world, including the immanence of past experience, as well
as the environment as immediately felt, with the apprehension of
purely potential forms.
1.3.4 PURPOSE AND INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION: A CRITIQUE
Certainly the operation of such purposes has by no means gone
unrecognized. J. McV. Hunt (1965) refers to them as intrinsic motivation
for information processing because the tendencies cannot be traced to ex-
trinsic physiological tissue needs. Robert White defines the phenomena
as effectance motivation (White, 1959). The defining attributes are the
same- -"a feeling of efficacy- -in transactions in which behavior has an
exploratory, varying, experimental character" and produces novelty and
change in the environment.
Once again we find root for this observation in Whitehead's
explanation of the upward trend of evolution. Referring to his char-
acterization of life's threefold urge, (1) to be alive; (2) to be
alive in a satisfactory way; and (3) to live better, the prominent
dimension of intrinsic motivation centers on this third purpose or aim.
Yet, neither Hunt nor White suggests that the source of
this intrinsic motivation derives from the inherently purposive na-
ture of human experience, and probably neither would concede to the ul-
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tunate reality of teleological causes. In fact, both Hunt and White
infer purpose to be a derivative effect of intrinsic motivation rather
than its cause. The implication here is that purposes, although con-
ceded to be "real" are, after all, determined by more primitive non-
purposive tendencies. In principle, these tendencies are assumed to
be reducible to principles of neurological function even though at
present such principles are acknowledged to be unspecified.
Viewed from the organismic perspective argued throughout
this chapter, such a position is not only reductionistic but repre-
sents an inversion of the facts. Intrinsic motivation has no meaning
apart from organismic purpose; the former is an expression of the sub-
jective entertainment of ideal ends, and not vice versa.
1.3.5 THE THEORY INTRODUCED
The theory of volition stated briefly here, and to be de-
veloped and expanded in the following pages, follows closely a previous
conception of volition put forth by William James (1890)
,
and McDougall
(1908). However, these two writers viewed volition as a rather special
form of conation in which a "loftier" but weaker impulse is made to pre-
vail over a "baser" but stronger tendency, or when one is acting against
the inertia of habit. James calls this phenomenon "will with effort"
and characterizes it as a "counter- agency to the line of least resis-
tance." The relevance of both James' and McDougall 's interpretations
will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.
The meaning of volition advanced here is somewhat expanded
over these earlier conceptions. It is conceived to be the emerging
factor of self-causation uniting the modes of efficient and final cause
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which underly the psychological concrescence of the human organism.
It is the purposive construction of experience, the bringing to bear of
one's sense of purpose upon the immediate reaction to the world. In
its most developed and refined form, volition becomes the capacity to
integrate one's various subjective tendencies into a coherent sense of
purpose that transmutes the ongoing flow of experience in terms of
operational plans and intentions which, ultimately, effect action. In
this sense, action is not restricted to overt muscular behavior but
includes cognition, perception, and other forms of psychological pro-
cess.
Much of the preceding discussion suggests a metaphysical
pattern which can accommodate this definition. The next task is to
move from the level of generality and explore the application of this
scheme to the specifically intentional aspects of the human organism.
The model developed here conceptually differentiates vo-
lition into three processes; "attention," "goal-setting," and "will,"
each of which may be briefly defined as follows.
Attention is the process by which the organism purposively
selects (differentiates) and structures (integrates) the actual sen-
sorial and emotional data immanent within the situation and the con-
ceptual data of the immediate present into a unity of conscious
experience.
Goal-setting refers to the conception of unrealized pos-
sibility as a consequent expression of one's purpose. More specifical-
ly, it is the process by which an individual anticipates and organizes
his future by making a conscious decision about future events or
conditions towards which ho will strive.
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wil1 is the Process of transforming an intention as po-
tentiality into actuality; the realization of intention in action.
The component subphases of will are (1) self- initiation, (2) per-
severance, and (3) effectance of closure.
The three main processes may be seen as successive degrees
in the expression of organismic purpose; that is, "will" presupposes
"intention,” while "intention" presupposes "attention." The character
of this relation can best be visualized under the image of a set of
three Chinese boxes, each box contained within a larger box. The
outermost box is analagous to the process of attention, the most fun-
damental expression of puspose. Within this box a more specialized
form of the process of attention is distinguishable; intention or
goal -setting. Within the domain of goal -setting, the even more spe-
cific expression of "will" is generated. The later, more specialized
process does not repudiate the more fundamental context within which it
occurs; as was seen earlier, the later process presupposes the more
general process and yet contributes to it an additional dimension of
definiteness and value.
attention
goal -setting
will
One prediction of the present model is that, when an in-
dividual is engaged in a more advanced process such as goal -setting,
this process influences reciprocally the subsequent operation of the
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more fundamental process, i.e., attention. This prediction is corrobo-
rated by an extensive body of research literature on intentional learn-
ing, which demonstrates clearly that an individual's intentions with re-
spect to a situation largely (though not wholly) determine the focus of
attention, what data are selected, and how they are organized.
Similarly, when an individual is in the midst of actualizing
an intention, the development of subsequent plans and goals tends to
conform with the tradition of realized intentions in one's past and
present. This cumulative tradition of actualized occasions constitutes
the immanent basis of personal identity and explains the means by which
the past participates in the creation of the present and transmits it-
self into the future.
As can be seen, this theory identifies attention as the
primary process in volition and the prerequisite to all other volition-
al operations. This insight was expressed over 70 years ago by William
James when he wrote, "Attention is the first and fundamental thing in
volition." Although the science of psychology has changed immensely
since the era of James, his brilliant insights and seminal ideas have
lost none of their originality. In fact, not until recently, with
accumulation of new evidence, could the full import of some of
James' remarks be fully comprehended. Many of James' ideas on the
subjects developed herein have provided a rich groundwork for the
speculations advanced here.
To facilitate comprehension, the format used in each of the
succeeding chapters is as follows;
1) brief definition of the process,
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2) elaborate description including a review and syn-
thesis of empirical and conceptual literature pertinent to the
process,
3) theoretical justification of the process, its sig-
nificance for intellectual, affective and social development,
4) developmental pattern of the process,
5) the process stated as an educational objective,
6) educational implications of two, three, and four, with
selected examples of prototypical learning experiences designed to
foster development of the process, and
7) suggestions of measures and methods for evaluating
effects of learning experiences (where available and feasible)
.
CHAPTER TWO
ATTENTION
Attention is the process by which one purposively sel-
ects (differentiates) and organizes (integrates) feelings
,
sensory
information3 memories 3 ideas , and bodily movements 3 into a single
focus of conscious experience.
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2.0 ELABORATE DESCRIPTION
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
When we pause to consider the dominant features characteriz-
ing conscious experience, one of the most salient traits to emerge is
its selective nature. Oar awareness consists of a relationship be-
tween ourselves and our extensive environment in which our arena of im-
mediate concern is sharply limited. We forego entertaining a multitude
of possible situations in the interest of maintaining a coherent unity
of experience with one.
Another irreducible element of consciousness is its un-
ending flow and transition. The relation between the organism and the
environment cannot be described in static terms but is highly mobile
and our awareness of this relation is the registration of the con-
tinual flux of this interaction.
The third fundamental characteristic of conscious ex-
perience is its purposive nature. The selectivity and mobility of
consciousness function largely in service to our aims and intentions
in a given situation. We differentiate that which is important to us
and ignore, by and large, that which is insignificant or meaningless.
The notions of meaning and importance are ultimately sensib only
when placed within the framework of some intention or purpose. The
meaning and importance of a situation or object is a determinate
function of how it relates to the organism in the fulfillment of some
aim.
These three parameters of conscious awareness’, selectivity,
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transition, purpose, deeply and indelibly present in our immediate ex-
perience, are wedded in the concept of attention. Indeed, we are
proposing that these elements are the interfused facets of a single
process which characterizes the purposive construction of experience.
Attention has been characterized as a persistent problem
in the annals of psychological inquiry-
-persistent in that attempts to
ignore its presence by resorting to mechanistic paradigms of behavior-
ism which systematically exclude purpose as a property of existence
have been unsucessful. Attempts to circumvent the construct of at-
tention have resulted in either (1) the necessity of substituting other
terms with basically the same meaning, or (2) an impoverished theoreti-
cal framework inadequate to account for substantial areas of human
experience. The first case is an example of circular methodology
while the second is an example of a dead-end. Faced with this reali-
zation, psychology is beginning to reconsider the matter of attention
with renewed vigor and the past fifteen years have witnessed a steady
increase in the number of studies concerned with attention. As might
be expected, however, there is little agreement as to what attention
really is, what underlies its operation, how it is controlled, and what
its effects are upon behavior. Because there is no generally agreed
upon theoretical base broad enough to accommodate the various perspec-
tives, the research presents a fragmentary and often incoherent
assemblage of data. Thus, there are self-contained dynasties of re
search, each approaching attention from a particular point of vie\v,
conducting studies based upon their conceptualization and each assuming
to have contained the entire phenomenon within that particular
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tradition. Most of these dynasties have tackled a legitimate problem
and made a contribution towards further knowledge. But there has been
remarkably little effort directed toward understanding how these
various perspectives might relate to one another as aspects of a larger
single reality. At this juncture such an effort would seem both ap-
propriate and necessary. Amassing more data will yield dimimishing
returns unless and until there is a unifying principle which can in-
tegrate the array of evidence into a coherent explanation of our
experience.
Generating such a synthesis is a large order and the detailed
documentation which should accompany this kind of task falls beyond
the purpose of this document. Following is an attempt to sketch the
outline of a tentative unified definition of the process of attention.
Because the research data represent the end product of a
great deal of abstraction and theorization, often reflecting a situa-
tion which is highly contrived and remote from the realities of every-
day life, the process of reconstruction must begin with a description
of attention that has its roots in the fundamental fact of our im-
mediate experience. Thus, our first step is to assemble the phenomeno-
logical data of attention as they appear before us in our personal
everyday existence. Once this process of assemblage is completed, we
then have the basis upon which to interpret the meaning of the special-
ized theories of attention and their associated empirical data.
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2 . 2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin with two accounts of attention on the experiential
level; that of Edward Titchener and that of William James. Attention
occupied a central position in the psychology of both of these men,
although, as we shall see, their approaches to the subject are in
sharp contrast.
2.2.1 Titchener. Titchener' s approach is representative of the
Structure School of psychology in which the strategy of investigation
consisted of the analysis of the contents of consciousness into its
elements. The method of analysis was introspection. The results of
his observation led Titchener to write, "It seems to me beyond ques-
tion that the problem of attention centres in the fact of sensible
clearness." Titchener concluded that the clearness of a sensation in
consciousness was influenced by a number of dimensions which he de-
lineated (Titchener, 1908, pp. 174-206).
Briefly stated, the conditions are: (1) The intensity of
stimulus and its sensory equivalents- -an intense stimulus such as a
sudden loud sound or a bright light, jumps into clear awareness more
readily than weaker stimuli. [Titchener qualifies the criteria of in-
tensity as relative to current levels of activity or adaptation, noting
that high levels of stimulation over extended periods result in de-
creased sensitivity and fatigue and hence recede from clear figure.]
(2) The form or quality of stimulus- -distinct, irregular stimuli are
generally more compelling than regular non-discrete ones. (3) The
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temporal relation of the stimuli-
-repetition, to some degree, and
suddenness are especially influential. (4) Movement of a stimulus-
-
this aspect tends to impair clearness. (5) The novelty, rarity, or
strangeness of an occasion-
-such qualities contribute to the emer-
gence of a stimulus into clear figure. (6) Similarity of the stimulus
to ideas, sensations, or images already present in the mind-
-this
factor seems to correspond to the modem notion of ’’set." If a sub-
ject has established a perceptual -cognitive set or predisposition to-
ward a certain class of stimuli, he is more likely to notice a member
of that class of objects than a subject who has no such set. Titchener
points to the examples of the collector, the inventor, or the expert
whose keen attention is aroused by stimuli which the rest of the world
pass without notice. (7) The accommodation of the sense organs--al-
though Titchener is cautious to acknowledge that the orientation of
the sense organs is not a sufficient condition for clearness. Ob-
viously, our eyes may accidentally converge upon some object in the
field of vision while we are mentally occupied with other things and
still not bring that object into the focus of consciousness. (8) The
rate of change, including its absence or cessation- -referring to the
first condition, how adaptation to an intense stimulus led to its re-
cession from awareness; if such a stimulus were to suddenly cease, we
would immediately take notice of it. Titchener points out that his
list of conditions progresses from the attributes of the stimulus to
the psychological disposition of the organism, which is an indication
that he viewed attention as a function involving a relation between
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the organism and its environment.
2.2.2 James. A radically different treatment of the concept of
attention is offered by William James, an approach representative of
the "Functionalist” tradition. Whereas Titchener identified attention
with the clearness of conscious contents, James conceived of attention
as an active process whose function was selection. For James, ,rMy
experience is what I agree to attend to." His definition of attention
remains probably the most eloquent and concise encapsulation yet
rendered.
It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and
vivid form of one out of what seem several simultaneously
possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization,
concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others and is a condition which has
a real opposite in the confused scatterbrained state
which in French is called distraction . .
.
(James,
1890, I, p. 403).
He goes on to explain that the "abolition" of this confused, ambient
state of mind is the awakening of attention.
One principle object comes then into the focus of con-
sciousness. Others are temporarily suppressed. The
awakening may come about either by reason of a stimulus
from without, or in consequence of some unknown inner
alteration [James did not elaborate as to the nature of
this inner alteration although there are indications
elsewhere that he is referring to the causal effects
of purpose and intentionality upon the awareness.] and
the changes it brings with it mounts to a concentra-
tion upon a single object with exclusion of aught be-
sides, or to a condition anywhere between this and the
completely dispersed state (Ibid., p. 404).
James points out that the effects of attention are to make
one perceive, conceive, distinguish and remember things better. It is
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here that the theories of Titchener and James find a common touching
point. But James carried the issue forward by asking whether the
prominence of things attended to is due to this increased clarity of
the sensation or to an increase of intensity. Conceding that the
matter is not clear-cut, James nevertheless asserts that to some
extent the relative intensity of two sensations is changed when one
of them is attended to and the other is not. He admits, however,
that it is also undeniable that attention augments the clarity of
experience. Clarity as James intended it means distinction from
other things and internal analysis or subdivision- -differentiation.
His interest in the selective aspect of attention led quite
naturally to the problem of how many things or ideas a person could
attend to at once. The question is quite important because it seems
to involve the nature of the processes which are responsible for the
limitation of attention. Is the conscious activity a serial process
which can do but one thing at a time or is it a parallel process which
can accomplish the total number of operations at the same time? If
the former hypothesis is correct, then there must be some method of
rapid switching among the tasks a subject is trying to do or else
there will be considerable loss of information obtained from any given
task.
James’ answer was that the number of things to which one can
attend is altogether indefinite depending upon (1) one's intellectual
powers, (2) what sort of operation one is performing on the data,
and
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(3) what the "things" are. He goes on to point out that when appre-
hended conceptually as a connected integrated system the number of
things may be quite large.
But where the object before us breaks into parts dis-
connected with each other, and forming each as it were,
a separate object or system not concivable in union
with the rest, it becomes harder to apprehend all these
parts at once and the mind tends to let go of one whilst
it attends to the other.
He thus concludes:
If then by the original question, how many ideas or things
can we attend to at once, be meant how many entirely dis-
connected systems or processes of conception can go on
simultaneously, the answer is not easily more than one,
unless the processes are very habitual; but then two, or
even three without very much oscillation of the attention
(James, 1890, p. 409).
2. 2.3 Attention and the Structure of Consciousness. Implied but
not explicit in this description is a third possible explanation of
the manner in which attention selects and structures consciousness.
Instead of regarding attention as a discrete binary function which is
either on or off (assumptions which underlie the concepts of serial
and parallel processing) it is conceivable that there are various
levels of attention or conscious activity, hierarchically organized
or stratified. At the top level of this structure is the apex of
consciousness, the center of focal awareness wherein we experience
the singular nature of intellectual processes; the seemingly one
channel capacity of conscious activity illustrated in the fact that
we can listen to and interpret only one conversation at any given in-
stant or solve only one arithmetic problem at a time. This focal
awareness is the product of an integration sustained by a number of
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contemporary lower-order subsidiary processes. Examples of these
lower order processes are the habitual operations which underlie
routine activities like walking or word recognition when listening to
or reading sentences. In either of these cases, a large amount of
information is being handled and processed by the nervous system in
any given moment. Walking involves the flexible coordination of
thousands of neuromuscular operations at once, and reading 300 words
a minute involves accounting for and interpreting an array of 30 to
40 letters per second, but neither walking nor comprehending language
are especially difficult activities for a human being to carry on.
The key to this capacity, as James indirectly hints, lies in the fact
that the large quantities of data which we assimilate are perceived as
highly interrelated and forming a coherent unified whole on the level
of focal awareness and that these component data which constitute the
whole conform to a set of conditions or rules which the organism has
previously differentiated and integrated and retrieves from memory to
apply to the present occasion. To put it another way, the organism
through previous experience and learning develops a structure or schema
which is stored in the memory and can be subsequently matched to in-
terpret and integrate incoming sensations. It is also worth mentioning
that such schema or programs are developed and mobilized for routine
motor activities like walking, knitting, driving, etc. One might refer
to these stored schema as "sets." Thus the individual can successfully
deal with novel and complex situations only because underlying the
novelty there are massive similarities between the present and past
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situations which enable the organism to apply the appropriate sets to
these similar aspects. Consequently, it may be said that a great many
"habitual" operations underlie every creative act.
These subsidiary structures are not subconscious. One is
aware of the movement of one’s legs in walking. Similarly, any lit-
erate person cannot deny consciousness of the letters on the page he is
reading. However, as Polanyi points out, the manner in which one is
conscious of these elements is in the form of clues which point to a
joint significance lying beyond their reality as separate entities in
and of themselves. Polanyi applies the term "tacit knowing" or "tacit
integration" to describe the hierarchical structure of consciousness
and he goes on to extend this notion into a theory of perception,
knowledge, and scientific inquiry. Polanyi maintains that tacit know-
ing involves two different kinds of attention or awareness towards a
set of particulars; subsidiary or proximal awareness and focal or
distal awareness. Take, for example, the situation of listening to
speech. Normally, one focuses his attention upon the semantic content
or meaning of the sounds which he hears and this act of comprehension
entails rapid integration of pitch, duration, consonant characters
(all of which are attended to proximally) into units which convey sym-
bolic meaning. However, if instead, one concentrates upon these sub-
units of speech, noting in detail the movement of the speaker's lips
as
he articulates various morphemes, noting the prosody and
intonation of
his voice, one would now be focally aware of these elements
of speech
as terminal objects and hence lose grasp of their higher order
joint
meaning as integral parts of a symbolic message.
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I feel that Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge lends vivid
illustration and support for the notion that attention consists of a
stratification of awareness characterized by increasingly complex
levels of data integration, culminating in the apex of focal con-
sciousness.
Focal consciousness is the highest order integration of the
experiencing subject and is immediately and primarily felt as the
unitary nature of attention. Thus, a complex of data may be entertained
or held in the arena of focal awareness insofar as the constituents may
be apprehended or integrated as a single unified whole. When the array
of data cannot be integrated into a meaningful unity (as in the case
of being presented with two simultaneously spoken messages) the organ-
ism cannot focally attend to the two unrelated groups of data at the
same time and one group must be rejected. The factors 3 then3 which
limit integration of data are the same which limit the capacity of
focal attention and account for its selective properties.
These factors may be studied as a function of two inter-
related variables: (1) the organism's capacity to differentiate and
integrate the diverse particulars within its phenomenal field, and
(2) the incompatibility among the data which are being considered.
The former depends upon learning competence, while the latter simply
means that certain things do not go together at least in this epoch ot
the universe. For example, two like-charged ions do not coalesce- -they
repel one another, and human beings cannot see both configurations
of a
figure-ground reversal simultaneously- -the presence of one by its
very
nature excludes the other. Naturally these parameters are
not totally
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independent of each other, inasmuch as the incompatability of elements
and/or processes is a function of the context or system in which they
participate.
Thus we have returned to the selective nature of attention.
But now, it is clear that selectivity is a consequent expression of
the structural unity of conscious processes.
2.2.4 Attention as Prehension. This interpretation of attention
is consistent with the organic process philosophy of Whitehead and
finds broad philosophical justification in his theory of prehensions.
Recall that, according to Whitehead, the nature of actual entities,
the final real things of which the world is made up, is characterized
by a process of concrescence in which "The universe of many things
acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item
of the many to its subordination in the constitution of the novel one
[Whitehead, 1929b, p. 321] ." Although the formal development of these
principles in Process and Reality is highly technical and detailed, a
non- technical paragraph in Modes of Thought provides a most effective
illustration of these notions as they apply to the analysis of human
1
experience.
I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, en-
joyments, hopes, fear, regrets, valuations of alter-
natives, decisions- -all of them subjective reactions
to the environment as active in my nature. . . .The
1
Incidentally, though Whitehead's philosophy may seem highly
abstract and difficult to understand, the reader should be aware that
Whitehead himself said that the aim of his philosophy is to elucidate
the nature of experience, to make explicit the implicit knowledge of
our being. He also felt that the foundation upon which a philosophi-
cal system must ultimately rest is a direct appeal to immediate ex-
perience .
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individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of a
natural activity. As I shape the activities of the
environment into a new creation, which is myself at
this moment; and yet as being myself it is a con-
tinuation of the antecedent world. If we stress the
role of the environment, this process is causation.
If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of
active enjoyment, this process is self
-creation. If
we stress the role of the conceptual anticipation of
the future whose existence is a necessity in the nature
of the present, this process is the teleological aim
at some ideal in the future (Whitehead, 1938, p. 228).
Two themes which clearly emerge in the preceding quotation
are that the organism becomes what it is as a consequence of its sub-
jective interaction with the data provided by its environment and that
this interaction is governed by the subject in an active process of
selection in accordance with a conceived ideal or purpose.
The process by which a subject reacts to its environment in
the act of self-creation is called prehension. More specifically, pre-
hension refers to the process of appropriating into a unity of existence
the many data presented as relevant by the processes of nature. "Every
prehension consists of three elements, (1) the concrescing subject or
actual entity, (2) the datum which is prehended, and (3) the subjec-
tive form or manner in which the data are prehended [Ibid., p. 88] ."
A prehension may be either positive or negative, depending upon
whether the reaction is incorporative or aversive, and it may be either
"physical" or "conceptual" depending upon the nature of the data pre-
hended. A positive prehension involves the assimilation or integra-
tion of data into the organism. It is the process by which data are
genuinely included in the real internal constitution of a new actual
entity; the derived data are literally absorbed into the complex life
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of the new entity. They are essential components. They are no longer
external facts to which the subject responds but are part of his ul-
timate privacy (Ibid., pp. 130-131).
Whitehead, however, is careful to point out that the data
of positive prehension are the result of a selection which must involve
the elimination of certain data by what he refers to as negative pre-
hension. A negative prehension is thus one in which the data are con-
sidered but then are rejected. In Whitehead's words, "A negative pre-
hension adds to the emotional complex though not to the objective data."
The necessity of negative prehension is rooted in the maintenance of
diversity in the universe. If, as Whitehead maintains, an organism is
a product of the vast multitude of its prehensions, which have been and
are being integrated into a unity of existence, then the uniqueness or
individuality of an actual entity, which is a function of its dif-
ferences with respect to other actual entities, must necessarily be due
to the fact that its component prehens ions- -past
,
present and future,
are different. Obviously, there are also a great many similarities
shared to a greater or lesser degree among entities, indicating that
many prehensions are commonly, even universally, felt. Nevertheless,
if all entities prehended all the available data in any given occasion,
all diversity would perish and there would be no basis for individu-
ality. Yet the undeniable fact of existence is its diversity within
its unity. As Whitehead puts it, the aim of the universe is beauty;
the form is meaningful contrasts. Thus, each subject in the process
of self-creation selectively prehends according to its ideal reality
as embodied in its subjedtive aim.
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But there is another angle, Individuality also rests upon
the unity of the becoming process. Some things do not go together in
certain contexts. Some clash rather than contrast. Certain things
experience destruction as a result of their relations to other things.
Thus negative prehension, the process by which an organism can dismiss,
ignore, or repress certain elements which would destroy or impair its
development is one means of rescuing complexity from the danger of in-
compatibility.
There are two types of negative prehension. One involves a
definite decision or act of exclusion, the typical case of which is
the organism excluding a possibility of development on the grounds of
organic incompatibility. Such negative prehension may be regarded as
aesthetic judgment in the concrescence of the organism. An example
at the lowest level, suggested by Eisendrath (1970) might be the de-
cision of an atom to emit or exclude a proton rather than to dis-
integrate. At the organic (living) level it may be represented in
the tendency of living tissue to reject foreign matter rather than
die, while on the psychological level it may mean that a gun sales-
man who recognizes the incompatibility between his selling guns and
his valuing non-violence decides to give up his gun-selling career.
The second type of negative prehension is a conception of an
object or ideal not realized in the datum. This latter variety which
figures prominently in the choices of the human organism might be
thought of as a form of transcendence since it is the means by which
an individual can move forward in his development by reacting not to
the immediate situation as given, but rather to some unrealized
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potentiality which lies beyond the present data. This form of nega-
tive prehension introduces novelty into experience through the effects
of consciously held aspirations and purpose. It is the supreme oc-
casion of pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps. Thus, a child
who aspires to become a statesman is rising above his datum as a
child and is entertaining an idea which to an extent negates his im-
mediate actuality. In a sense he has turned his attention towards an
ideal, altering his awareness of the present data.
Generally speaking, then, negative prehension is the inter-
vention or contravention of the organism's subjective aim in the de-
termination of its concrescence. It is the anticipation of future
possibilities and the urge toward their realization which preserves
the integrity of the organism in its advance toward novelty. It
necessarily implies choice, elimination, and selection of the data
which become the subject's experience. We would propose that attention
is the exemplification of the prehension process on the level of con-
scious thought and perception. What is gained by interpreting atten-
tion in terms of this paradigm? Of foremost significance we have ac-
quired a sense of how attention functions in the ongoing process of
creative becoming, and how the individual constructs his experience.
In addition, the construct of "prehension" emphasizes a necessary and
vital connection between what the individual consciously experiences,
i.e., what he knows, and what his aims and aspirations are. Attention
as a mode of prehension represents the interfusion of cognition, per-
ception, and conation. Conation refers to more than a mere design or
intention about something- -it includes the deeply rooted emotional
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complex and pathos (loving) underlying such designs, the feelings,
implicit and explicit, which form the basis of our aspirations. Thus,
the interrelation between knowledge and aim in the operation of atten-
tion also involves an interrelation between knowledge and feeling
(loving). The conceptual recognition of this interconnectedness has
a long history emerging in the vocabulary of 19th Century phenomen-
ology as intentionality.
2.2.5 Intentionality and Interest: The Affective Base of Attention.
Bretano, who introduced the concept of intentionality, be-
lieved that consciousness is defined by the fact that it intends some-
thing, points towards something outside itself- -specifically that it
intends the object. Edmund Husserl, Bretano' s disciple, pointed out
that consciousness never exists in a subjective vacuum but is always
consciousness of something, or more accurately, consciousness toward
something. "Thus meaning is an intention of the mind."
Heidegger extended Husserl's notion to include the total
feeling, valuing and acting of the human being. He did this by in-
troducing the concept of "care." Care is constructive of our world,
in a sense analogous to the molding of understanding by purpose.
Actually, one could just as easily substitute love in the place of
care, inasmuch as the descriptive and functional qualities which
Heidegger ascribes to care correspond to love in contemporary language.
There is an undeniably close relationship between caring or loving
and intentionality already suggested by the fact that the root word
"tend," to take care of- -is the center of the term intentionality.
This indication that affective tonality is heavily impli-
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cated in the molding of conscious experience recalls a statement made
by James concerning the close inner relation between attention and
interest. He says that what we attend to and what interests us are
synonomous terms. For James, the interest is the basis upon which the
subjective field is organized. He writes:
Millions of items of the outward order are present to
my senses which never properly enter into my experience.
Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience
is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I
notice shape my mind- -without selective interest exper-
ience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent
and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground
--intelligible perspective in a word (James, 1890,
p. 409).
By placing interest at the core of attention, James has
touched upon a key issue in the dynamics of attention. Interest is
the vital link between ideals and aims, conscious or subconscious and
the immediacy of the present. Its effect is felt in the relative im-
portance of our experience. "To feel interested in something is to
feel attracted to it, to feel inclined to give attention to it [Ibid.,
p. 430] ." Here again, we encounter the element of feeling. It
seems to this writer that feeling is a crucial factor in the operation
of interest. As such, interest might be regarded as the feeling or
loving component which underlies attention. Because it is essentially
a quality of feeling, interest is not subject to the direct control of
the will. Interest must be aroused- -must be achieved indirectly.
This does not mean that an individual cannot make conscious efforts to
become interested in something. A person can voluntarily attend to
something for which he holds no interest, but only to a very limiLed
extent unless there is something in the situation which strikes him
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as novel, relevant and meaningful to the realization of his individual-
ity (concrescence). When this happens, the subject develops a positive
attraction or interest toward the object and positive prehension occurs.
If the object or situation is perceived as irrelevant or destructive,
negative prehension follows
.
2
Thus, although attention and interest are not to be equated
with each other (since one may be interested in many things but only
attend to one at any given moment), one’s interest (or feeling) in a
situation or object will determine his capacity to attend to it. In-
terest is the vague fashioner of one's attention; what one has attended
to in turn figures heavily in what one knows. What one knows is part
of what one feels and who one is (an organism is the multitude of its
prehensions), what one feels is in turn the basis of one's interest.
This cycle is grossly over-simplified and there are many important
variables which are unaccounted for (which consequently gives it the
appearance of a vicious inescapable circle- -this inadequacy is acknow-
ledged)
,
but its purpose is merely to show that interest (and attention)
is not without genesis and not without some means of self-determination.
2The fact that people sometimes are interested in morbid
things is not a contradiction of this principle. An interest or
preoccupation with the morbid is an instance in the pathology of at-
tention and can arise as a consequence of two conditions. The first
case is when the subject's history has involved the systematic sup-
pression of his self-expression through constructive channels. Re-
peatedly and hopelessly frustrated, he is driven to self-destructive
expression as the only remaining form of self-becoming (albeit dis-
torted) left open to him. For such a person, destruction is indeed
perceived as relevant and meaningful to his self actualization.
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The first section of this paper has been an attempt to as-
semble a phenomenological account of the various aspects underlying
the process of attention and construct a coherent philosophical
framework which will serve two pruposes. (1) To provide a con-
textual basis for understanding attention as a process interrelated
with other aspects of personality in the evolving consitution of
the total human being, and (2) to serve as a basis for interpreting
the theoretical and empirical data on attention generated by the
various schools of experimental psychology. Hence there will fre-
quently be references to notions, ideas and sources developed in this
section of the dissertation.
2.1.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
A survey of contemporary psychological literature reveals
that attention is treated as one of three quite distinct phenomena,
each of which we will consider separately. First, there is a body of
literature which equates attention with arousal. This interpreta-
. 3
tion is often used in experiments on preparedness and vigilance.
A typical vigilance task is to present the subject with a clock-face
^The basic purpose of vigilance experiments is to assess or
measure a subject’s ability to detect a weak signal or stimulus the
exact moment of occurrence of which the subject has no foreknowledge.
Generally, the subject is aware of the kind of event he is supposed
to detect beforehand and because it is of relatively low intensity
,
he must maintain his attention and alertness upon the region of his
environment where the anticipated signal is to occur if he is to per
ceive it. The procedure is then to determine the decrement in the
subject’s vigilance (operationally defined by the percentage of suc-
cessful detections) with respect to the length of time he is involved
in the task. Decrements in performance are attributed to the onset
ot
fatigue, boredom, and a general decrease in the level of activation
and arousal.
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having a single hand which moves a certain distance in discrete jumps
at regular or irregular intervals. Occasionally, the hand makes a
double jump and the subject is to press a key when the double jump
occurs. The task can be complicated further by requiring the subject
to monitor several clocks simultaneously, by presenting other extran-
eous signals, and so on. When a subject is required to keep on with
this task for a considerable period of time, say two or three hours,
his vigilance usually declines as time goes on- -his accuracy falls
off more or less rapidly.
There is an expansive volume of experimental literature and
theoretical discussion concerned with the reasons for this decline in
vigilance and factors which can maintain accuracy without loss over a
period of time.^ We will not attempt to cover all the explanations,
but will instead consider those accounts which connect performance
with arousal.
The concept of expectancy has been used to explain the lack
of decrement when the signals are irregularly spaced. In the case of
irregular signals, however, expectancy does not account for the re-
duction in accuracy over time unless one assumes that the particular
character of the irregularity of a given series has some effect of
changing expectation over time. A number of investigators seem con-
vinced that the gradual loss is more akin to some kind of fatigue or
Tor a more detailed and in-depth summary of the vigilance
phenomenon the reader is referred to McCormack, P. D. , "A Two Factor
Theory of Vigilance in the Light of Recent Studies.” In A. F.
Saunders (Ed.) Attention and Performance . Amsterdam: North Holland
Publishing Co., 1967 and Mackworth, J. , Vigilance and Attention.
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.
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boredom which accumulates during the task period and lowers the read-
iness to respond. This phenomena of decrement in vigilance naturally
suggests that arousal is somehow reduced through the infrequent stim-
ulation. One must tread cautiously on this speculation, however,
since the predictions from arousal theory can be quite complex and at
odds, depending upon the specific circumstances. For instance,
Broadbent (1963) points out that poor performance can be produced by
either very high or very low arousal. For example, it is now known
that knowledge of results is one factor which helps maintain vigil-
ance
. Presumably the usual decrement without knowledge of results is
due to loss of interest in the task and a consequent low-level of
arousal. Providing feedback to the subject makes the job more in-
teresting, raises the level of arousal, and prevents performance loss.
However, it is conceivable that the subject might get so bored that
activation would increase (with the onset of restlessness) rather
than decrease and then one would have to argue that the loss of per-
formance is due to too high a level of arousal.
Another complication arises with the explanation that a
decrement of attention is caused by a decrease in interest and thus
presumably arousal. If this were the case, one might expect regular
signals to make the task more boring and thus increase the decline of
performance. Yet regular signals seem to maintain performance at a
more or less constant level. This contradiction dissolves when we
consider that because of the predictability of the signals, the sub-
ject can relax between them and prepare himself temporarily for each
signal as he anticipates it.
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Nevertheless, the arousal or activation approach to atten-
tion suffers on several counts. First, the several attempts made to
directly relate vigilance performance to physiological indices of
arousal have yielded unclear and often conflicting results. This is
partially because there is a lack of clearly valid and generally ac-
cepted indicators of arousal. For example, Eason, Beardshall and
Jaffe (1965) experimented with four indices of arousal--skin con-
ductance, heart rate, muscle potential in the neck and potentials
in the eye region. On two of the measures, no change was observed
while the two other indices showed changes in opposite directions.
Such results suggest arousal is multi-dimensional and that dif-
ferent indicators reflect different aspects.
A second problem is that there has not yet been a satis-
factory separation of general alertness and arousal from the more
specific pattern of attention to particular stimuli. As Ryan (1970)
points out, an individual might be very alert to his daydreaming or
to worrying about some personal problem outside the experiment but
not alert to the task in the laboratory.
Finally, there is somewhat of a logical problem in equating
attention with arousal. Arousal is basically purported to be a non-
specific, vague and diffuse pattern of activation while attention is
essentially conceived of as a highly selective, versatile and speci-
fic orientation of the organism towards a particular aspect or seg-
ment of a situation. There is reason to believe, for instance, that
intentional learning is generally superior to unintentional learning
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because the intention to learn directs the subject’s attention to-
wards the relevant attributes of the task. If the effects of atten-
tion were solely derivative of the influence exercised by arousal
,
there would theoretically be no basis for the fact that a person in
a high state of arousal still performs better upon material which is
intentionally as opposed to incidentally learned. In other words, it
would seem theoretically insufficient to suppose that a process which
is characterized by diffuseness can somehow fully account for a pro-
cess which is characterized by specificity.
Neisser (1967) feels that any conception of attention as
psychic energy is not a useful heuristic in understanding the various
processes comprising attention. He suggests that a more constructive
view is to regard attention as an allotment of analyzing or organizing
mechanisms to a limited region of the perceptual field. We would say,
however, that arousal and activation are probably significantly in-
volved in the process of attention but that they do not explain the
whole story.
2.3.1 Attention as Organization. The first and most persistent
efforts to conceptualize attention in terms of the principles of or-
ganization were made by the Gestalt psychologists. Attention was seen
to involve the phenomenon of reorganizing materials into figure
-
ground relations. Since reorganization and figure-ground relation-
ships were the general principles of perception, the gestaltists did
not view attention as much different from any other aspect of per-
ception. The notion of the individual actively reorganizing the data
attended to seems potentially to be a powerful concept and one that is
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basically congruent with the philosophical framework proposed earlier
in this paper. However, it is precisely this kind of active organ-
ization on which Gestalt theory is weakest. Their principles of
organization are, for the most part, extvinsically based
,
that is,
they deal almost exclusively with the variables inherent in the
stimulus arrangement such as "isolation,” "grouping," "fitting," etc
Consequently, there is a neglect of the active 'intr'Cns'ic structuring
of experiential data which originates from within the organism. Again
two experiments on intentional versus incidental learning provide a
test case for the theory.
Kaswan (1957) had subjects learn to associate pairs of
figures. In some cases, the figures were "fitting" in that the two
formed continuations of each other and could be seen as part of a
single gestalt. In other instances, the figures were more disparate.
The experiment showed that the "fitting figures" (good gestalts) were
learned better than the disparate ones; this held true for both in-
cidental and intentional learning. Another study, testing the
isolation effect (another gestalt principle) yielded essentially the
same results. Thus, the evidence suggests that these principles of
perceptual organization may play a part in learning but they do no
of themselves explain the differences between what we attend to and
what we do not attend to; why intentional learning is superior to in-
cidental learning.
There are other inadequacies in trying to subsume the pro-
cess of attention under the Gestalt model. These perceptual
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principles refer to a limited set of phenomena that might be called
pre-cognitive (pre-cognitive not in a developmental sense but rather
in the sense that they are primitive structures which operate below
the level of cognitive activity). As such, the Gestalt principles are
subject to the following limitations: (1) they are heavily dependent
upon and therefore restricted by the arrangement of sensory data,
(2) the permutation of structured wholes are of a limited and pre-
determined number, and (3) once a good gestalt is attained, the struc-
ture becomes inert, reaches its ceiling, so to speak. Beyond this,
the Gestalt principles do not account for the effect that logical or
personal meaning exercise on attention. We may attend to and struc-
ture a situation along lines that have nothing to do with gestalt
forms. Finally, because they are supposedly invariant, we are left
with the problem of structures without genesis, form without process,
and structure without construction. The double-binded insufficiency
of static structures is that in being devoid of ontology, they are
also incapable of explaining creative and novel organizations of
experience.
2.3.2 Attention as Selectivity. Most of the contemporary research
approaches attention as the problem of perceptual-cognitive selectiv-
ity. For these investigators, the core phenomenon of the attention
process is that we select what is relevant and reject the rest. The
research has been directed toward elucidating what enables a person
to select and separate one group of data from its embedded context
and from it construct a coherent, meaningful pattern.
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One finding that has so far emerged from the experiments is
that humans will use all the information that is available to them in
performing this task of selection or differentiation. Some of the
most interesting and illuminating results of this problem come from
the studies concerned with selective listening. In typical designs,
the subject is presented with the task of separating out two simul-
taneously spoken messages so that one is followed and understood while
the other is ignored. Norman (1969) lists the major cues which sub-
jects seem to utilize in performing such an operation.
A) The voices come from different directions,
B) Lip reading, gestures, etc.,
C) The fact that messages are uttered by different speaking
voices and are thus distinguished by variances in mean
pitches, mean speeds, male versus female, etc.,
D) Differing accents
.
When these cues, which are based on the purely physical
characteristics of the two messages fail or are not present, the sub-
ject can resort to psychological continuity or semantic structure as
a means of disentangling or differentiating the data, utilizing such
parameters as the transition probabilities between words. In this
case, subject matter, syntactic structure, and voice dynamics become
differentiating cues.
With respect to the rejected message, the indications are
that it has certain statistical properties which the subject recog-
nizes. For example, the listener may notice the rejected signal as
speech, notice a change in voice timbre and pitch or become aware
that speech has been replaced by some other sound. It is almost as if
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there is a system that monitors the gross characteristics of the un-
attended aspects of the environment while the organism is attending
to a situation.
Efforts aimed at uncovering the nature of this system have
led some psychologists to posit that we possess a very short term
storage or temporary memory for items to which we are not attending.
The existence of such a system would suggest that the limitation of
the perception of many features in a complex field is imposed less
by the original intake of information than by the necessity of storing
it in memory for more than a very short time. Lawrence and Laberge
(1956) found that when observers were shown various numbers of dif-
ferent shapes in various colors and given instructions to attend pri-
marily to number or shape or color, the subjects were able to report
some information about the features to which they had not been direc-
ted to attend (or even told specifically not to attend) , provided
that this was done instantly following the trial. Lawrence and Laberge
maintained that their results indicated no evidence of immediate per-
ceptual selectivity and that it made no difference whether the subjects
were given task instructions before or immediately after exposure. A
recent review of these results in a study by Egreth (1967) revealed
several methodological problems and therefore casts some doubt upon
the above conclusion. Meanwhile, further investigation has fairly
well established that some of the selection takes place in the pre-
liminary perceptual act itself and further selection takes
place in
the process of recalling the information for report.
Moreover, the
evidence indicates that intention affects selection at
both of these
stages
.
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2.3.3 The Filter Model. The first modem effort towards a foimal
theory of attention was advanced by Donald Broadbent (1958). Actually,
Broadbent 's theory aimed to deal comprehensively with the entire phen-
omenon of human information processing. His thesis was that the
nervous system acts to some extent as a "single" communication channel,
so that it is useful to regard it as having a "limited capacity." The
selective mechanism, supposedly situated in the brain, selects from
all sensory events those data which have some features in common. The
criterial basis for auditory selection include physical features of
the signal, intensity, pitch, and the spatial localization. The filter
then can be tuned to accept the desired message and reject all others.
The locus of selectivity, the filter stage which yields the single
channel capacity follows two prior stages of processing; primary sense
data pathways and a short-term buffer storage, both of which have a
multi-channel capability and are presumably non- selective. Broadbent
holds that the maximum time incoming information may be held in buffer
storage is in the order of seconds. He further points out that the
selection of data is not completely random and that the probability
of a particular class of events being selected for processing is in-
creased by certain properties of the events and by certain conditions
of the organism. Such properties include parameters of (a) physical
intensity, (b) time elapsed since the last information from the par-
ticular class of events, of which the present instance is a member,
entered the organism's attention, and (c) whether the sound is of high
as opposed to low frequency.
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Support for the notion of a single channel hypothesis has
accrued from a number of studies which, oddly enough, have dealt with
the phenomenon of directing attention toward two objects simultaneously.
Mowbray (1954) reported that some individuals seemed to be capable of
perceiving two messages presented at the same time in a single sen-
sory mode provided that the two remained separable in terms of their
physical identity. However, the messages were not long, continuously
spoken sentences but rather short phrases presented simultaneously.
Thus, some theorists have claimed that what actually occurs is that
the subject's attention alternates rapidly between the two series of
events
.
Yet another explanation which appears even more likely but
which has not yet been suggested is that both phrases are sufficiently
brief, so that by the time the first phrase has been completely pro-
cessed, the second one, initially unattended to, has not decayed and
hence is still available for retrieval from short-term memory. In
order for this to occur at all, however, the two contemporary data
must be adequately separated physically in order that the nervous
system can differentiate the input into two discrete sensory events.
Otherwise, the objects or sounds may not be perceived at all, or there
may be some modification of the percept of one by the percept of the
other (Vernon, 1962). Therefore, if two figures are presented tach-
istoscopically in rapid succession of one another they will be per-
ceived as a single figure, combining the attributes of both originals.
Despite the supporting evidence, there are nevertheless some
serious difficulties with the single-channel theory. To begin with,
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Broadbent claims the strength of his model rests in its superior pre-
cision; it is a "more exact version" than the accounts offered by the
introspectionists
. Yet the notion of what constitutes a single chan-
nel, the central construct of the theory, is left vague and undefined.
If by single-channel we mean that the organism can carry on only one
activity at a time, our definition is circular and we have explained
nothing. We are still left with the problem of establishing a set
of general parameters that accurately differentiate what constitutes
a single activity from two activities. For example, I might com-
fortably say that sight-playing more than a single melodic tune would
for me exceed the boundary of a single activity. But for a concert
artist, sight -playing a Bach three-part invention or even a fugue
(four independent melodic lines) might easily qualify as a single
activity. If the single channel concept is to have any scientific
merit, the criteria which define it must be different from those con-
ditions which are explained by it.
Another problem is that the theory provides no means for the
selection of data on the basis of meaning. If an individual were
able only to notice the gross physical characteristics of the rejec-
ted message he would theoretically be unable to switch his attention
to a more relevant or meaningful message newly introduced into the
situation, since he would have no way of ascertaining the meaning or
content of the new data until after he stopped the first task alto-
gether. The fact of the matter is, that people are able to perform
such shifts of attention. For a long time, experimenters argued that
they could not demonstrate this fact, citing documentation from
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selective listening studies which indicated that subjects were unable
to remember any of the content of the rejected message. Norman (1969)
has pointed out that in these instances the investigator waited a
while before questioning the subjects on how much of the non-attended
message they remembered. Speculating that the material which re-
ceives no attention is noticed only briefly, Noiman himself conducted
an experiment in which he asked subjects at various points during the
trial to recount what they were able to remember of the rejected
message they had just heard. The results yielded evidence that the
subjects did have a short-term memory for items to which they were
not attending but no long-term memory.
The inevitable question that this discussion leads to is,
at what stage in the sequence of information processing does this
selection by meaning occur. Conceivably the locus of selectivity could
fall among one or several of the following five stages.
1) Primary selection on the basis of meaning prior to
’’buffer" (short-term) storage,
2) Selection from aspects of the buffer material for
further processing,
3) Selective retention over a period of time,
4) Factors in the environment at the time of recall
which select from what the subject has retained.
Norman's study already confirms that there is some selec-
tion at and perhaps beyond stage 3. More research is needed to con-
firm the extent to which an analysis of meaning takes place during
prior stages of processing.
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A more recent series of studies on this problem (Anne Treise-
man, 1965) were aimed at determining upon what level and upon what
criteria the selection of relevant from irrelevant material is made.
Treiseman’s experiments relied upon the technique known as "shadowing"
which requires the subject to attend to one of two simultaneously
spoken messages and to repeat the relevant message as soon as he hears
it. Treiseman varied certain features of the irrelevant message, such
as voice type (male versus female)
,
the language of the irrelevant
message, and she even inserted reversed speech in order to vary the
number and type of cues available to the listener as a means of dif-
ferentiating the two signals. She was especially curious as to
whether or not both messages are fully analyzed with respect to mean-
ing before one is selected and, if not, at what stage in the analysis
the unwanted message is discarded. Moreover, she was interested in
what determines the selection and switching between messages.
Her findings suggest that both messages are not fully an-
alyzed before one is rejected but that a preliminary analysis takes
place at various levels in the perceptual system, depending upon the
type of characteristics which differentiate the two signals. She
proposed that the features of incoming messages are analyzed succes-
sively by the nervous system, starting with general physical attributes
and proceeding on to the identification of words and their meaning.
Signals are separated from one another by their physical attributes
when it is possible and by their grammatical and semantic features
when it becomes necessary.
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In regard to these conditions, Treiseman found a graded
effect on the ability of her subjects to reject an irrelevant message.
When there was a distinct physical difference between the relevant
and irrelevant channels subjects experienced no difficulty in shadowing
one and ignoring the other. When the messages had similar physical
characteristics but belonged to different languages they were much
less successful. The better they knew the language, the more diffi-
cult it was to prevent intrusions from the unwanted message. The
most difficult task was to maintain shadowing when both messages were
read in the same language and spoken with the same voice. Treiseman’
s
explanation of the selective process does not glaringly conflict with
the experiential account of attention presented in the first section
and is far more successful than Broadbent’s theory in accounting for
the experimental results. However, there are still certain inade-
quacies .
The main criticism against Treiseman’ s theory is its com-
plexity. If each incoming message is analyzed and judged, the sel-
ection process has not simplified or reduced the amount of infor-
mation the organism must deal with- -the original basis for assuming
that a selective mechanism exists in the first place.
The second objection is that Treiseman' s theory is basically
a modification of Broadbent’s single channel filter model and hence
suffers from vagueness and some of the logical circularity which af-
flicted the original theory. For example, though it is acknowledged
that meaning is functional in the selective process, there is still
no explanation as to how meaning is understood or noticed and thus
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how it influences selection. These questions are crucial because
meaning is the primary factor in determining the structural inter-
relationship of the many data present to the organism in a given sit-
uation. And it is this structural interrelationship which in turn
constitutes the phenomenal units of our experience
--the units around
which the singular capacity of focal attention may conform.
These problems are so fundamental that they extend to the
core of the perceptual process. Therefore, a satisfactory resolution
of these can be arrived at only through a re-examination and reformu-
lation of the basic principles which underlie the perception itself.
2.3.4 Issues in Perceptual Theory. There is yet no comprehensive
theory of attention because we lack a generally agreed upon theory of
perception. However, man’s attempts to construct theories of per-
ception date back to ancient times and constitute his earliest efforts
to deal with "psychological issues." Both Aristotle and Plato were
concerned with perception. The classical models of perception which
guided research, theory and speculation of modem psychology derive
from seventeenth century philosophy and particularly the mechanistic
doctrines of Descartes. Cartesian philosophy is a descendant in the
rationalist tradition of Aristotle and much of Descartes' thought rep-
resents an extension of the former’s doctrine. We will not re-attempt
a critical discussion of these foundations now except to say that the
legacy bequeathed by this tradition upon modem psychology was less
than liberating.
The model of perception we inherited was essentially one in
which the organism passively registered impressions and images of the
85
world. The mind was "the passive clay on which sensations write,
something which merely absorbs and classifies facts." One key as-
sumption behind this conception is that the perceptual system,
the senses and the mind consisted of facsimile images that mirrored
the arrangement of elements and physical forces in the external world.
Learning causes individual differences only in terms of the detail
and completeness of this mental image, i.e., how closely it matches
external reality.
Despite the fact that philosophy itself disinherited such a
notion in the nineteenth century; notwithstanding the advances of
twentieth century nuclear physics and the theory of relativity which
proved the arbitrary and inadequate bases of these assumptions, and
the recent trends in modem biology (the implications of which we
considered earlier)
,
much of experimental psychology remains entrenched
in these archaic notions. Feeling less and less comfortable with
this anomalous situation, psychologists have made sporadic efforts to
expand their vocabulary and generalize their conceptual framework.
But underneath, the materialistic biases persist and continue to
govern methodological sanctions, the priority of issues and the
legitimacy of evidence. Few within the field have seriously ques-
tioned the basic paradigm.
Only within the past few years has perceptual theory begun
to break away from the stultifying notions of material objectivism.
A widening circle of psychologists has become strongly critical of
the objectivist inversion which assumes that sense perception is
totally subservient to external reality with the mere task of
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transducing sense stimuli into their respective mental images. There
is an increasing rejection of the primacy of naive realism and a grow-
ing recognition of the immediate and personal nature of awareness.
Emerging from this is the realization that perception is primarily
a process of construction, transition and interpretation and that
it is ultimately subjective. Such a model of perception suggests,
in the words of Platt,
That each of us stands at the creative choosing
focus of a moving web of past antecedents and future
consequences that branch out from our present choices
and actions propagating and amplifying themselves in-
definitely (Platt, 1970, p. 23).
2.3.5 Perception as Organismic Process. In accordance with the
principles of organismic process outlined in Section 1, we advance the
following principles as a rudimentary foundation upon which may be
built a coherent and adequate theory of perception. We propose that
the mind's grasp and enjoyment of the world, of which perception is
an integral facet rests on two basic psychological and neurological
principles. The first is the principle of response to novelty or
change while the second is the principle of response to repetition or
permanence in the form of pattern. Both of these notions (which are
reflections of the processes of differentiation and integration) are
the indispensable ingredients in sustaining the process. If one is
absent, the grasp of consciousness rapidly decays.
These principles imply a radical departure from the histori-
cally dominant views of perception. The essential nature of percep-
tion now becomes a problem of process, rather than substances of
transition as opposed to stasis.
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To clarify what this means, let us draw upon some specific
illustrations afforded by the research literature in perception.
These studies might best be characterized as efforts to determine
the boundary conditions of human perception-
-that is, investigation
into those factors or influences under which perception breaks down
or is radically altered. Studying these sorts of limits can provide
us with a knowledge of those fundamental conditions upon which per-
ceptual operations are based.
One such area of inquiry has been concerned with the spon-
taneous and irrepressible fluctuations of attention which occur in
an unchanging situation. The evidence accrued from experiments on
vigilance and sensory deprivation is fairly conclusive in demon-
strating that it is impossible for a person to focus his perception
for an indefinite period of time upon a single aspect of a stabilized
unchanging situation. This holds for all sensory modes, including
vision, although it is generally easier to preserve the focus of
visual perception than auditory or tactile perception because of the
person’s capacity to control the orientation of the sense organs
themselves.
Broadbent (1963) has attempted to account for the results
of Mackworth's clock-test vigilance task in terms of this factor.
He argues that the decline in vigilance is due to "the inability to
maintain any concentration of awareness on a relatively unimpressive
and unchanging situation.” Sooner or later there occur blockages
in perception and a wandering of attention to other features of the
environment or to the observer's own thoughts. Hence, an event
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occurring during this period goes unnoticed- though this is less like-
ly to happen if the event is expected. This inability to maintain
attention on monotonous tasks is a well-known phenomenon to radar
observers, pilots and industrial inspectors.
In reviewing the findings, Broadbent found that a short in-
terval between periods of testing or a novel stimulus (e.g., a tele-
phone message) temporarily restored the full efficiency of a subject's
performance. He also discovered that when every signal was followed
by an auditory message informing the subject of his performance, de-
terioration was retarded and in some cases performance improved.
There are several explanations for this effect of feedback (knowledge
of results) upon performance but we will reserve discussion on these
speculations for a later time. The immediate point is to recognize
that such feedback at least serves to introduce some variation (novel-
ty) into an otherwise monotonous situation and in so doing creates a
climate in which perceptual processing can occur.
After conducting a similar series of experiments, using
dial-watching tasks, Broadbent observed that the signal itself in-
troduces novelty into the situation and that the occurrence of each
signal restores performance partially to that level appearing at the
beginning of the watch. He also noted that when signals come from
several possible sources, some of these sources are naturally more
likely to receive a response than others but when the time of monoto-
nous watching is extended, these priorities are reversed and attention
fluctuates so that those initially neglected sources become favored.
An interesting mode of perceptual fluctuation can be
89
observed in the spontaneous reversals of figure
-ground relations that
occur when looking at ambiguous representations of familiar objects.
Such reversals seem to happen when the sensory data provides the ob-
server with input for which there are two or more possible repre-
sentations that are quite different and about equally plausible or
familiar by whatever criteria the perceptual system employs. Another
version of this multi- stability of patterns is connected with the
depth-reversal that often occurs when focusing upon ambiguous two-
dimensional schemata which suggest three-dimensional forms; for example,
the rhomboid cubicle,
Such reversals of perceptual configuration are largely
spontaneous and are only partially under voluntary control, i.e., the
viewer cannot completely inhibit these tendencies. Voluntary direc-
tion of attention towards one configuration may increase its dominance
but it seldom produces complete suppression of the other. As we shall
demonstrate later, the reason for this probably lies in the physical
organization of the perceptual system.
An even more dramatic instance of the breakdown of perception
under invariant stimulation is the phenomenon of perceptual fading.
This is elicited when a stationary image is projected on the retina
for a prolonged period of time. Under such conditions the observer
finds that the image begins to fade or disappear completely and
then
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spontaneously reappear over regular intervals. It is interesting to
note that the speed and amount of fading as well as rates and fre-
quency of regeneration varied according to the nature of the figure.
The amount of fading correlated negatively with the degree of meaning
and complexity associated with the particular figure, again suggesting
that novelty and variation are requisite ingredients of perception.
But there are even further confirmations in the results of recent in-
quests into the neurological processes underlying vision.
The findings indicate that the function of vision is de-
pendent upon continual change or fluctuation of stimulation upon the
retina. For example, Ditchbum and Riggs have found that constant
motion of the eyeballs is necessary for visual perception. These
motions are too tiny and too rapid to be seen by the unaided eye.
Their amplitudes are less than one minute of an arc and their fre-
quencies are in the range from 50 to 150 cycles persecond. Never-
theless, if this movement is compensated for by optical or electronic
feedback devices so that the image is exactly stabilized on the retina,
vision disappears within a fraction of a second.
We might extrapolate with respect to these findings that
(1) our perceptual system is not equipped to deal with steady inputs;
the subjective experience of vision cannot be reduced to states of
matter or energy, to substance devoid of process. Rather, it is
fundamentally based upon the experience of transition, the motion of
process within a situation. (2) The organism is actively involved in
generating this condition of flux and transition and is therefore en-
gaged in the construction of reality. (3) Complementing the requisite
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element of change and novelty is the reciprocal need for sameness or
pattern within the process. This is necessary because without order
and structure (integration), experience is unintelligible. Pattern
perception, the experience of identity or sameness amid change is the
result of an array of stimuli upon the retina which is congruent with
an immediately previous array upon a different set of cells. The
brain can perceive something only if it can detect the sameness of an
array before and after displacement. Thus, neither a steady state
nor an unpatterned random flux can be assimilated by the experiencing
organism. The emerging theme is elegantly Whiteheadian
;
of novelty
emerging within order and order emerging from novelty. In the words
of William James, it is the "felt transition from one passing thought
or drop of experience to the next." The data provide fresh insight
into James’ testimony of the immanence of the past in the present-
-
that the immediate present is the felt transition from the immediate
past. Thus, for James, the clap of thunder is the feeling of the
silence persisting from a moment ago. "The parts of experience hold
together from next to next by the relations that are themselves parts
of experience."
2.3.6 The Dynamics of Perception. To recapitulate a basic premise
articulated at the beginning of this paper, the relation between or-
ganism and environment must be described not in static terms but in
terms of its ongoing transactions. If we put the emphasis on opera-
tions, there is no clear distinction between self and world and body
and mind- -indeed, the two become functionally inseparable. This may
be a clue that efforts at such abstraction would be missing the mark.
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Operationally, the more important entities to be considered are per-
haps not the system and environment so much as the flow-processes
that connect them-
-their mode of interrelation.
We now see that the classical model of perception, which
assigns the sense organs to the mere role of transducers, changing
physical energy to some physiological analog which subsequently gets
selected for further processing by the central nervous system, is a
vast and somewhat misleading oversimplification of the perceptual
process. The transformation, and alterations that the nervous sys-
tem performs upon the original physical stimulus received by the
sense organs are profound and impressive.
Similarly, there is no longer any empirical basis for as-
suming that perception involves a template -matching process wherein
the brain matches incoming sensory data to a duplicate schema which
is stored somewhere in the cortex. According to such an explanation,
the only way in which I am able to see a chair or to perceive it in
any meaningful sense is to fish through my perceptual memory until I
can match the present array on the retina with its exact mental ana-
log. If nothing else, there is a basic logical problem behind the
template theory in that the number of possible patterns or combina-
tions of patterns as well as the new viewing angles or transpositions
under which these original patterns may be perceived is practically
infinite. If we needed a template for each figure or schema we see
or know in its many variations and distortions, the number of neural
networks and the size of the brain required to process our daily in-
take of data would rapidly approach infinity . Yet , the fact remains
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that human beings are faced daily with the task of recognizing
familiar patterns in previously unexperienced perspectives and con-
texts. Moreover, there is no indication that there are any limits to
one s capacity to do this despite the fact that the number of physical
networks in the brain is finite.
But there is another difficulty. If we accept the template
theory, we are left with the serious problem of explaining how these
templates are acquired or developed. The theory cannot account for the
ontological genesis of these neural structures. Hebb proposes that the
neural structures are honed out in a cumulative fashion as certain
groups of neurons are repeatedly stimulated in a particular pattern
or sequence. But this does not hold. If to properly recognize a
situation from a particular perspective it is necessary to match the
specific array with its corresponding analog, how is it possible for
a child to recognize something from a perspective he has never before
witnessed? The only alternative is to say that the structures are
pre-existent, i.e., without genesis. Such a position would be un-
tenable in the face of empirical evidence and antithetical to a
developmentally based process psychology.
Our position is that an adequate account of perception must
be firmly built upon the notions of structure , process and subjective
aim.
Stepping in the direction of such a reformulation is Hale's
principle of "analysis by synthesis." As opposed to passive template
plate-matching, Hale stresses that perception is an operation of ac-
tively comparing incoming data with previously learned intenelations.
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Presumably, there is a set of rather general purpose operations which
examine the features of data input extracted by basic physiological
analyses. These features are differentiated according to the struc-
tures yielded by previous learning and experience and are subsequent-
ly integrated into a novel structure as a function of (1) those already
existent integrations and (2) the subjective aim (conscious or sub-
conscious) by which the novelty is introduced into the occasion. Thus
the assimilation and accommodation of perceptual data is characterized
and sustained by an ongoing process of creative synthesis.
Perception conceived in terms of analysis (differentiation)
,
by synthesis (integration)
,
explains the extremely important role that
context plays in the recognition of patterns, a role which could not
be accounted for by the template
-matching model. For example, we
often recognize persons who have been considerably changed by the
passage of years. On the other hand, we may fail to recognize an
unchanged face in a novel or unexpected context. This apparent
anomaly can be resolved when we consider the operation from the stand-
point of process. In these terms, pattern recognition occurs to the
extent that the present act of visual synthesis approximates an
earlier one. Thus it is not a matter of absolute similarity among
the items (determined by some fixed abstract criteria) which is criti-
cal or pertinent, but their similarity along dimensions used by the
subject in the two acts of synthesis or construction involved.
95
2.4 TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF ATTENTION
Building upon this interpretation, we propose that attention
be defined as the momentary focus and configuration of perceptual oper-
ations within the total (inner and outer) environment. This configura-
tion possesses a unitary character, i.e., no more than one focus can
predominate during any given occasion or the structure of conscious-
ness disintegrates. The focus need not be confined to concrete data--
it may just as well be an abstraction or an unrealized ideal. As was
explained earlier, consequent to its unitary nature, it follows that
attention implies a selective interaction with the multitude of data
received by the organism.
2.4.1 Attention and the Morphology of Abstraction. As Whitehead
points out, the power of conceptual abstraction is its ability to unify
data which on a concrete level are inconsistent or unrelated among them-
selves. A necessary consequence of such abstraction, however, is that
the rich diversity and subtle uniqueness of experience must to some de-
gree be sacrificed. Consequently, it is not only impossible but im-
practical for us to view the world exclusively in terms of towering
abstraction. Conscious understanding, knowledge, indeed survival, de-
pend upon continual interchange between the general and specific,
between the abstract and the concrete. As such, the bulk of our ex-
perience is built upon various degrees of abstraction. As we move away
from the abstract toward consideration of the concrete pole of actual
data, the subtleties and differences among things emerge into awareness
and accordingly we encounter aspects of this inconsistency. For example,
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we may see an array of objects; some are cone-shaped, others cube-shaped.
Insofar as our attention is directed towards coneness or cubeness, we
may not be immediately aware as to whether the objects are blue, red,
or yellow. Color may be irrelevant in determining the focus of attention.
Thus, on the basis of shape (a unifying principle), we are able to at-
tend to an entire set of diverse objects as comprising one object of
attention. The singular focus of attention in this case is the abstract
entity shape and under this single theme we are able to integrate an
entire set of concretely different objects into one object of attention.
If we descend the ladder another step so that we take the color of the
objects into our immediate awareness, i.e., we "prehend" the data of
color, we suddenly introduce disjunctive elements into the perceptual
occasion. The formerly single "object of attention" perishes and be-
comes segmented, creating several new and independent potential foci.
In this condition, each focus constitutes a potential object of atten-
tion and a new criteria or ceiling for the inclusion and exclusion of
data. To entertain one focus requires the momentary suppression or
exclusion of other possible foci. For example, to perceive an object as
a red cone demands reciprocally that one perceive it as not blue or not
yellow. To see an object as both red and blue simultaneously is con-
tradictory in terms of the conditions. The exclusion of data incompat-
ible with unity of the perceptual event by negative prehension is the
boundary principle underlying the selective nature of attention.
The conception of attention as a constructive act of synthesis
is remarkably consistent with the theory James advanced over 75 years
ago in his Principles of Psychology 3 (Vol. I). James proposed that
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attention involved two processes: (1) the accommodation of the sense
organs, and (2) preparation from within of the ideational centers con-
cerned with the object to which the attention is paid. James calls
this anticipatory pre -perception. The former concerns the physical
orientation of the sense receptor itself, e.g., direction of the eye-
ball, focusing of the image upon the retina, while the latter refers
to a matrix or schema retrieved from primary memory which the individual
conjoins with the present stimulus. He writes, "The image in the mind
is the attention; the preperception is half of the perception of the
looked-for thing." James avoids the pitfalls of an exact copy or tem-
plate model by explaining that the pre-perceptual image is a matrix of
references which are brought to bear upon the immediate array of af-
ferent stimulation; references of past association, references to
native and acquired interests, references to aims and aspirations.
These references are what suffuse with the factual data in creating the
percipient occasion. For James, "The only things which we commonly see
are those which we preperceive."
This notion also accounts for the fact that what is synthe-
sized is not always so clear and distinct as Tichener and his intro-
spectionists claim. Recall that for Tichener, the effect of attention
was to enhance the accuracy or resolution of the perception. However,
the object of attention may be amorphous and ill-defined but still very
much at the center of focal awareness. This is because the construc-
tion and synthesis will contain only those dimensions which the subject
has given it. Thus, the young child’s perception of an automobile
though intensive, will tend to be relatively undifferentiated. If
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asked to draw what he sees, he is likely to omit the door handles,
chrome trimming, window vents and other details, whereas a designer is
apt to "see" much more of the subtleties and detail since he brings to
the situation a highly differentiated and integrated set of references
and operations which allow him to attend to and perceive the car in
far greater complexity and refinement.
2. 4.2 The Purposive Base of Attention. One advantage in regarding
attention as an act of constructive synthesis is the parsimonious way
in which it can account for the effects of intention. In passive
models of attention, intention has been a troublesome problem. Since
by definition intention is an active construct, it introduces a funda-
mental inconsistency into a basically passive system of explanation.
As an ad hoc element which had to be brought in from outside the ex-
planatory framework, intention has been an inert concept unrelated in
a vital sense to the rest of the theory. Although many theorists in-
tuitively recognize its indispensability within the formal theories, in-
tention as a construct was never articulated in a way that had coher-
ence or explanatory value. This anomalous inconsistency has in the
past led many of the more rigorous experimentalists to discard the con-
cept altogether. Though such disillusionment may well have been
justified, the strategy of pushing the issue under the rug does not
solve the problem. Fortunately, the present model is not only logic-
ally compatible with, but even requires intention as a component of
the system.
To restate the problem, how is it possible for a person to
select in a situation where there are two or more stimuli of equal in-
tensity in relatively equal proximity, one such object and reject the
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other, to hear one voice and ignore the others, to ’’see" one image or
configuration and "not see" the others? Presumably the unattended data
are impinging on the sense receptors just as strongly as the one to
which the subject is attending yet he is in most instances successful in
selectively perceiving only those data which he intends to entertain.
If the answer is to claim that intention determines which template is
activated to accommodate the present stimuli, all we’ve said is that
intention is a factor- -we still have not explained in any significant
sense how it operates, how in causal terms the process of selection is
accomplished. However, when attention is conceptualized as an act of
synthesis the role of intention can be better understood. If the in-
dividual perceives reality by constructing it3 then selection becomes
an integral function of the creative operation underlying the percep-
tual event.
Let us bracket this statement for a moment and recall an
earlier discussion dealing with the concept of intentionality, in which
we explored the link between what one knows and what one intends. It
was Bretano who said that consciousness is defined by the fact that it
intends something, points towards something outside itself- -specifically
that it intends an object. The ancestral roots of this notion can be
traced back to Aristotle who wrote, "What is given to the eyes [what is
perceived or apprehended] is the intention of the soul." The inter-
connection is succinctly illustrated in the etymology of intention.
The
Latin root from which "intend" and its associated derivatives
stem is
"tendere" meaning "to stretch," from which we get "tension."
This im-
mediately suggests that intention is a stretching of the
mind, a tending
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or pulling toward another entity. Intentional ity is vital inasmuch as
it determines the degrees of importance and dimensions of meaning we as-
sign to a situation and thereby introduces perspective and structure into
our experience. Our aims and purposes in a sense provide the all im-
portant context into which the fragments of data (differentiated ex-
perience) are integrated to form the meaningful realities of our exis-
tence .
Returning to the original question, intention operates as one
parameter influencing the direction or form of process taken in the act
of perception. We are assuming that the essence of an individual's being
consists of a continual transition from potentiality to actuality. Thus,
at any given moment in one's life, one has to determine which one among
the myriad number of possibilities before him he will actually become
in the next moment. (This means that some possibilities have to be
selected while others must, therefore, be excluded.) Whitehead explains
that this self-determination in the act of creation is conditioned by
the "subjective aim" of the organism. Subjective aim or purpose is what
preserves the continuity and identity of the evolving entity. To some
degree, what the organism becomes is automatically decided by historical
and biological factors. Yet for Whitehead even the genetic code which
governs the form and patterns of our bodily processes without our con-
scious decision is an aspect or level upon which subjective aim exerts
its influence. Conscious intention and purpose are the highly developed
and complex genre of subjective aim associated with human experience.
But it serves the same type of function as its lower-order exemplifica-
tions, shaping the pattern and continuity of one's concrescence.
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Briefly, intention is a foimative element in the process of becoming,
or self-creating, and since attention or selective perception is in
every way a manifestation of this process, it also is subject to the
causal ingression of purpose.
Again, this supposition is consistent with experimental evi-
dence as well as informal observation. For example, it is commonly
known that a person's expectations about a situation heavily influence
his actual perception of that situation. If an observer is led to ex-
pect that he will see a particular shape or object, he often sees what
he expected to appear rather than what was actually presented. Such
tendencies may be introduced by instruction or by the more frequent
cases in which an observer's general familiarity with a situation
causes him to perceive what he expects. A well-known illustration of
this phenomenon is the proof-reader's illusion, the case in which a
reader does not detect misspelled versions of familiar words. He, in
effect, "fills in" the missing letter, or "corrects" the wrong word
himself, without any conscious effort of doing so. Of course, the in-
dividual may be trained or given special practice in detecting such
discrepancies, but this involves establishing a "set" which sensitizes
him to certain incongruities of configurations in his sensory experience.
In the case of the proof-reader, he is able to be receptive to discrep-
ancies only by ignoring to a considerable extent the meaning of the
material he is reading.
2. 4.3 The Physiology of Attention. A newly opened vista of inquiry,
the physiological study of attention, holds promise and is a fascinating
field of investigation.
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Recent studies by Magoun (1958) and Hernandez
-Peon (1964)
suggest that the physiological processes underlying attention at least
partially involve the reticular formation, a structure located in the
thalamic region of the brain- stem.
One of the functions of the reticular formation seems to be
the regulation of the sleeping and waking patterns of the organism; the
initiation of arousal and quiescent states. But the reticular formation
is also functional in the perceptual processes of waking life and it
appears that the locus of these operations is centered in a section of
the structure other than that concerned with sleep-waking cycles.
Evidently the ascending afferent neural fibers are structurally
divided into two pathways. The main pathway, sometimes referred to as
the lemniscal system, rapidly conducts incoming sensory impulses from
the lower ganglia directly to the cerebral cortex. In addition to this
system there is both physiological and anatomical evidence indicating
the presence of a high-threshold, slow conducting extra-lemniscal sys-
tem, the locus of which is presumably the reticular formation. This dif-
fuse system apparently receives input from all sensory systems by means
of collateral fibers which connect the reticular formation to the main
pathways leading to the cortex from the lower brain. At one time, it
was thought that the reticular formation was fed by collateral fibers
branching off from the direct tract leading to the cortex in the region
of the midbrain, but later research confirms that the extra-lemniscal
system is fed by a separate and independent neural tract. The primary
function of this system does not appear to be the transmission of sen-
sory messages, but it does seem to play a major role in the functions of
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arousal and vigilance.
Operationally, the extra- lemniscal system serves to enhance
the sensitivity of the receptor areas in the cortex and to facilitate
their nervous discharges particularly with respect to input which is
novel or interesting. At the same time, it acts to inhibit cortical
responses to repeated or uninteresting stimulation (Hernandez
-Peon,
1967). Granit (1955) and Dodt (1956) observed that stimulation of the
reticular formation could either inhibit or facilitate the unit dis-
charge of retinal ganglion cells. Similar effects were demonstrated in
relation to the auditory system. Because the reticular formation seems
to mediate this function in a number of sensory modes, Hernandez -Peon has
characterized it as a poly- sensory system.
Although the rostral brain- stem is undoubtedly involved in
the control and maintenance of attention, there is still a missing link.
How does this diffuse sub -cortical system ’’know" which impulses are to
be excluded or attenuated and which are to be amplified? This question
is particularly important with regard to the sophisticated varieties of
attentional control found in man and the higher animals. In what opera-
tional mode, for example, is meaning introduced as a determining factor
in attention? Recalling an earlier discussion, it was suggested that
the nature of meaning is ultimately sensible only when placed within
the framework of some goal or purpose. This may be an oversimplifica-
tion but it certainly is clear that meaning is a highly complex phenome-
non which in many instances implicitly involves teleological criteria.
As such, we might expect the higher forebrain structures to play an
active role in the selective inhibition and facilitation of the afferent
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sensory tracts through the reticular formation. Also, it would be in-
teresting to see if the conceptual interconnection between meaning and
volition is supported by a physiological correlate. More specifically,
if it can be established that the frontal
-lobe structures associated
with the capacity to form and carry out intentions are also involved in
the selective functions of the reticular formulation, we may at last
have uncovered physiological justification for the psychological sup-
position that purpose is an irreducible causal factor in our perceptual
and cognitive enjoyment of the world.
As it turns out, a number of recent investigations have phys-
iologically and anatomically traced descending corticofugal axon fibers
extending from localized cortical areas into the vigilance system of the
reticular formation. Of all the corticofugal projections, those arising
from the frontal lobes appear to be most importantly related to the
maintenance of attention since ablations of the frontal cortex in mon-
keys and frontal lobotomies in humans interfere with the performance
of tasks that require sustained attention.
At present, it is impossible to say what ultimate value or
significance inquiry into the physiological aspects of attention will
hold. At the moment, so little exists that current studies provide al-
most nothing in the way of new perspectives on the problem. At best,
where its findings are conclusive, physiological research can serve as
a testing ground for the validity of current theories and their con-
structs.
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2.4.4 Operational Phases. By now, it should be clear that attention
is a term applied to a very complex aggregate of operations, highly in-
terrelated and reciprocal to one another. For the sake of conceptual
analysis, we propose following Neisser (1967), that the phenomenon of
attention can be broken down into two distinct phases: (1) pre-
attentive structuring, and (2) focal attention. These two aspects
might be better described as sequential stages in the attention process.
Objects or patterns in our environment are identified only
after they have been segmented (differentiated) one from another. Since
the processes of focal attention are by nature structuring and selec-
tive and are unable to operate on all perceptual data simultaneously,
they are effective only after preliminary operations have already seg-
regated or formed the figural or auditory units upon which attention
may be focused. These preliminary operations, though very elusive and
somewhat inaccessible to current experimental methods, are nevertheless
a subject of great interest and importance to attention theorists.
Neisser calls these operations, pre-attentive processes, to emphasize
that they bring forth the units which subsequent processes elaborate
and interpret. As such, pre-attentive operations are relatively global
or holistic, serving to separate figure from ground, and to establish a
tacit framework for more explicit analysis. In terms of our process
model of attention, preattention creates and maintains the frame of
reference and boundary conditions within which the constructive syn-
thesis aspect of attention takes place. The versatility and capability
of this process is dependent upon previous experiences of differentiat-
ing and integrating similar types of situations. For example, Neisser
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points out that, on request, a literate person can focus his attention
onto a single letter of the page (for instance the "gM appearing earlier
in this sentence). Having found it, he can note whether it is well-
formed or how it differes from such letters as "pM or "b. M The pre-
attentive processes keep the "g" a separate and integral unit while all
this happens. This is an acquired or learned capacity, very difficult
for young children and illiterates. They must deal with much cruder ob-
jects of attention, such as the entire block of print on the page or the
whole word in which the "g" is embedded.
Thus, it would be a serious misjudgment to conclude that because
preattention is such a fleeting and implicit part of our experience, it
should be taken for granted. It is precisely because it is so implicit
that it must be taken seriously, and its subtleties and complexities
elucidated.
The functional significance is encapsulated in the old Gestalt
maxim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This means
that the appearance of a part depends upon the whole in which it is em-
bedded, that the manner in which a piece of data is interpreted, its sig-
nificance and identity, is a determinant function of the nature of its
inter-relations with other pieces of data in the constitution of a
higher-order entity. (Recall Polanyi’s reformulation of this phenomenon
in terms of "tacit inference.")
The next logical question: Does an observer first see the
parts as separate elements in and of themselves and then infer the pat-
tern or whole they constitute, or is the whole seen first, without a pre-
liminary analysis of the parts? In some respects, this question is
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inappropriate, because it is based upon some unchecked presuppositions;
specifically, to presume that one either sees the whole or the parts as
if the two were mutually exclusive of each other. However, the per-
ception of the whole requires perception of its component parts or else
there would be no whole to perceive. As Polanyi emphasizes, it is the
way in which the parts are perceived which makes the difference. Re-
call the contrast between focal awareness of the elements as self-
sufficient particulars and subsidiary awareness of these parts as clues
which contribute toward a subsuming higher-order reality.
Rephrasing the question then, do we prehend the data of a
situation first focally and then subsidiarily or vice versa, i.e., do
we first examine the elements of a situation as separate particulars
and then infer their existence as a constellated whole, or is it the
other way around? There is strong indication from both subjective and
physiological evidence that situations are immediately experienced in
terms of structured wholes and then secondarily core the various parts
isolated from context as abstracted entities. The rapidity and ef-
ficiency with which we recognize complex patterns would preclude any
possibility of a perceptual system which relied upon inductive inference.
Such a mode of processing would be so inefficient and so cumbersome as
to require physical and neurological resources hundreds of times larger
than those which the human brain possesses.
For example, reading 300 words per minute (an average speed)
breaks down to an average of 5 words per second. Let us assume for a
moment that each word contains an average of 6-7 letters. If before the
word could be recognized, each letter had to be separately identified
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and combined with the ones preceding it, and then after every possible
combination is considered and the most likely inference is selected,
the operation would require hundreds of sequential decisions per second
merely to recognize the words themselves. This of course does not in-
clude an account of the more complex syntactic and semantic decisions
which still must be made. We would concur with George Miller that to
say that people can make '’decisions" at such rates is to extend the
concept well beyond its useful range. He suggests that phenomeno-
logical data show that the larger, more meaningful decisions are made
first and that the details are pursued only so far as they are necessary
to serve one's immediate purposes.
Thus, preattention provides a skeletal synthesis for a broad
range of incoming data. It is primitive (though learned) and holistic.
A more elaborate synthesis is then constructed around some focal unit
which has been derived by the preattentive processes. The operations of
focal attention articulate and abstract the subtle variations, the re-
fined structure of forms in our environment. It consists of differen-
tiating the various modes of extensive interconnection between the sub-
ject and the object in clear and distinct terms. Whereas preattention
yields a comparatively vague and global awareness of life's flow and
transition in focal attention, the perception acquires a selective em-
phasis whereby the finite occasions of experience receive clear defi-
nition. The price of such articulation and refinement is, however, the
exclusion of other possible perspectives. Nevertheless, its power is
awesome. As Whitehead puts it:
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This clarity of human vision both enhances the
uniqueness of each individual occasion and at the same
time discloses its essential relationships to occasions
other than itself. It emphasizes both finite individ-
uality and its relationship to other individualities.
Further, it discloses some analysis of the matter-
of-fact in immediate realization. And yet, by this
disclosure it brings into prominence the potentialities
for alternative realizations, in the past, in the
future, in the present. It tells what may be and what
might have been. It lays bare diversities and analogies.
Mankind enoys a vision of the function of form within
fact, and of the issue of value from this interplay
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 77).
2.4.5 Conclusion. In the preceding pages, an attempt has been made
to develop a coherent definition of attention based upon the process
metaphysics of Whitehead and the psychological philosophy of James.
Working from this frame of reference we have sought to interpret and
integrate the rather specialized findings and concerns of experimen-
tal psychology.
Because current theory and research pertinent to attention
ranges over a broad spectrum of conceptual issues and diverse method-
ological approaches (e.g., introspective, phenomenological, experi-
mental, physiological) a comprehensive definition of attention must be
sufficiently general to accommodate and integrate the various avenues
of inquiry. However, in order to render such generalization meaning-
ful, it is necessary to explore its applications to specific problem
areas. Hence, the extensive treatment given to articulating and ex-
plicating the interface of attention with its related notions and con-
structs: interest, intention, set, arousal, perceptual selectivity
and structuring, and consciousness.
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In brief, the purpose of this entire chapter is to lay the
foundation for, and develop the meaning of, a definition of attention
as the process by which the organism purposively selects (differentiates)
and structures (integrates) feelings, sensory information, memories, and
ideas in the immediate present into a unity of conscious experience.
This focal unity depends upon the continual penetration and transforma-
tion of the subject's environment (including memories, ideals, possibili-
ties as well as extereoceptive sensation)
,
the perpetual perishing of
the present and the progressive unfolding of potentiality toward a novel
synthesis of consciousness. It is our thesis that purpose provides the
coherence, continuity and direction of this creative advance.
2.5 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
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2.5.1 LEARNING COMPETENCE AND ATTENTION:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
If there is one point over which educators find no dispute,
it would be that attention is a fundamental prerequisite to effective
learning. Indeed, the statement appears to be so self evident that it
hardly bears mentioning. Yet, why and how attention so influences learn-
ing is somewhat less obvious and on this score psychologists are in far
less agreement. Many of these differences can be understood in terms of
the various conceptions of attention that have grown out of contemporary
research, conceptions which we reviewed in the previous chapter (i.e.,
attention as arousal, organization, selectivity). Nevertheless, it is
helpful to make a more detailed analysis of the manner in which at-
tention is related to learning competence in order to establish more
precisely its crucial role.
Recall that our fundamental assumption about the nature of
human life is that its intensity is affected by the degree to which an
individual is engaged in creative evolution or concrescence. This pro-
cess is mediated by the reciprocal capacities of differentiation and
integration. Differentiation involves a definition and particulari-
zation of substance and experience which results in the establishment
of diversity whereas integration concerns the structuring of these di-
verse elements into a new unity- -the creation of order or pattern. The
identity of each element then emerges as the totality of its inter-
relations whith other elements in the constitution of the actualizing
whole organism. The psychological and spiritual aspects of concrescence
are what we define as learning. Learning competence is, then, the ability
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to differentiate and integrate any aspect of experience in such a way
as to put the individual in greater touch with the reality of the or-
ganic interrelatedness characterizing his physical, human, and spirit-
ual environments. Inasmuch as we have defined attention in terms of
selection (differentiation) and construction (integration) of ex-
periential data, one might naturally expect that attention is at the
very core of the learning process itself. How then do we justify treat-
ing it as a distinctive process? In fact, we cannot. It may be more
correct to regard attention as a mode of interaction that underlies and
constitutes a phase of learning.
As James has written, the effect of attention is to make us
perceive, conceive, distinguish and remember things better. Recall his
point that an object attended to will remain in the memory and his con-
clusion that because attention is one of the tasks of the self, the lat-
ter helps deteimine which things get in the primary (long-term) memory.
McDougall maintained that the effect of attention is not only to select
and stabilize a particular form of thought but to allow for a more de-
tailed analysis and therefore a more subtle control of actions with
respect to that focus.
These statements indicate three ways in which attention serves
as a means of differentiating experience. First, it enhances the subtle-
ties and detail of our immediate perception of things. Secondly, it
mediates the storage and retrieval access of experience and thirdly,
because attention allows us to discriminate or distinguish variations
among data on a high level of resolution and refinement, we are
capable
of responding more effectively to the diversity within our
environment.
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In other words, unless we are able to differentiate between
two situations, we have no basis upon which to develop different kinds
of actions towards them.
These propositions receive a good deal of empirical documen-
tation from the research concerned with intentional versus incidental
learning. In the laboratory studies of human learning, it has been
demonstrated again and again that the presence of an intention or "task"
to learn can have a very powerful effect upon the rate and accuracy of
learning. Although there are differing points of view as to how the
intention to learn exerts its effect upon learning, suffice it to say
that the explanation which most adequately and coherently accounts for
the experimental data and which is most congruent with the evidence of
subjective experience, centrally involves the direction and redirection
of attention. Presumably, the attention is intensified or redirected
by the task and as a result, the material is more organized or per-
ceived differently. Earlier in this paper we attempted to explain how
intention and purpose were formative elements in the process of attention.
It was emphasized that perception is a creative function of the
organism
and is thus subject to the aims and purposes of the individual. White
-
head, concurring that this organic construction necessarily
involves
the realization of ideal ends or subjective aim, writes.
The conception of knowledge as passive contemplation
is too inadequate to meet the facts. Nature is
ever
originating its own development and the sense of action
is the direct knowledge of the percipient event
as
having its very being in the formation of natural
relations .... For this reason Perception
at the utmost point of creation . • • : Th®
forwar
moving time exhibits this characteristic of
experience,
that it is essentially action. This passage.
. .
in other words, its creative advance, is its funda-
mental characteristic (In Eisendrath, 1970, p. 106).
With regard to the role of attention in the integration of
experience
,
a great deal has already been said in the previous chapter
.
A considerable portion of the discussion was devoted to describing how
the selective nature of attention could be ultimately understood as a
natural and necessary means by which the imperative coherence and unity
of consciousness is maintained. Introducing the Whiteheadian construct
of negative prehension provides a broad and basic philosophical justi-
fication for this function. Negative prehension on a psychological
level refers to the process by which the organism can dismiss, ignore,
or repress certain data which are incompatible with, and destructive to,
the unitary synthesis of the conscious field.
Another form of negative prehension which we said figured
prominently in the human experience is a conception of an ideal or un-
realized potentiality not actual in the immediate data. Focussing upon
this novel data necessitates to some extent a dismissal of certain as-
pects of the current situation. A person who interprets and responds to
a situation in terms of some ideal or goal has integrated the data of
his momentary situation in such a way as to exclude perspectives which
contradict the presently determining ideal. In this condition the con-
ceptual data (the ideal) negates the present data by replacing it. As
such, this mode of negative prehension underlies the supremely human act
of transcendence, one of the most powerful sources and means of
human
growth. As we shall see later, this capacity has implications
for moral
and spiritual development.
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So far, we have treated the relation between attention and
learning competence in very general terms. The remainder of this sec-
tion will concentrate on the importance of attention to several specific
aspects of learning competence.
2.5.2 ATTENTION AND VOLITION
William James defines the essence of "healthy will” as action
following vision. In so doing, he identifies attention as the central
problem of will. He writes, "Attention is the first and fundamental
thing in volition. The essential achievement of the will, in short,
when it is most voluntary, is to attend to a difficult object and hold
it fast before the mind [James, 1890, Vol. II, P. 528]." We might feel
apt to dismiss James’ account as naive and uninformative and excuse it
as an artifact of the primitive state of psychological thought during
this time. However, over 70 years later, Rollo May was to concede,
When we analyze will with all the tools modem psycho-
analysis brings us we shall find ourselves pushed back
to the level of attention- intention as the seat of the
will. The effort which goes into the exercise of the
will is really effort of attention; the strain in willing
is the effort to keep the consciousness clear, i.e.,
the strain of keeping the attention focussed (May, 1970,
p. 220).
We are inclined to agree with May's analysis. No matter which
way we approach the problem, attention is an indispensable prerequisite
in any volitional process. In fact, it would appear that attention in
its rudimentary form is the genesis from which these other processes
evolve. Take, for example, the process of goal-setting or formulating
intentions. Implicit within any such consciously held goal or intention
is some measure of attention toward the object or situation which the
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goal reflects. It is worth re-emphasizing that the relation between
intention and attention is not of one state or faculty preceding the
other sequentially. Rather it is one of reciprocal interdependence-
-one
is a precondition for the other.
The ability to turn one’s attention towards some yet un-
realized possibility in the future is essential if one is to have a
degree of control and self-determination over his destiny.
The differentiation of complex goals and intentions into com-
ponent sub-plans and intermediary steps also requires the capacity to
focally attend and analyze the conditions and contingencies with which
one is faced in constructing a coherent plan of action. This includes
the ability to project and imagine the consequences of a given alter-
native. Obviously, other operations are involved in the process but
without the ability to isolate and focus upon a particular possibility
and follow-through the steps of projection and decision-making to con-
clusion, the individual's efforts would become fragmented, sporadic,
and ineffectual.
Although attention is most crucial in the formative phases of
goal-setting, it serves an important function in the translation of in-
tentions into actuality (the process of willing; See Chapter Four).
With respect to self- initiation, the first subprocess, it is
James who again provides us with a description, this time through one of
his charming anecdotes.
We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing
morning in a room without a fire, and how the very
vital principle within us protests against the ordeal
[remember James lived in New England before the advent
of central heating] . Probably most persons have lain
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on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable to
brace themselves to the resolve. We think how late
we shall be how the duties of the day will suffer; we
say, 'I must get up, this is ignominious,' and so’ on.
But still the warm couch feels too delicious and the
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away
and postpones itself again and again just as it seemed
on the verge of the decisive act. Now how do we ever
get up under such circumstances? If I may generalize
from my own experience we more often then not get up
without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly
find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of con-
sciousness occurs, we forget both the warmth and the
cold; we fall into some reverie connected with the
day's life, in the course of which the idea flashes
across us, 'Hollo! I must lie here no longer' --an
idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradicting
or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces
immediately its appropriate motor effects. (James,
1890, Vol. II, p. 527)
And then he adds,
It was our acute consciousness of both the warmth and
the cold during the period of struggle which paralyzed
our activity. (Ibid.)
As Rollo May has pointed out, there are important links mis-
sing from this description. For example, at the crucial turning point
of the episode, the moment in which the intention is actualized, James
skips over the issue by saying that there is merely a fortunate lapse
of consciousness in which the paralyzing ambivalence is forgotten and
suddenly we get up. The implication is that the arousal to action
occurs almost by accident. If this were the whole truth there would be
no basis for arguing that will or attention has anything to do with
the purposive self-determining construction of personality.
In all fairness to James, I think it is highly unlikely that
he really meant this. Gleaning from his writing elsewhere on the sub-
ject, he hints that there is more going on than just a lapse of
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consciousness is a direct result of the purposive dimension underlying
our perceptual cognitive processes. To explain this, let us momentarily
retrace our steps to the previous discussion of the relation between
interest and attention.
We suggested that interest be regarded as the feeling (loving)
component of attention and that one's interest in a situation or object
will determine his capacity to attend to it. It was also argued that
whether or not one would be interested in something would depend upon
how the particular thing in question is subjectively perceived to relate
to one's deep-seated aims and ideals. It would seem that the missing
element in James' account is the causal role of interest (loving) or in-
tentionality in creating the fantasy connedted with the day's events.
The rest falls into place when we realize that fantasy is a mode of
attention in which the object is some unrealized occasion or form of
concrescence, i.e.
,
the object is potential as opposed to actual.
As a variety of attention, fantasy is also by nature selec-
tive, in which case the actual data of the immediate present, in this
instance the warmth of the bed and the cold outside, are dismissed from
consciousness along with conflicting tendencies they evoked. As the
fantasized possibilities assume prominence in the phenomenal field, they
accordingly evoke their respective ideomotor tendencies. In other words
if a compelling idea or intention is brought into the focus of attention
unobstructed, an action will automatically follow. The keynote here is
"unobstructed attention." The felt tendency merges into and becomes the
bodily expression.
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James' application of the ideomotor theory to the problem of
will is one of his greatest insights because it so beautifully avoids
the perilous bifurcation of mind and body which so easily creeps into
explanations of will. Mind and body, or as Whitehead says, the mental
and physical poles of an actual entity, interfuse with each other in
the process of becoming (concrescence). Thus, the nature of our in-
dividual experience, our role as causal agents in our own advance is a
unity of body and mind. Though in an abstract sense, we may see them
as distinctly different natures in the ongoing process of life, the two
intermingle and merge in every occasion to create a single actual being.
Returning to self-arousal, it follows as an expression of un-
encumbered intention or attention toward unrealized possibility. Until
the conscious field is momentarily released of competing intentions so
that a unitary idea or fantasy is held in unobstructed prominence, the
initiation of action will be fragmented, weak, ineffectual, and per-
haps immobilized.
Much the same relation applies to perseverance which is the
process of maintaining effort toward the actualization of some intention
or purpose when faced with difficulties. If the child is able to fan-
tasize (i.e., direct his attention toward) the desired goal state, he
can often infuse his immediate activity with new energy and determination,
especially when the goal is remote. Fantasy can also provide the criti-
cal impetus needed to consummate goal -directed activity and achieve
closure
.
ATTENTION AND COGNITION
For Piaget, the process of centering attention upon data in
2 . 2.3
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the environment is a fundamental prerequisite for all stages of opera-
tional thought. In fact, Piaget regards the concentration of attention
on one idea as precisely nothing else but the centering of thought
(Piaget, 1966). He points out how in pre-operational intuitive thought
the child is able to focus his attention on one dimension of comparison
between two different sized and shaped objects. For example, take the
case of the child who estimates that there are more beads in jar "B" than
in jar "A" because the level has been raised. He centers his attention
on the relation between the heights of B and A and ignores the widths.
But if we transfer the beads from B into another glass, C, which is even
thinner and taller, the child is apt to reply that there are fewer beads
because C is too narrow. This represents a shift of attention from
height to width. On the other hand, the child who judges the quantity
in B to be less than that in A on account of thinness is likely to favor
the increased length of C in favor of height and ignore the decrease of
width. Piaget remarks:
Now the transition from a single centring to two
successive centrings heralds the beginnings of the
operation; once he reasons with respect to both
relations at the same time the child will in fact
deduce conservation (Ibid, p. 131).
Thus the operational stages of thought are characterized by an
increasing ability to coordinate and focus one' attention upon the
various aspects of incoming sensory data so as to yield a more complex
and versatile integration of the referrent experience.
The simultaneous coordination of many variables in the stage of
concrete operations does not mean that attention is focally divided to-
wards each variable or dimension independently. Such a hypothesis
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would be in contradiction to our knowledge of attention as primarily a
unitary phenomenon. But this apparent contradiction is resolved when
we recall that the unit object of attention may be a higher order con-
cept, an abstraction which structures the plurality of variables into
a number of subsidiary functions which converge into a joint focal
meaning; e.g., height and width and depth are three separate variables
which can be coordinated into a single abstract unity identified by the
concept of volume.
In the more advanced formal operations stage which involves
logical transformation of operational data, the child must develop the
capacity to disregard the immediate intuitive appearance of an object
in favor of interacting with it on the basis of these complex ab-
stractions. As Piaget points out, with the advent of formal operations,
there is more than mere representation of things as they are "Since the
world of the possible becomes available for construction and since
thought [attention] becomes free from the ’real’ world [Ibid., 151]."
One final note- -Piaget' s equation of attention with the cen-
tering of thought is a point I think worth re-emphasizing. For Piaget,
thought is an internalized scheme of operations by which the individual
transforms the perceptual data and constructs his view of reality. This
is entirely congruent with the conception of attention as the process by
which the subject actively selects and synthesizes the sensory and con-
ceptual data of the immediate present into an experience of conscious-
ness.
Turning to the field of research, many studies underscore the
key role of attention in the formation and utilization of concepts.
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Effective conceptual thinking depends upon the ability to respond to a
situation very selectively in terms of one or several of its attributes.
If a child is unable to focus his attention upon the relevant attributes
of an embedded instance while ignoring the irrelevant qualities, his
capacity to order and classify experience and thus manage its otherwise
overwhelming complexity, will be severely handicapped.
To cite just two studies, one by Hendrickson and Muehl (1962)
involved training children to attend to the relevant attributes of a
discrimination task. The trained group markedly outperformed a control
group that lacked such training. Another study by Klausmeir and Meinke
(1968) was conducted to ascertain the effect of various kinds of in-
struction upon a concept-learning task. When subjects were taught both
the plan and principle (purpose) for the focusing of attention on the
problem, the efficiency of their efforts was superior to any of the
other groups.
2.5.3 THE ROLE OF ATTENTION IN THE EXERCISE OF VALUES:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT
Inasmuch as the application of moral and spiritual principles
to one’s daily life involves the translation of ideality or aims into
actuality, volitional competence is centrally implicated in the moral
and spiritual aspects of human growth. Since we have discussed in de-
tail the relation of attention to volitional competence already, we can
infer a great deal about the role of attention in value effectance.
But to make this interrelation more explicit, let us consider a speci-
fic illustration. Assume that individual "A" holds as his highest
value, working toward the organic oneness of the human race.
Let us
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also assume that A sees the primary means of realizing this ideal in
his personal life as the establishment of harmony in his interpersonal
relationships. Now, one of A's frequent contacts is "B" a cantankerous
ill -wishing individual, seemingly devoid of a real interest in the feel-
ings of others. Thus, whenever A meets B, A's capacity to respond to B
in a manner congruent with his values is often overtaxed. However, A
discovers that he is much more successful in actualizing this value if
he actively focuses his attention upon the positive qualities which B
displays (however sporadically) and ignores the irritable aspects of
the latter's character. The effect of this strategy then begins to
exert a transforming effect upon B's actions as both informal experi-
ence and the research on behavior modification would predict.
Raising this to a more general level, one of the goals of
value competence is the expression of one's ultimate concerns and values
in the immediate structuring of potentialities as they become powers in
the actuality of everyday life, a supremely human form of transcendence.
One means of achieving transcendence is to focus consciousness- -atten-
tion- -upon a potential object (ideal, value) which lies beyond the
actual data and to introduce it as a novel element into the immediate
occasion.
2 . 6 DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
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In a review of the literature pertaining to the genesis and
development of attention in early childhood, Blum and Adcock (1968)
suggest that certain long-held notions about the ontogeny of attention
need to be critically re-examined. For example, a supposition quite
popular in recent years is that the infant’s world is largely un-
differentiated. However, this notion has been seriously challenged by
a number of studies during the past five years. Investigations by Fantz
(1961, 1964, 1965), Stechler and Latz (1966) indicate that the child
selectively attends, i.e., fixates his gaze upon (though not on a wholly
voluntary basis) prominent visual patterns in his environment within the
first week after birth.
Carpenter and Stechler (1967) observed that infants displayed
an increase in attentiveness (fixation) from the first through the second
week with a drop between the second and the third. From the third week
on, however, there was a steady increase in the period of fixation along
with the emergence of definite approach- avoidance reactions toward
various objects.
Hunt (1965) also points to a number of studies which indicate
that infants possess the capacity for crude pattern recognition shortly
after birth. Specifically, neonates appear to prefer (i.e., they fixate
longer upon) patterned surfaces to homogeneous surfaces and they also tend
to prefer complex patterns to simple ones. Moreover, this appetite for
complexity increases both with age and experience,
A series of studies conducted by Gilmer and Moyer (1954, 1955)
yielded some surprising results. Their findings suggest that the child's
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ability to concentrate or attend to something for an extended period of
time remains relatively constant over the span from 18 months to seven
years of age. Apparently even very young children are able to concentrate
for relatively long periods of time in situations where they find mean-
ingful interaction. Given the proper setting, a child can be absorbed
in a single activity for perhaps a half hour without interruption. We
hasten to underscore that the span of attention is not only a function of
the child’s temperament and development, but also is related to the
manner in which the situation is presented and the modes of interaction
open to the child. If, for example, the stimulus array is simplified,
ordered and uncluttered, attention will be facilitated.
Another belief which has received little support from empiri-
cal studies is the popular assumption that children become less dis-
tractable with age. Hagen (1967) found that auditory distraction did
not negatively affect the performance of the younger children to any
greater extent than it did the older children. In visual tasks, ir-
relevant information placed adjacent to relevant material caused in-
terference, making performance at all ages inferior to performance under
conditions where no such distraction existed. It is again worth noting
that the effect of extraneous stimuli is not always to cause distrac-
tion. Whether or not is is attention-getting depends upon the needs and
adaptation level of the child.
To my knowledge, there does not exist a comprehensive theory
that deals directly with the growth and development of attention in
children. However, a number of writers have made significant contribu-
tions toward a fuller understanding of the process, sometimes directly
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or more often indirectly by way of some closely related issue.
One among this latter category is J. McV. Hunt. In a monograph
published in 1965, Hunt attempted to point out how the traditionally dom-
inant answers to the question of human motivation based upon homeostatic
principles of drive coupled with associationistic principles of learn-
ing were inadequate in explaining a large segment of human behavior. He
argued that most of our actions are purposive in origin and cannot be
accounted for in terms of extrinsicly based drives such as tissue defi-
cits, pain, sex, etc. Specifically, Hunt noted that in very early in-
fancy, children showed signs of an intrinsic motivation toward ex-
periencing both novelty and order in their interactions with the environ-
ment. This notion refers to basically the same phenomenon as R. White's
concept of competence motivation (White, 1959). Although the basis for this
motivation is presumably innate, it can be either facilitated or ex-
tinguished depending upon the quality of the environment to which the
child is exposed.
The relevance of this issue to attention lies in the fact that
the sort of actions toward which this intrinsic motivation aims is the
perceptual, cognitive -affective enjoyment of actual and conceptual data
in one's environment. The dynamic underlying this aim is the appetite
for novelty, incongruity and contrast within experience. Inasmuch as
this entire process involves the purposive and selective operation of
consciousness, attention is an essential aspect of its function and
perhaps even its development. It is upon this hypothesized inter
connection that we base the following speculation.
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Hunt s review of the literature suggests that the epigenesis
of intrinsic motivation involves three stages:
In the first stage, from birth to four or five months of age,
the infant's attention is captured by situations of change and con-
trast. As James succinctly put it, the child's attention is less
controlled by him than it is captured by the environment around him.
In Section 2.1.3, we put heavy emphasis on the idea that attention is
not the passive absorption of sensation but rather a continual process
of constructing the data of an occasion into a coherent immediate ex-
perience of consciousness. We also argued that the organism's ability
to construct an object depends on a pre -perceptual schema or matrix
upon which the synthesis can be built. This is not to say that in order
to perceive something we must already have an image of it somewhere
within our brain. If this were true, we would be faced with explaining
how it is possible to attend to and perceive something one has never be-
fore seen, since presumably one would have had no means of building a
preperceptual image to match the data. Rather the point is, as alluded
to earlier, that we bring to bear on any new (previously unencountered)
situation a matrix of references derived from previous experience which
serves both to differentiate the object from the field of data and to
establish in some way its orderly interconnection, similarities and
differences, with previous experience. This is to say that the form or
reality of a percipient object is a function of its interrelation with
the total history of experiences as they are assimilated and expressed
in the contemporary self or organism.
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In the case of an infant who has not yet developed through
the differentiation and integration of experience, such a matrix of
references or structure by which incoming data is given intrinsic iden-
tity and meaning, attention is primarily deteimined by the locus of
transformation, contrast and change in the extensive environment.
This predisposition of attention towards change and contrast appears
to be an innate tendency. Soon the child begins to coordinate and
pattern these primitive encounters with the environment. The stored
and organized traces of these interactions constitute the emergent pre-
perceptual structure or "sets" (immanence) which, when fused with the
immediate sensation, creates the "object" of attention. Because the
emergent structure is constantly evolving with each act of experience,
his attentional capacities become more refined and differentiated
(this of course assumes rich and diverse interactions with the en-
vironment)
. Moreover, the growth of these pre -perceptual sets with
their greater elasticity mean that the child to an increasing degree
is shaping the nature of his perceptual experiences. Thus, attention
gradually shifts from being outwardly determined, to becoming self-
determined.
The first expressions of this nascent self-determination of
attention appear in the second stage with the growing child's desire to
gain contact with recognizable objects, people or situations. Here,
the rudimentary pre-perceptual structures are in the making and require
interaction with familiar circumstances to establish the order and
pattern in experience.
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The behavioral signs of this stage have been documented by
Piaget and Hunt. Infants smile at, and will make efforts toward re-
peated encounters with an incident. The child’s babbling consists
largely of incessant repetitions of a narrow repertoire of sounds and
he most readily responds to the parent if the parent utters sounds or
morphemes which are close imitations of those already in the child's
repertoire. It is also worth noting that not until this stage does
the child show distress when left in an unfamiliar place or with a
strange person (separation anxiety)
.
In the third and final stage which commences around 9 months
after birth and continues throughout life, the child's interest begins
to shift from things which are familiar to things which are novel.
The strong attachment to familiars still exists as an anchoring stan-
dard or platform from which he ventures into new situations. Hence, he
seeks to view a familiar object from new perspectives, exploring
through various modalities. He begins experimenting endlessly upon his
environment and his experimentation is impelled by his thirst for novel
discovery. Whereas in Stage Two, babbling is largely repetitious and
invariant, in this third stage the child is more interested in gen-
erating novel sounds. He will attempt many variations on a single
vocalization and readily imitate adult phrases which he has never heard
or spoken previously.
There is some indication that these three roughly defined
stages are sensitive periods for the development of curiousity , in-
terest, and attention. For example, if the child is placed in a homo-
geneous environment and thus is subjected to sensory deprivation during
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th® first stages, retardation and apathy will result. A homogeneous
input deprives the child of an opportunity to build pre-perceptual sets
since the development of such sets depends upon interaction with a
changing and contrasting yet orderly environment. Moreover, the ab-
sence of change leads to a waning of motivation and the onset of apathy,
the consequences of which is retardation. Dennis (1960) conducted a
series of studies and observations in a Tehran orphanage and found that
children who were subjected to a bland and uneventful environment
suffered an impoverished social existence. These children were grossly
retarded in their development of perceptual, motor, cognitive and lin-
guistic skills. Sixty-five per cent of all children two years of age
were not able to sit up on their own, while 85 per cent of those who
had reached four years of age were still not walking. In order for
attention to develop optimally during the first stage, the child
should be exposed to a rich, active environment so that he experiences
changes in receptor input.
During the second stage the child also needs to be in an
active environment but he should have the opportunity to make frequent
encounters with familiar objects, people, and circumstances. After 9
months the child requires an even more diverse and responsive environ-
ment, yet the novelty should not be so disparate from previous occasions
as to disorient and overwhelm the child. If there is excessive strange
ness and little relation to his prior experiences, he will be unable to
integrate the experience and may retreat in anxiety from further ex-
ploration. The guiding parameters for facilitating the growth of at-
tention in early childhood should be to provide novelty and
transition
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within order and permanence.
On the basis of existing research data and the developmental
sequence outlined above, as well as a good deal of speculation, we have
abstracted three broad developedmental parameters which appear to
characterize the epigenesis of attention. Because they are general hy-
potheses and summarize many ideas which have been implicit in the fore-
going discussion, it seems appropriate to conclude on them.
The ontogenetic evolution of attention can be seen in terms
of three distinct but interrelated modes of progression.
1. From outward to inward control. According to Piaget, as
the child matures, what he assimilates in the course of experience be-
comes more and more the product of the operations which the youngster
enacts upon his environment. Thus the nature of a child’s experience,
his respresentation of reality and his immediate perception of the
world around him become less a direct registration of sensory input and
more a function of his self-directed interactions and transformations
upon the world around him. Inasmuch as consciousness and attention are
fundamentally the result of active self-determined process, it shifts
from being extrinsically (outwardly) determined to intrinsically de-
termined.
2. As the child advances further in age and experience, his
repertoire of operations expands, diversifies, arid becomes integrated
into complex structures. This expansion creates new realms of poten-
tial, awareness, and perspectives. Thus, the forms of attention pro-
gress from simple to more complex and novel situations.
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3. Another major developmental trend involves the progressive
internalization of perceptual and motor operations. The child depends
less on overt physical manipulation of objects and is less reliant on
concrete sensory-motor experiences to direct and control thought and
attention. Instead, he can conceptually manipulate, project, and op-
erate upon data to produce ideas, concepts,. and abstractions which be-
come in themselves a new and increasingly important source of data for
prehension. This generation of novel, conceptual data through the var-
ious forms of psychological process --essentially the creation of new
potential- -is the primary means by which the human organism transcends
the boundaries of the actual world and advances into a new realm of
being, wherein the course of his growth and evolution becomes determined
by higher-order, spiritual, and ethical principles.
Thus, the third major trend in the epigenesis of attention is
a progression from a level in which the prehended data are actual and
concrete to one in which the data are conceptual and potential.
2.7 EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
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The following central objective is directly taken from the
definition of attention advanced in Section 2.1.4. Note that it is
stated in terms of a process which the learner would enact
:
To purposively select and structure the sensory and
conceptual data of the immediate present Into a unitary
focus and reject those data incompatible with or ir-
relevant to one's purpose.
It seems appropriate that the more specific objects be de-
rived from the developmental progressions outlined in the previous
chapter
.
1. To bring the operation of attention more into the domain
of self-determined process so that the transformation and flow of in-
terrelation between subject and data (a requisite element in the com-
position of the attention process) become less dependent upon activity
in the environment and originate increasingly from the individual.
2. To be able to subsume under focal attention, increasingly
complex and novel modes of process and structure. This includes the
ability to focally attend to abstract and conceptual data.
3. To turn one's attention toward the realm of potentiality,
i.e., to fantasize or imagine an unrealized future possibility.
134
2.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE AND
PROTOTYPICAL LEARNING EXPERIENCES
The purpose of the present section is to sketch out certain
aspects of the educational environment which serve to facilitate the de-
velopment of attention. Many of these principles are implicit in the
previous discussions but at this time we wish to make these guidelines
explicit.
A. In our treatment of some of the developmental issues sur-
rounding attention, we mentioned the critical role of early environment.
In accordance with the stages of development outlined earlier, we pro-
pose the following conclusions:
That the child's environment be rich and varied in stimulation.
However, the environment should not be cluttered- -it is important that
objects be thoughtfully separated so that there is clarity in the stimu-
lus array. Since the infant begins to respond differentially to pat-
terns within the first few days after birth, this exposure should com-
mence immediately. Following the fifth or sixth week, it becomes in-
creasingly important for the child to begin to have not only a diversified
environment but also a responsive one. There should be ample opportunity
for the infant to manipulate and experiment with the things around him.
This kind of active participation in the environment is a critical stage
in development of attention. It is through such manipulation that the
child begins to acquire a schema of operations which form the basis of
internalized perceptual-cognitive processes. Recall that these internal-
ized operations are what enable attention and perception to be internally
directed. A popular example of this sort of provision is the three
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dimensional mobile which is fastened to the child's crib. By moving,
the infant causes the mobile to move. His own actions then become in-
strumental m the perceptual experience. A variant of this setup is to
tie a string or yam ribbon between the mobile and the child's hand.
Here again, the effect is the same, but in this case the child can affect
motion by a more refined, differentiated movement, whereas in the for-
mer case, gross bodily movement is necessary. As a result, the infant
has more control over the kind of effects he can produce. The experi-
ence can be further enriched by tying several ribbons or lengths of
yam, each of a different color, to various sections of the mobile so
that by pulling a different ribbon he can produce a distinctly differ-
ent experience.
It is not enough that the inanimate environment be respon-
sive to the child's actions. Even more important is that his inter-
personal contacts especially with respect to the parents or primary
adults be frequent, warm, nurtural and responsive. Lack of such regu-
lar contact amounts to a form of emotional as well as perceptual -intel-
lectual deprivation. Thus a parent's interaction with the child should
include little games wherein the parent shows recognition and actively
responds to the infant's sounds and bodily movements.
During the second stage (4-9 months), when the child's innate
interest tends toward recognitive familiarity, the format of parents'
interaction with the child should place heavy emphasis upon repeating
patterns of behavior and speech on subsequent occasions. This, of course,
should not preclude introducing novel incidents into such occasions of
interchange
.
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After 9 months, when the child begins to show a curiosity for
the novel and unfamiliar, the substance of parent -child interaction
should shift toward a greater inclusion of new patterns and elements.
Thus, instead of merely repeating vocal or motor patterns, the parent
should produce novel variations in his responses to the child’s activi-
ty. For example, if the child babbles "ma ma" the mother might respond
not just with "ma ma" but perhaps with "mi mi" or "moo moo" and encourage
her child to imitate. Or if the parent and child have been clapping
hands together the parent might initiate a departure from the original
game by patting her hands on her head or cheeks. Of course, the varia-
tions on such a theme are innumerable and need not be explicitly spelled
out here. The main guidelines are all a parent or teacher requires to
generate her own individually tailored learning experience.
B) The role of feedback - -It is fairly well known that if an
individual is provided with a knowledge of the results of his efforts,
his performance improves. Moreover, the experimental results indicate
that the more complete such knowledge of results is, the greater the
improvement in performance. An analysis of the research suggests that
knowledge of results influences attention in two ways.
As we mentioned earlier, a point of view taken by those in-
vestigators who equate attention with vigilance is that the effect of
feedback is to help maintain the subject's alertness by retarding
habituation to the otherwise monotonous or uneventful situation. How-
ever, arousal itself does not seem to be the main function of
feedback
because knowledge of results given on previous occasions has
been shown
to improve performance on subsequent tasks in which no
feedback was
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given.
In light of this, it would appear that the main value of
knowledge of results is to let the subject know when his attention is
wandering or lapsing and hence provide a corrective cue for him to re-
focus his energies upon the task. Insofar as the individual is know-
ledgeable of his behavior and the subjective feeling with which this
behavior is associated, he has a measure of control over it. This
principle might be implemented in a number of ways on a number of lev-
els. For example, students who are working together in a cooperative
task which requires constant attention towards the activity of each
other can incorporate a vigilance game within the main task in the
following way.
Suppose the main task involves a shadowing exercise, the ob-
ject of which is to mirror the movements of one’s partner through one's
own movements. The vigilance game could consist of an unanticipated sig-
nal given by the leading partner, which would signify that the following
partner should immediately reverse the direction of his movements so
that instead of mirroring the leader's movement he opposes them. Thus,
if the leader were to extend his left arm, the follower who would be
facing the leader, would be required to raise his left arm instead of
his right and therefore oppose the leader's pattern. The signaling cue
could be any inconspicuous action or common word, a particular movement;
wrinkling one's nose, etc., but both leader and follower should have
agreed on what the signal will be ahead of time. When the signal
is re-
peated, this would indicate a reversion to the original mirroring
ex-
ercise.
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In these circumstances, a lapse of attention would yield im-
mediate overt consequences enabling the leading child to give prompt
feedback to his partner. Presumably, the follower would then have the
advantage of knowing when his attention wandered and would be able to
better identify the onset of lapses in future occasions and redirect
his energies and efforts to avoid them.
Another situation which would yield valuable feedback, on-
ploys the type of selective listening task used by Broadbent and Treise-
man in their studies (see Chapter One). The task requires a subject
to verbally shadow one message and ignore all others. The exercise de-
mands high levels of concentration and any failure or shift in attention
results in an immediate breakdown of the subject's activity.
This design can be modified or complicated to provide various
levels of difficulty. For instance, a younger child may be at first in-
capable of differentiating two sources of speech in which case simply
shadowing without this interference would be a sufficiently challenging
task. More advanced students might be challenged by using three instead
of two simultaneously spoken messages. In addition the physical intensity
or clarity of the shadowed message could be varied with respect to the
intensity and clarity of the unwanted messages. Blindfolds may or may
not be used depending upon whether the child requires or can dispense
with visual cues in differentiating the messages. Another variation
would be to have the speaking voices constantly in motion, criss-crossing
one another in space, making the use of spatial cues more
difficult and
intriguing
.
These experiences require no special equipment and can be
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implemented easily. Students can work together in groups, each one
serving a vital role in the experiment.
C) On a very fundamental level, the above experiences can be
viewed as exercises which require one to differentiate figure-ground
relations; since this is one way to characterize the process of attention,
we would like to suggest a couple of practical applications derived from
this conception.
The first instance involves the use of simple figures and
images embedded in a variety of increasingly complex backgrounds. This
sort of exercise is commonly used as a device for assessing a child's
level of perceptual development and serves to determine whether or not
the child suffers from any psycho-neurological handicap. There is no
reason why this technique could not be modified and developed into a
learning aid.
The second instance utilizes the same principle but in the
auditory mode. In this case, music is the medium and the task becomes
one of identifying themes or motifs in various rhythmic and harmonic
contexts, within various keys, tempi, etc. Again the level of difficulty
should be gauged according to the child's capacities, beginning with
simple exercises and gradually moving toward more complex tasks.
D) Equally, if not more important than being able to focally
attend to selected sources of information in one's immediate environ-
ment is the ability to entertain as the object of one's attention, some
ideal or unrealized possibility- -the capacity for imagination and fantasy.
Many children show a natural inclination for fantasy but often
teachers
either ignore or suppress fantasy because they feel it has no
practical
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value. This could be no further from the truth. As was mentioned
earlier, fantasy is one of the primary means by which an individual trans-
cends the present and gains control of his destiny. Specifically, fan-
tasy is extremely important in fonnulating goals, initiating and main-
taining goal -directed activity.
The teacher should thus be willing to entertain and encour-
age fantasy in her interchange with children, as well as among the chil-
dren themselves. For example, the teacher might develop a game based
on the question, "What would you do if. . .?" The game could be con-
ducted in various ways, depending upon the children's level of develop-
ment and what other objectives are being served by the content of the
learning experience. The following illustration merely suggests a di-
rection.
Each student writes (or if he cannot write, the teacher or
an older child can write for him) on a small piece of paper the question,
"What would you do if. . .?" and then adds on his conditions, such as,
"What would you do if you had 100 rolls of toilet paper?" All the papers
are then scrambled up in a box, after which each child draws a question
and spends a few minutes fantasizing on what he would do under those
circumstances presented to him. Once everyone had written down or re-
corded in some way, his particular fantasy, each would share his own
with the others.
A variation on this procedure would be to use actual mater-
ials such as blocks, paints, balls, sticks, dolls, etc., allowing the
child to touch and see materials about which he is speculating and
then
to actually demonstrate his speculation.
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E) Because the Thematic Apperception Test is designed pri-
marily for clinical diagnosis, its potential use as a learning tool re-
mains largely unexplored. This is unfortunate especially since one of
the functions of the test is to evoke fantasy. The learning opportun-
ities which could be built around the test are virtually innumerable.
Such experiences need not be limited to non-directive situations in
which the child merely makes up a story. The teacher may encourage the
child to carry out or dramatize his fantasy (if this is feasible)
,
to
project consequences and have the child self-evaluate the qualitative
aspects of his projection and generate other possibilities.
E) To conclude, we would like to raise some general considera-
tions about the structure of the learning environment and the role of the
teacher in fostering the development of attention.
One point which consistently emerges above all others in our
description of attention is its nature as an active process of differen-
tiating and integrating experience. As such, we cannot expect a child
to attend for any length of time to something with which he cannot in-
teract- -to develop his capacity for attention without allowing him to
actively interrelate with the tings in his environment. Although the
nature of this interaction may evolve to be highly internalized and con-
ceptual, it must begin with overt concrete forms of process and then
progress to more covert and abstract levels.
Attention depends upon the continual penetration and trans-
formation of the subjective world, the advance of consciousness intp
novel realms. Research clearly demonstrates that if this
process stalls
if the interaction between subject and data subsides into stasis,
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attention will disintegrate. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect a child
to attend for any length of time to something with which he cannot inter-
act; yet, we continue to subject children to passive, inert conditions,
reducing both their capacity to attend and the receptiveness to learning.
Many observers have noted that children in Montessori schools
generally display extraordinary attentional capacities. One explanation
for this seems to be that Montessori children are allowed extensive
periods of uninterrupted time to explore and manipulate objects on their
own. These sessions involve a minimal amount of passive taking-in and
are filled with activity which the child himself autonomously generates.
Another is that the child is provided by the teacher with a
"set” of operations to perform upon the object. The teacher demonstrates
several, though not all the ways in which an object may be used, after
which the child attempts to replicate these operations on his own. A
child who has acquired such a structure or "set” now has the means for
governing an ordered, integrated series of transformations in relation
to his environment. The more knowledge a child has about a class of
events, the longer he can work at assimilating a new event and the more
prolonged his attention. There is a close parallel between the autono-
mous effectance of these operations in concrete action and the inter-
nalized mental operations associated with focal attention. In fact, as
we have suggested previously, there is good reason to believe that one
is the developmental precursor to the other.
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2.9 EVALUATION
Since there is no possible way of reducing a higher-order
process such as attention to a strict group of behavioral elements, the
measurement of attention must be approached indirectly by way of in-
ference from behavior. The particular behavioral manifestations ac-
companying or resulting from the function of attention will vary ac-
cording to the characteristics of the occasion. For example, the
behavior of a child who is concentrating on solving a jigsaw puzzle
might be very different from the behavior of a child who is wrapt
in fantasy about becoming an astronaut. Fifferent from either of these
circumstances might be the actions of a child who is very attentive
to the antics of his neighbor.
If these examples of attention involve vastly diverse forms
of behavior, at what level do they have something in common? Each of
these instances are similar to one another insofar as all involve a
selective interaction of the child's conscious awareness with some as-
pect of the subject's environment, integrated around a unitary object
or theme. Arriving at this recognition requires the observer to go
beyond an analysis of the behavioral elements as final in themselves
and instead infer their joint meaning as indicators of an ongoing
higher-order mental process. Thus, any evaluation of the degree of
success or failure in the foregoing educational objectives must be
based largely on the non-explicit, informal criteria of tacit inference.
Of course, it is possible to present the child with a series
of mental exercises such as items from an intelligence test, note
the
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amount of time until, and the frequency with which, behavior apparently
irrelevant to the assigned task begins to appear. In this design, one
might measure the elapsed time until first distraction and the rate of
occurrence of subsequent unrelated activities as a behavioral measure
of attention. At first glance, this may appear acceptable but a closer
look reveals some inadequacies.
First of all, this approach requires one to take for granted
a number of seriously questionable assumptions, one of which is that
the observer’s frame of reference is identical with that of the child.
For example, if the observer's aim is to assess the span or degree of
control a child has over his attention and he notices an apparent de-
viation in the child' efforts toward the task, he has no basis for
taking this behavior as evidence of the child's ability or inability
to voluntarily direct his attention, unless the child's purposes and
intention happen to correspond with the task assigned by the experimen-
ter.
There is no easy solution to this problem and such difficul-
ties certainly do not mean that current methods of measuring attention
are useless and dispensable. It is, however, very important that one
be cognizant of the limitations and uncertainties encumbered in relying
upon them. Having issued this "caveat" let us breifly list some measures
of assessment presently in use.
Kagan (1972) has recommended using the quality of short-term
memory, fixation time, eye tracking patterns, and quality of performance
on continuous vigilance tasks. The quality of performance on continu-
ous vigilance tasks might be assessed in the following way.
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The child is asked to show by some response, verbal and non-
verbal, that he understands what is said by the examiner. The examiner's
questions and directions are designed on four levels of age appropriate-
ness: 18 months, 24 months, 30 months, and 36 months. Examples of
items
:
a. Ask child to point to objects and to objects in pictures.
b. Using a single imperative with a variety of verbs; e.g.,
show/give me the ball; find it, etc.
c. Ask child to pick out objects by size, shape.
d. Ask child to respond to two or more parts of a series of
instructions.
e. Show pictures of objects in pairs, ask child to point to
pictures; e.g., "Show me the boy and the dog; the dog playing with the
ball, etc."
f. Ask child to respond to imperatives in which two parts are
simultaneously varied; e.g., "Give me the ball; give me the blocks, etc."
After showing pictures of a variety of situations, ask child to point to
the dog running, the boy sitting down, the girl playing ball, etc.
Finally, the quality of short-term memory can be assessed by
asking the child to repeat short sequences of numbers, letters and
words, e.g., 1 2 - 3; 1 7 - 8; a - o - f; dog house; the cat is red.
CHAPTER THREE
GOAL SETTING
Goal-setting refers to the conception and structuring of
unrealized possibility as a consequent expression of one’s purpose
or subjective aim.. More specifically
,
it is the process by which
an individual anticipates and organizes his future by making a con-
scious decision about future events or conditions toward which he
will strive.
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3.1.1 GOAL-SETTING AS A MODE
OF PREHENSION
Discussing the differences between the organic or living uni-
verse and the inorganic or lifeless universe, Whitehead states that the
primary meaning of life is "The origination of conceptual novelty-
-nov-
elty of appetition [Whitehead, 1938, p. 26)." This statement can be
understood only when one keeps in clear perspective the fundamental
principles of the Philosophy of Organism, namely, that the nature of
any organism is not its substance or momentary state but its form in the
process of evolution, i.e., that process is reality. In the particular
case of the living organism, this process exhibits two characteristics,
the first of which is creative activity.
Whitehead defines creativity as the process of "Eliciting in-
to actual being factors in the universe which antecedently to that
process exist only in the mode of unrealized potentialities. The
process of self-creation is the transformation of the potential into
the actual, and the fact of such transformation includes the immediacy
of self-enjoyment [Ibid., p. 23]."
Thus, an important distinction emerges between the already
actualized or existent data, inherited from the past and the immediate
present, on the one hand, and the non-actualized potentialities on the
other, which "Lie ready to promote their fusion of those data with
those potentialities." This is the creative advance into novelty, the
means fulfilling one's being in the present by transcending the bounds
of the present and passing into the future.
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Yet, there is another aspect. The creative advance into
novelty does not proceed in a random, unordered fashion but embodies a
teleological, purposive dimension, i.e., subjective aim, which gives
coherence and unity to the becoming process. One way in which sub-
jective aim or purpose is directive of concrescence is through an ex-
clusion of the boundless wealth of alternative potentialities which
lie before the organism at any given juncture, selecting that pos-
sibility which maintains the unity of organismic structure and the
continuity of progression from past to future. To put it differently,
an important aspect of concrescence involves an act of decision about
what one is to become, how the ideality of one's purpose and aim will
be expressed in the actuality of one's immediate situation. Recall
Whitehead's definition of concrescence as the name for the process in
which "The universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a
determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination
in the constitution of the novel 'one' [emphasis added] [Whitehead,
1929, p. 321] ." Concrescence is complete when the particular occasion
of the transformation of potentiality into actuality is fully realized.
Its culmination marks the "Evaporation of all indeterminacy; so that in
respect to its own feeling and to all entities in the universe, the
actual entity embodies a determinant attitude of yes or no [Ibid., p.
323] ." This notion of "determinant relegation," or the "resolution of
all indeterminacy" in a particular situation implies a definite as-
sertion about one's relation to one's present and future environment.
Such an assertion necessarily involves a rejection of alternative
possibilities as well as the acceptance of the one presently
selected.
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Here again, the Whiteheadian category of prehension can be
applied. In this sense, prehension is synonymous with decision. It
will be recalled that prehension may be 1) either positive or negative,
depending on whether the reaction is to incorporate or reject the data
in question, and 2) it may be either physical or conceptual; "physical"
if the data are actual, "conceptual" if the data are unrealized or
potential.
A negative prehension was defined as one in which data are
considered but then rejected. There are two types of negative pre-
hension. One involves a definite decision or act of exclusion, an
aesthetic judgement in which the organism dismisses, ignores, or re-
presses incompatible elements which would destroy or impair its de-
velopment. One example would be the case in which a student who
recognizes the incompatibility between his playing football and studying
for his exams decides to give up playing football.
The second type of negative prehension which is particularly
significant in the choices of human beings is the conception of form
or ideal not realized in the data. This process is a prime means of
transcendence- -through it an individual can advance in his develop-
ment by reacting not to the immediate situation as given, but rather
to some unrealized potentiality which lies beyond the present. This
form of negative prehension underlies the creative advance into novelty
and operates through the channels of consciously held aspirations and
purpose. An illustration offered is that of a child who aspires to
become a statesman. Through his intentional fantasy he rises beyond
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his reality as a child and is entertaining an idea which to an extent
replaces his immediate actuality. He has turned his attention towards
an ideal; his prehension is conceptual.
Inasmuch as goal-setting involves (1) the anticipation and
differentiation of future possibilities, and (2) a definite set of de-
cisions about these respective possibilities, it may be regarded as a
form of conceptual prehension. Thus, goal-setting is a crucial phase
in the creative advance of the human organism, standing at the critical
juncture wherein one's sense of purpose or subjective aim is trans-
lated into the ongoing flow of immediate experience in terms of op-
erable plans and intentions.
3.1.2 A NOTE ON GOALS VERSUS DECISIONS
Although goal has been characterized as a decision, it is
important to clarify that all decisions are not necessarily goals. A
goal is a decision which involves a pre-disposition to act with respect
to some potential unrealized occasion. A goal can be an end, a result,
as well as a task or function to be performed. It describes a con-
dition one desires to achieve. It may be a standard of achievement, a
criterion of success, something tangible, measureable, and valuable to-
ward which one is motivated. It is concrete, explicit, and definitive.
It may be long-range or short-range: long-range goals help clarify short-
range goals; major goals determine minor goals, and the present is de-
termined by both the immanence of the past and the transcendent ideality
of the future.
3.1.3 GOAL SETTING AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION
Generally speaking, theories of motivation are concerned with
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what initiates and maintains human behavior. In Chapter One, it was
shown how traditionally dominant answers to the question of human mo-
tivation have followed the mechanistic objectivism of Descartes. Mechan-
ism has managed to claim a strong hold on psychological thought up to the
present, despite many of its logical contradictions and inadequacies.
In the field of experimental psychologies of motivation, the drive theory
of Clark Hull and Skinnerian behaviorism represent two important schools
in twentieth century American psychology that rely upon a mechanistic
approach. Although only a small percentage of psychologists would
claim strict adherence to these theories, a great majority of the
current research and speculation in the field of motivation is de-
rived from problems and issues posited by these two systems.
One instance of this is the large body of research as-
sociated with behavior modification. The basic supposition under-
lying behavior modification is that patterns of human action can be
precisely correlated with a corresponding pattern of stimulus input.
The problem for the behavior technologist who wishes to elicit a
certain behavior then becomes one of simply providing the appropriate
stimulus condition. Little if any consideration is given to the
subject's own intentions, which are by and large regarded as epi-
phenomenal. As a result, behavior modification programs consist of
an elaborate system of incentives and rewards which are presumed to
be the critical agents for changing a subject's behavior.
In an effort to clarify the effect of incentives, as well as
other extrinsic causal agents upon behavior, Edwin Locke conducted a
series of studies which varied incentives and the goals of the
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subjects independently of each other. Locke cites instruction
,
money,
knowledge of results, participation, time limits, competition with one's
previous performance or with another's performance, and praise and re-
proof as different kinds of incentives most commonly used to increase
performance. Contrary to the assumptions of behaviorism the author
found that these incentives are effective in increasing output only to
the degree that they affect a person's goals or intentions. He notes
that the effect of a well-run incentive system is to encourage workers
to accept tasks and set goals that they would not accept or set on
their own, i.e., for the intrinsic enjoyment of the work itself. Thus
incentives can serve to commit subjects to tasks which they would not
otherwise undertake.
In a controlled series of experiments, Locke tested the
following hypotheses:
1. That goals and intentions will be related to behavior
regardless of incentive condition; that is, goals and intentions
will be related to behavior, both within and across differences in
goals or intentions.
2. When incentive differences do correlate with behavior
differences, these differences will be accompanied by corresponding
differences in goals or intentions.
3. When goal or intention differences are controlled or
partialled out, there will be no relationship between incentive con-
dition and behavior. (Locke, 1966, 1969; Locke and Bryan, 1966a,
1966b, 1969)
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Although there are a number of methodological difficulties
with Locke’s experiments, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
these hypotheses are correct. Thus we would concur with Rayan’s analy-
sis that,
Tasks [intentions, goals, etc.]
. . . are to be treated
as causal factors in behavior. By this I mean that a
task is a necessary condition for most kinds of be-
havior. (To find an account for the exceptions is an
empirical problem) ... I shall assert that a very
large proportion of behavior is initiated by tasks and
that a very large proportion of tasks lead to the be-
havior specified by the tasks (Ryan, 1970, p. 79).
To say that human behavior is predominately purposive
does not mean that an individual is aware of, or consciously intends
every single action or movement he makes. Obviously, there is a mas-
sive amount of habitual action, performed subconsciously, which under-
lies consciously held aspirations. For example, it is possible that
the effect of a task or intention may operate over such a time span
that it may produce an effect at a time when the individual is no
longer aware of the task as such. Locke suggests four types of un-
intentional behavior:
1. Behavior whose end is foreseen but in which movement
in a sequence is not consciously initiated.
2. Behavior in which a different end occurs than is
intended due to error or lack of ability, i.e., accidental behavior.
3. Behavior in which the end- as -is -foreseen logically en-
tails another end that is not foreseen as such.
4. Behavior which is not and never was under direct con-
scious control, but may be indirectly controlled (e.g., muscle
contractions, neural activity and so on) (Locke, 1969).
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Type I could be termed sub- intentional (as opposed to un-
intentional) since one may not be focally aware of the behavior it is
subsidiary to-
-some consciously held goal. Of the others, 2, 3, and 4,
are the only categories that could properly be called unintentional,
but they constitute a relatively insignificant segment of our total
experience
.
3.1.4 PHASES OF THE GOAL SETTING PROCESS
Tentatively, the goal-setting process can be analyzed in terms
of the following elements:
(A) The first step involves directing one's attention to-
ward the future expecially with reference to one' purpose or sub-
jective aim. At this stage, one's apprehension and consciousness of
the future is vague and indeterminant.
(B) The second phase involves bringing into clear figure,
alternative courses of action, i.e., to articulate in clear terms the
set of possibilities which lie before one, i.e., Shall I sleep? Play
the piano? Study? Etc.
(C) Following this, the individual projects the consequences
which the various courses of action hold for his development, and elimi-
nates those with negative consequences for his greater purpose or aim.
Of those which remain, he must consider and evaluate the feasibility.
In other words, one must be able to anticipate the prerequisites and
consequences connected with a particular possibility.
(D) Establish priorities of the remaining feasible alter-
natives.
(E) Integrate the alternatives into a coherent plan of
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action. This process of integration first requires the differentiation
of larger complex goals into their component sub-plans. For example,
the goal of becoming a medical doctor is unapproachable in terms of a
single action; such a goal consists of a large aggregate of smaller,
shorter- range goals such as taking various courses in anatomy, phys-
iology, organic chemistry, entering medical school, completing train-
ing and internship and finally locating a job. All of these sub-goals
must be integrated in such a way that they do not conflict with one
another, fragmenting and dissipating the individual's energies, ul-
timately preventing attainment of the goal.
(F) The final step of goal -setting involves a commitment to
the formulated plan of action. This act of decision and commitment is
most crucial --without it a person's intentions and plans are ineffectual.
It requires faith and confidence both in the correctness of the goal
and in one's ability to achieve it. On another level, it means actively
refusing to entertain other plans until the goal is achieved or unfore-
seen consequences make it apparent that achievement is either impossible
or undesirable.
3.1.5 QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF
GOAL-SETTING
We have been describing in general terms the various operations
involved in the goal -setting process with little reference to the content
of actual goals set, as if content were irrelevant. But this is not the
case. Process is meaningless without content, as is content without pro-
cess. Thus, there are several important qualitative aspects of goal-
setting we would like to address. First, competent goal-setting should
lead the individual toward the release of his potentiality at an optimum
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rate. This implies that one’s goals should provide a degree of novelty
and challenge appropriate to one’s present capacities. And finally, one’s
goals should avoid leading to destructive results for others as well
as oneself. This implies that biological psychological and spirtual
needs should be taken into consideration when goals are set. Maslow
postulates a hierarchy of needs beginning with basic physical needs
such as food, shelter, warmth, etc., progressing to the emotional needs
such as love, security, etc., and finally to higher order needs of self-
actualization which concern the release of the highest level of human
potentiality-
-creative activity expressed in service to one's fellow-
man. Maslow holds that these higher order needs emerge only when the
lower needs have been satisfied. Thus, goals dealing with needs
of self-actualization presuppose the satisfaction of needs of security
and physical well-being. If Maslow' s hypothesis is correct, it may be
unreasonable to expect people to set goals on the levels of self-actuali-
zation when their more basic needs have not been satisfied.
Several studies have attempted to elucidate the ways in which
various types of empirically identified needs affect goal -setting.
Sicks and Nicholson (1966) found that females with low need for approval
among peers tended to be less restrictive, and less cautious in goal-
setting when among peers than when among females with a high need for
approval. Franken and Morphy (1970) investigated the manner in which
the need for achievement would affect goal-setting under various con-
ditions of success and failure. Results indicate that individuals with
a high need for achievement preferred goals of moderate risk, presenting
a moderate challenge to their abilities, in which the probability of
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success and failure is about equal. On the other hand, individuals
"bo show a low need for achievement and a high motivation to avoid
failure (i.e., test-anxious subjects), generally prefer tasks which
are either extremely easy so that their success is guaranteed or
tasks which are extremely difficult in which case failure would not
cast a threatening reflection on their ability. The reason that sub-
jects with a high need for achievement choose tasks of moderate risk
is that if the goals are too easy to achieve, they are not valued and
consequently there is no feeling of success when they are achieved.
In conjunction with these other factors, success on previous
tasks has a significant effect on an individual's goal-setting. In a
series of three experiments conducted by Locke (1965) there was a
definite, positive relationship between success and measures of task-
liking and satisfaction. The most difficult goals generally led to
the lowest degree of satisfaction with and liking for the task because
they were reached less often than easier goals. Locke points out,
however, that there are three means of achieving the feeling of success
other than actually reaching the goal. They are: (1) getting close
to one's goal; (2) improving over one's previous performance; and (3)
being able to set goals that one considers desirable. Thus, all of
these means of achieving a feeling of success would probably influence
task- liking and subsequent goal -setting.
3.1.6 GOAL-SETTING AND PERSONALITY PROFILE
Hughes (1965) has assembled a profile of characteristics des-
cribing the "goal -oriented individual" and contrasts this profile with
that of the "task-oriented individual." In general, the goal-oriented
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individual seeks feedback and knowledge of results and wants evaluation
of his own performance, while the task-oriented individual avoids feed-
back and evaluation, seeking approval rather than performance evalua-
tion. Whereas the goal-oriented individual seeks personal responsibility
for work if goal achievement is possible, the task-oriented individual
avoids personal responsibility regardless of opportunities for success.
The goal-oriented individual performs best on jobs that hold possibili-
ties for improvement and he prefers opportunities for creativity. The
task-oriented individual, on the other hand, prefers routine non- improv-
able jobs. He obtains no satisfaction from creativity, whereas the goal-
oriented individual seeks goals with moderate risks and obtains achieve-
ment satisfaction from solving problems. The task-oriented individual
seeks goals with either very low or very high risk, and obtains satis-
faction not from problem-solving so much as from finishing a task. The
goal -oriented individual initiates action with a high level of psycho-
physical energy directed toward goals and adjusts his level of aspira-
tion to the realities of success and failure. In contrast, the task-
oriented person prefers to follow the directions of others and he may or
may not have a high-drive energy level directed toward the particular
goal. In addition, he rigidly maintains either a high or low level of
aspiration regardless of success or failure.
It is interesting to observe that the profile of the goal-
oriented individual closely resembles patterns of behavior associated
with achievement motivation, whereas the task-oriented profile correlates
highly with indicators of test anxiety and the motivation to avoid fail-
ure.
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3.1.7 THE DYNAMICS OF GOAL- SETTING
During the process of goal-setting, one must be able to
create, maintain, and clearly articulate the incongruity between one's
present state and the future occasion towards which one aspires.
Winter et al (1968) found that the tendency to phrase personal goals in
a manner which implies dissonance or incongruity between the goal and
present behavior was correlated with a high ability for self-directed
change. When subjects who exhibited a low tendency for self
-directed
change were asked to think of goals, they concentrated heavily on
what the present condition was and appeared to be unable to postulate
for themselves clearly different behaviors or feelings than those that
they presently experienced. The low-change subjects appeared closed-
minded to possibilities that did not exist at the present time. This
inability to articulate differences between present behavior and future
goals reduces the possibility of experiencing incongruity or dissonance
between the two conditions. If dissonance or incongruity can be regarded
as a motivating factor, then one would expect these subjects to show
little motivation to change their behavior.
Such a person. Winter postulates, would rate high on a scale
of identity diffusion tolerating internal ambiguity and contradiction
between present behavior and a valued goal, without experiencing dis-
sonance, because he ordinarily conceives of himself in contradictory
terms anyway. When one's identity is highly integrated around a sense
of purpose, dissonance between present self and valued goals is created
because of the premise, "I do what I value." Thus, self-directed change
and goal consummation may be increased by creating conditions in which
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one can clearly see and feel the discrepancy between one's present
condition and the anticipated goal-state. Until this incongruity is
differentiated, the goal will not have been adequately conceptualized.
In fact, if goal-setting is conceived as a process, then it can be de-
fined as a contemplated transition from one set of conditions to
another set of conditions. Until the processes that mediate this tran-
sition can be represented in operational terns, the individual has no
definitive focus upon which to concentrate his energies in effecting
self-determined change.
3.2 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
The problem of explicating the role of goal -setting in the
release of human potential can be approached from two slightly dif-
ferent perspectives: (1) by defining its relation to learning com-
petence in terms of differentiation and integration; and (2) by focus-
ing on the crucial role that goal-setting plays in the translation of
potentiality into actuality. Since there is much more empirical evi-
dence available with respect to this latter relation, we will deal with
this perspective first.
3.2.1 GOAL-SETTING: THE ACTUALIZATION
OF POTENTIAL
The very phrase, "the actualization of potential," implies that
there is some transition, some behavior, some change in the state of the
organism. The goal-setting process is a central element in the process
of self-actualization, perhaps because the establishment of a goal is
crucial in arousing motivation for the difficult struggle to achieve
change. There is little dispute among psychologists that motivation,
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i.e., the initiation and maintenance of behavior, is a complex phenom-
ena that includes various causal factors emerging in the interplay be-
tween the organism and its environment. What has not been resolved,
however, is the way in which these factors should be conceptualized,
their relative importance in any given occasion, and the way in which
they interrelate with one another in the whole functioning personality.
For example, theorists in the behaviorist tradition hold that
any human action or behavior is directly analyzable to some extrinsic
stimulus condition, while cognitive psychologists generally maintain
that any theory of human motivation must take into account intrinsic
psychological variables such as plans, intentions, etc., which can be
quite autonomous of any physical stimuli. For the behaviorists
,
plans
and intentions are merely epiphenomena--that is, they are not causal
agents, rather they are simply inert verbal labels which culture has
attached to the primary causal stimulus. Inasmuch as one of our basic
premises is that human behavior is primarily purposive, i.e., purpose
is a predominant causal factor in human action, and since purpose is
an intrinsic non-physical element, it is very crucial that the causal
relation between intentions and behavior (goals or intentions being
differentiated expressions of purpose) be clearly demonstrated.
(i) Intention and the Level of Achievement. In an earlier section
of this chapter, mention was made of Locke's efforts to empirically
separate intentions and goals from extrinsic sources of motivation
such as incentives, and thus demonstrate that intentions directly
mediate action. Since the present section is concerned with the ef-
fects of goal-setting upon achievement, it seems appropriate to re-
view at least one of his studies in detail.
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In this particular experiment (1967) there were four dif-
ferent groups of subjects who were equally distributed with respect to
ability and task interest. Group I was assigned difficult goals and
received knowledge of results. The experimenters set goals for this
group based on the best performance of each subject, plus an increase
of ten per cent on subsequent trials. The experimenter also told sub-
jects of their results at the end of each trial. Group II was also
assigned difficult goals but received no knowledge of results. Group
iilwas not assigned specific goals to aim for. Rather, they were
told only to "do their best," but they were informed of the number of
problems they had correctly answered at the end of each trial
,
i . e
.
,
they received knowledge of results. Group IV was given the same in-
structions as Group III but they received no knowledge of results.
By the fifth trial, Group I (hard goal--KR group) computed
approximately ninety-eight problems correctly per minute; while Group
II (hard goal--NR group) correctly completed 90 problems. Group III
(do best--KR group) scored 82, while the fourth group (do best-- NR
group) achieved a score of 78. These results suggest that motivation-
al effects which previously had been attributed to differences in re-
inforcement or knowledge of results were actually a function of dif-
ferences in performance goals associated with the knowledge of results
and reinforcement conditions. When differences in the goal-setting of
the "feedback" and "non- feedback" subjects was controlled, no overall
effect of the knowledge of results on performance was observed. On
the basis of this and previous studies, Locke concluded that all types
of incentives (e.g., knowledge of results, money, instructions,
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participation, praise, verbal reinforcement, etc.)
,
are causalonly to
the degree that they affect a subject's goals or intentions (Locke,
1967 ).
In actual fact, however, knowledge of results and goal-
setting tend to be interactive. Feedback or knowledge of results pro-
vide an important basis upon which subsequent goals are formulated.
Thus, realistic goal-setting depends upon the ability to interpret and
utilize feedback in the goal-setting process.
Another important aspect of the relation between goal -setting
and achievement concerns the level of difficulty of the goals which an
individual sets for himself. There seems to be a direct, postive cor-
relation between the difficulty of the goal which an individual sets
and his achievement with respect to that task. Even in cases where
the goal is set an an unreasonably difficult and unattainable level,
achievement is superior to conditions in which specific goals are set
at more realistic and attainable levels. Thus, high levels of pro-
ductivity and achievement can be elicited with difficult, challenging
goals. However, if an individual consistently sets goals which exceed
his capacity to succeed, his sense of satisfaction with, and liking
for. the task is likely to diminish. His disatisfaction or dislike is
liable to lead to apathy and to discouragement. Therefore, some com-
promise with task difficulty must be made in order to optimize both
achievement and satisfaction. On this basis, it is recommended that
individuals be educated to set goals of moderate risk and difficulty,
so that both the sense of advance into novelty and the experience of
satisfaction in this process can be maintained.
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(n) The Specificity of Goal-Setting and Its Effects upon Task In-
terest and Attitude. In three different studies, Locke has succeeded
in demonstrating that goals which are set with respect to a certain
activity causally affect the level of interest or involvement the sub-
ject will develop with respect to that task. The way in which this
influence is exerted is somewhat complex. However, the general trend
seems to indicate that specific performance goals enhance interest in
the task much more effectively than instances wherein the subject has
no specific goal. Moreover, the effects of goals on interest seem to
grow with the length of the task and/or the length of the time period.
In one study (Bryan and Locke, 1967), two groups of subjects who were
initially different in the degree of motivation they brought to the
task were given different goal instructions. The purpose of the study
was to investigate the effect of setting specific goals on the perform-
ance and attitudes of low motivation subjects as compared to the per-
formance and attitudes of high motivation subjects who were told only
to do their best.
Twelve subjects were selected after a pre-test. Six of the
subjects had uniformly low performance slopes on the pre-test and low
scores on the attitudes scales. These subjects were placed in the
"specific goal condition." The other subjects had uniformly high
scores in both performance and attitudes on the pre-test and were
placed in the "do best" or "non-specific goal condition." The task
was simple addition; one page of addition problems for each trial
period. The trial periods were short at first, 15 seconds, but gradu-
ally they increased to 32 minutes in length. There were 12 trials in
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in all. Between each page of problems was a page consisting of four
attitude scales: (1) interest-order; (2) degree of task focus, i.e.,
percentage of time focused on the task; (3) intensity of task focus;
and (4) the degree of total effort exerted during the trial. The
subjects filled in these attitude scales following each trial.
The subjects who initially scored low on the pre-test for
motivation operating under the specific goal condition, raised their
performance levels and developed more positive attitudes towards the
task. The group who scored high on the initial motivation pre-test
under the non-specific goal condition showed little performance in-
crease and developed less favorable attitudes towards the task. When
graphed, the scores for each of the measures of the two groups showed
convergence, i.e., the low motivation group "caught up" with the high
motivation group in performance and in task interest.
If this finding is valid, then inducing individuals to set
specific goals will be a more effective means of motivating them to-
wards actualization then if they articulate their intentions in merely
vague terms such as "I'll do what I can," or "I'll do my best."
In addition, setting goals can function as an antidote to
boredom. This has implications for school and industrial situations.
It might be possible to turn to interest and enthusiasm in otherwise
useful but difficult to get involved in activities if the individual
resolves to set a determinant goal with respect to his involvement in
that activity.
Although Locke's work is beset by certain methodological dif-
ficulties such as inadequately accounting for and controlling experi-
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mental variables, his findings at the very least present reasonable
speculations sufficiently sound to warrant further research. In ad-
dition, since they are not in contradiction to the evidence of immedi-
ate experience, we tentatively accept them.
3.2.2 THE PROCESS OF GOAL-SETTING AND ITS
RELATION TO LEARNING COMPETENCE
The key dynamic underlying learning competence depends upon
the reciprocal processes of differentiating and integrating experience.
Goal -setting mediates and facilitates the differentiation of experi-
ence in two ways: (1) It involves differentiating one's future by
bringing into clear figure the alternative possibilities with which
one is faced and formulating a determinant predisposition with respect
to these various possibilities; (2) Once a goal has been decided
upon, it now becomes possible to differentiate a complex mass of
immediate experience in terms of its particular relevance to the
adopted goal.
For example, one might distinguish a particular occasion of
experience in terns of whether or not it facilitates reaching a goal.
Thus, it introduces a dimension of importance into one's consideration
of data, providing a criterial basis for selective attention. In fact,
it has been suggested that one important way in which setting specific
goals improves performance on a task is by aiding the subject to sel-
ectively direct his attention toward the relevant attributes or para-
meters in the problem situation (Ryan, 1970).
In addition, goal -setting also represents a mode of in-
tegrating or structuring experience around some purpose or intention.
Recall that one phase in the process of goal -setting requires the
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individual to integrate the feasible alternatives stretching before
him into a coherent plan of action. Moreover, once a person has con-
structed a goal, he can link and tie together otherwise diverse or
disparate elements of experience in terms of their interrelation to
the higher order purpose or intention. Such patterns of interrelation
give these elements meaning.
The basic position taken here is that man is a purposive
being, and because goal -setting represents a primary means by which
his purpose is expressed in concrete experience, intentions and goals
serve as both differentiating and integrating agents of psycho-motor,
perceptual, cognitive, and affective levels of experience. In addi-
tion, goal -setting is an important means by which these various po-
tentialities are differentiated and integrated with respect to the
various ontological levels of the organism's environment, i.e.,
physical, social, and unknown.
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3 . 3 DEVELOPMENTAL STRUCTURE
3.3.1 APPETITIONS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF GOALS
Insofar as human life can be regarded as a process of con-
tinual unfoldment and transformation, any meaningful description of the
goal- setting process must be based upon an adequate grasp of its onto-
genetic evolution. Such a developmental approach requires that one
trace from the beginnings of life, the very first manifestations of
purposive or intentional behavior. At that point, we must confront
two crucial questions: (1) Since it is obvious that the mature form
of the goal-setting process, replete with elaborate symbolized plans
and objectives, is not manifest in infancy and early childhood, what
parameters do we take as the ontogenetic precursors to the fully de-
veloped process? (2) What is the nature of the transitions which in-
termediate the crude early forms of intentional activity and the mature
goal -setting process?
This is where the speculative value of an adequate meta-
physical foundation becomes very clear. The function of philosophy
is to provide a coherent unified system of ideas through which we can
interpret the welter of our individual and collective experience. One
of the aims of such a system is to generate speculation about the in-
terrelation and causal relations existing in the universe. It then
remains for science to test and evaluate the adequacy of these specu-
lations, and make them accountable to experience. Thus, we turn to
the philosophical foundation upon which our conceptualization of the
goal-setting process is built, to derive the primary qualites which
characterize its genetic development. In this particular case, the
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fundamental notion, derived from Whitehead's philosophic scheme in our
formulation of goal-setting, is that of "appetition." Appetition refers
to the mental awareness of some unrealized goal condition coupled
with an immediate physical feeling of the urge towards realization
of the goal. By means of appetition the organism directs its cre-
ativity so as to procure in the future, the fulfillment in actual-
ity of some ideal or potentialiety. An example on the physical level
is hunger or thirst. There is a physical feeling associated with an
urge towards a future realization of some fact or condition such as
drinking water or eating food, a change which will involve the ab-
sorption of new elements into the constitution of the organism.
Eisendrath (1971) points out how appetition may be exemplified by
aggression, a process which may be set in motion by an insult.
One of the factors of anger is a greater than
normal supply of adrenaline in the bloosdtream.
The idea, or insult, has here caused a somatic
change. An angry man may also strike out with
his fists. Such a motion changes the environment
supplying data for that man. In this case, it
may put his fist in contact with another man’s
jaw (Eisendrath, 1971, p. 104).
In brief, the developmental antecedents of goal -setting
reside in the basic or primary appetitions of the human infant. These
appetitions are most commonly expressed through primitive assertions
of desire and assertions of aversion.
It has often been assumed that the first forms of appetition
that emerge in infancy are those connected with simple biological needs,
but the evidence is now somewhat at variance with this. Very early
in life, almost immediately after birth, the child manifests need
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tendencies of sorts other than those associated with biological sur-
vival. A growing number of investigators (White, 1959; Hunt, 1965;
Ryan, 1970; Buhler, 1968; Berlyne, 1960) have argued that incongruity,
uncertainty, surprise, contrast-
-are also primary needs and therefore
are attractive rather than repulsive to infants. As the child matures
through experience, these appetitions are modified, refined, and ex-
tended with the development of perceptual
-cognitive abilities. Thus,
there is a trend of gradual evolution in which the biologically based
function takes on cognitive structuring as it interacts with the en-
vironment
.
The developmental progression of these primary appetitions
in infancy may be regarded in terms of three phases, each of which en-
tails the emergence of some new capability on the part of the organism.
Phase I: This phase begins at birth or perhaps even before.
Here, the infant's appetitions are relatively undifferentiated and tend
to be concerned with the satisfaction of biological needs or appetites,
i.e.
,
sleep, air, warmth, food, etc. This is not to say that the needs
themselves are unspecific. Rather, the various expressions of activity
which the infant associates with these needs has not yet become selec-
tive. This would suggest that the appetition, although it may fully
exist in terms of a physical feeling that indicates an incongruity
between the present and some unrealized condition necessary or desira-
ble for survival has not yet acquired a conceptual dimension. Thus,
that part of appetition with which the child is bom includes simply
the physical feeling or urge towards some fulfillment. Gradually, a
conceptual component emerges which explicitly indicates the unrealized
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condition toward which the physical feeling refers. With the emergence
of this conceptual dimension, the focus of consciousness becomes in-
tentional, i.e.
,
the organism's awareness of the present becomes par-
tially defined in teims of his awareness of the unrealized conditions
toward which he aspires
.
Phase 2: As the child approaches the age of six to ten
months after birth, many of his appetitions, along with their respec-
tive modes of expressive assertion, have become differentiated. Even
before this time, the child's crying and other vocalizations show
regular variations according to the kinds of needs he feels. For
example, every parent knows the difference between a cry indicating
distress and a cry which indicates crankiness, or a cry of fear or
a cry associated with rage. Although these differentiations point to
the beginning of symbolic representation of appetitions, they remain
primarily on the level of simple expression.
Phase 3: At approximately one year, not only do appetitions
and their associated expressions continue to become differentiated,
they also become symbolized in language. The advent of this capacity
to symbolize appetitions is significant because it greatly extends the
child's power to determine his future and to bring this sense of future
to bear on his current development. For example, since he is now
able to systematically manipulate and behave with respect to condi-
tions which are not physically present, the child can weigh alter-
natives without having to experience them beforehand. In additon,
symbolizing appetitions enables a child to formulate an intention, the
fulfillment of which will occur at a remote point in time and space.
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Moreover, the capacity to conceive of possibilities is almost limitless.
For instance, he may express a desire for something, the fulfillment of
which rests upon the prior fulfillment of another unrealized condition.
There is yet another element which seems to emerge parallel
with these phases; the emerging awareness of personal causation-
-the
child’s tendency to see himself as a causal agent in his experience.
This awareness of causality accrues from the traces of a child's first
interactions with his environment. It depends not only upon mere
motor activity but also on "reafferent" stimulation or feedback, i.e.,
a perceptual experience which indicates the results effected by this
interaction. This sense of personal causation is absolutely essential
if the fchild is to begin structuring his future in active self-deter-
mined terms. Without it, he has no basis for developing the plans and
strategies necessary to fulfill his purposes.
3.3.2 SUMMARY
Current speculations on the developmental structure of goal-
setting trace its origins to very fundamental, perhaps innate, pri-
mary appetitions. Such appetitions are the basis of novelty and
advance in the human organism. As the individual's potentialities un-
fold through successive occasions of experience, these appetitions
undergo extension and transformation in three distinct but interrelated
directions; (1) they progress from simple to complex, i.e., highly dif-
ferentiated and integrated aims; (2) they advance from specific to gen-
eral concerns; (3) they progress from very immediate to longer-range, and
more remote goals. The relatively restrictive tendency to respond only
to appetitions which are directly present is supplanted by an increas-
ing propensity to symbolically represent appetitions and the capacity
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to respond as fully to the symbols as to that which they originally
represent. The functional qualities of symbolic representation dra-
matically extend the individual’s capacity to anticipate and control
his future.
3 . 4 EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
The present statement of educational objectives is derived
from both the expanded description of the various phases in the se-
quence of the goal-setting process and the developmental progressions
outlined in the previous section. Please keep in mind that these ob-
jectives are stated from the learner’s frame of reference.
a. To develop the ability to turn one’s attention toward
the realm of unrealized possibilities in the future.
b. To differentiate into clear figure the alternative
possibilities which lie before one, i.e., to articulate as clearly as
possible a set of possibilities with which one is faced.
c. To project or fantasize the consequences which the
various possibilities hold for one’s development, and to eliminate
those whose negative consequences for one’s greater purpose or aim.
In other words, to assess and evaluate the feasibility of the various
courses of action. This requires the learner to be able to anticipate
prerequisites and consequences connected with the particular possibility.
d. To determine the priorities of the remaining feasible al-
ternatives with reference to one’s ultimate concerns or purpose.
e. To integrate these alternatives into a coherent plan of
action. This process requires differentiating the larger, complex
goals into component sub-goals, structuring these sub-goals so as to
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optimize attainment of one's purpose.
Hie three developmental progressions which interrelate with
the above scheme of objectives are:
(1) Jo intensify or increase the degree of differentiation
and integration of the goals envisioned by the learner
Not only does this refer to the ability to formulate
and conceptualize long-range, elaborate life-goals, but
also includes, (a) the abilities to discern and articu-
late the differences which separate one's present condition
from the goal being entertained, and (b) to determine
the sequence of actions that forms the process which
must transpire in order to actualize the goal or po-
tential. H
(2) To develop the capacity to adequately symbolize one's
goals and intentions. (Note: Language is not the only
mode of symbolization available to the child for this
purpose.)
3.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE
AND PROTOTYPICAL LEARNING EXPERIENCES
3.5.1 GENERAL COMMENTS
An impressive volume of research summarized by both Hunt
(1965)
,
and White (1959) point out the crucial role of early environ-
ment in the development of intrinsic (purposive) motivation. If there
is any clear directive that can be extracted from this research it is
that a neonate's environment should be rich in contrasts, complexity,
change, and order or regularity. But these attributes in themselves
are not sufficient to foster the growth of intentional behavior. The
child must also be able to actively interrelate with his environment,
to causally effect changes in his world and to receive reafferent feed-
back which reflects the consequences of his interaction. The first
suggestion thus concerns the general quality and arrangement of the
learner's environment.
A. The child should be provided, and encouraged to play, with
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plastic materials; materials which he can mold, shape, build or change
in some way. Such materials include blocks, clay, paints, typewriter,
beads, etc. Objects which are relatively impervious to change or mo-
tion such as books, tables, pictures, etc., do not allow the child to
experiment with his causal, creative powers as extensively.
3 . 5.2 LEARNING EXPERIENCE I.
Purpose: To assist the learner to turn his attention toward
the future and begin thinking in advance of his future actions, i.e., to
begin differentiating and structuring his future.
Procedure: Initially the child should be allowed to experi-
ment and familiarize himself with the materials, improvise on his own,
and begin to explore some of the possibilities and limitations for ef-
fecting change or creativity within his environment. If the child is
having difficulty visualizing possibilities on his own, the teacher
may stimulate the child's speculation through leading questions, or, if
this does not work, the teacher herself may judiciously suggest some
possibilities. At some point, when the child indicates that his explora-
tion has resulted in a number of discoveries, the teacher might begin
asking the child what he intends to do, or what he wants to do. The
idea here is to get the child to express in however tentative or primi-
tive terms he might, some design relating to his future which goes be-
yond a merely random, impulsively-based activity.
Sometimes a child might find it difficult to generate such a
design. In this case, the teacher should try to refrain from directly
suggesting a plan- -rather, the emphasis should be on helping the child
enact the process himself of seeking out ideas from his environment,
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and deciding from among those possibilities he has assembled, which
one will be the basis of his goal. With this im mind, the teacher may
take a magazine or book of pictures, sit down with the child and page
through it, helping the child to think in terms of possible subjects
or themes for a project; perhaps a dance, a painting or sculpture.
The role of the teacher here is to stimulate the child's
consideration of the realm of possibilities (the potential environment)
and to extend his natural tendencies toward imagination beyond the
present, and to help him differentiate clearly what his possibilities
are.
3.5.2 LEARNING EXPERIENCE II
This experience presupposes the student has successfully
negotiated the process contained in Learning Experience I.
Purpose: To differentiate the stages and processes involved
in achieving one's goal.
Procedure: Once a child has identified and chosen a defi-
nite goal (let us assume for the moment that his goal is to create a
collage)
,
the next step is to determine the materials or actions to
which he must attend in order to go about creating the collage. The
teacher's intervention here might consist of encouraging or alerting
the child to actively consider the means necessary for the achievement
of his goal, i.e., paper, paste, paint, pictures, water, etc. The
obvious way of doing this is, of course, for the teacher to begin
asking questions after the child has made a decision: "What do we
need to do first?" or "Which things do we need in order to begin?"
Or, if the materials are on hand she might ask, "Do we have everything
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we need here?” As the child responds, he should be encouraged to list
the items or steps for his project on a piece of paper. If he cannot
write, then the teacher herself may write down what he says. Prefer-
ably the list would reflect the order of priorities and sequence in
which the plan will actually be implemented. Then, the child can
use the list as the basis for his subsequent activity, checking each
item off as it is taken care of. The list thus serves a two- fold
purpose, a) it serves as a helpful reminder of the child's plans,
and b) if the child discovers that his original plan is somehow in-
adequate, he has a record which enables him to immediately pinpoint
the specific deficiency against the needs of the situation. This sort
of feedback is a useful device for correcting and refining one's goal-
setting and planning skills. Once the process of assembling or pre-
paring materials is finished and the project is completed, both the
teacher and the student should discuss how effective the planning
process was, e.g., was there enough time to do everything? Was the
plan flexible enough to allow for un- anticipated ideas or occurrences?
Did we forget an important step or ingredient? Following the dis-
cussion, the child should summarize the evaluation in his notebook, or
if the child cannot write, the teacher may write the summary from the
child's dictation. Thus a permanent retord of the child's progress
is easily accessible to the teacher who seeks to evaluate the effective-
ness of learning experiences as they bear upon the child's performance.
3.5.5 LEARNING EXPERIENCE III
Purpose: To conceive of the realm of alternative possibili-
ties in one's future, to differentiate and integrate these into a
coherent plan of action.
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Procedure: At the beginning of each day or class session,
the student begins by taking a few minutes to write his goals and
plans for the coming day. This list of goals then becomes the guiding
standard for the child's use of time and his scheduling of activities.
At the end of the day, he compares his achievements against his original
intentions in writing. Besides fostering the habit of planning one's
future, this exercise also helps the child to learn to set realistic
goals. The child has clear evidence as to how well he fulfills his
intentions, whether the goal is unreasonably high, or whether it was
too easy. Students in the class can be trained by the teachers to give
each other valuable feedback. The thrust of this feedback might be to
articulate any dissonance between what a child is doing and what his
stated goals and intentions are. In addition, such discussions might
include ways in which goals or plans could have been improved.
At a later time, this experience might be extended to include
longer-range planning, such as scheduling a week, a month, or perhaps
even a semester. Naturally, such complex goal -setting presupposes
that the student has been successful in planning smaller and simpler
units of time and activity. However, the same principles of stating
and symbolizing goals, and utilizing feedback apply here as they do
in the simpler conditions.
As noted earlier, a number of studies have indicated a posi-
tive correlation between the level of performance attempted, i.e., the
difficulty of the goal, and one's level of performance on the task,
even in cases where the goal is beyond the possibility of achievement.
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In the latter situation, although achievement will be maximized, the
child’s subjective experience is one of failure. If such experiences
are both frequent and intense, the result can be a loss of self-confi-
dence, a withdrawing from potentially challenging situations and a gen-
eral anxiety associated with facing the future. Keeping in mind both
the need for success and the need for challenge, the teacher should
encourage and stimulate the child to set goals which will extend his
capabilities but will also avoid experiences of traumatic failure.
Occasional failure in small degree can, on the other hand, refine the
goal-setting process and cultivate individual stamina.
3.5.5 LEARNING EXPERIENCE IV
Purpose: To express and symbolize one's goal.
Procedure: The child writes a story, or paints a picture
portraying the intended or goal situation towards which he aspires.
When completed, the child shares this expression with the teacher and
other children in order to reinforce its meaning for him. The painting
or story should then become relatively visiable and a permanent part of
the child's environment, serving both as an incentive and as a reminder
of the goal he has set and later on, after he has attained the goal, a
symbol of his achievement.
3.5.6 A NOTE ON MODELING. The child begins very early in life to look
for a model to provide directives which he can follow. From imitation
of sounds and movements, to the imitation of adult actions and make-
believe play, children are continually relating themselves to the adults
they observe. Buhler and Kolberg, among others, have demonstrated that
modeling and identification are important sources of goals to the child
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as well as an important means by which he acquires knowledge and skills
of the goal
-setting process. Thus it almost goes without saying that
the teacher herself must exemplify clearly and consistently the prin-
ciples of competent goal-setting in her own activities.
CHAPTER FOUR
WILL
•
Vy 1} 'ls the P^ess of realizing an intention in action and
-is expressed zn terms of the three sub-processes of (i) self-initiationperseverance and (Hi) effecting closure. 1
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4.1 ELABORATE DESCRIPTION
4.1.1 WILL: A HISTORICAL DEFINITION
Despite the moratorium on the study of inner experience which
has prevailed over American experimental psychology for the past 40
years, the will has remained a topic of discourse among many psycho-
analysts (Rank, Farber and Sullivan to mention a few)
, existentialists
(May), and the third- force psychologists (Frankl and Maslow in particu-
lar)
. These writers have kept alive and drawn heavily from a rich
tradition in western thought that extends back to Plotinius. Vernon
Bourke s classic survey (1964) identifies ten major conceptions of
will that have figured prominently in western philosophy from ancient
times up to the present. From among these various meanings, he attempts
a synthetic definition that embodies a core meaning for the idea of will
,
Willing is that psychic activity of man whereby he
tends toward or away from certain objectives reflec-
tively adopted, whereby he acts with some spontane-
ity or self- initiative and whereby he approves or
loves what he deems good and disapproves or hates
what he deems not good (Bourke, 1964, p. 235).
In addition, Bourke cites a common pattern running through
these historically diverse conceptions. This pattern is expressed as
five steps or successive phases: Step I consists of certain unresolved
initial feeling tendencies or impulses. Step II involves the initiation
of personal effort to resolve these tendencies in terms of some reflec-
tively adopted purpose or value. In Step III the resolving process
is terminated with the yield of a decision or choice, while Step IV is
the controlled execution of the decision in consciously directed activ-
ity. Finally, Step V includes an evaluative relection upon the
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consequences of the entire process. As can be seen, this descriptive
definition subsumes a very large category of phenomena and indeed paral-
lels much of the present theory. However, the tern will, to be deveoped
in the following pages, refers to a specific operation that could be
classified within Bourke's Step IV-
-the expression of an intention in
coherent activity. Although this definition provides a starting point,
it furnishes no insight into the nature of the process itself. But
this is understandable since Bourke is a historian, not a psychologist,
and his attempt is simply to give a descriptive summary of the numerous
interpretations of will that have evolved through centuries of philo-
sophical speculation.
4.1.2 THE WILL IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
(A) William James. The study of the will in modem psy-
chology received its most comprehensive expression in the work of
William James. His treatise on will in Principles (James, Vol. II, Ch.
26) remains a classic, yet to be equaled in more recent literature.
Although himself not heavily involved in laboratory experiments, James
was in constant touch with the results of such research. His survey is
both comprehensive and penetrating. Another important factor not to
be underestimated, is that James was one of the most gifted intro-
spectionists in the history of western thought- -a gift which enabled
him to articulate some of the most elusive aspects of direct experience.
Some of James’ ideas on the will were introduced in an
earlier chapter, but the emphasis here will be somewhat different.
However, some repetition may be unavoidable.
James begins his account with what he considers to be the
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most elementary instance of will, ideo-motor action.
Whenever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately
the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action.
We are aware of nothing between the conception and the
execution ... We think the act and it is done; and that
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ntr°SpeCti0n tells us of the matter (James,
For James, ideo-motor action is far from an indicental, iso-
lated curiosity of experience; it is the fundamental process "un-
disguised by complications" and as such is the key to understanding the
entire phenomena of volition. Examples of ideo-motor action permeate
everyday life; walking, talking, driving, writing; it is rare that any
of these activities "demand a distinct impulse of will." They most
often occur on the heels of the mere intention.
The determining condition of ideo-motor action, according
to James, is "The absence of any conflicting notion in the mind [Ibid.,
p. 523] ." He points out that the experience of ideo-motor action is
frequently not self-evident because, "The mind entertains so many ideas
which do not result in action [ibid., p. 527]." That is, one can
think many things but not do them. This is so because other ideas co-
present with the original rob it of its impulsive power.
Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it
in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from doing
so by an antagonistic representation simultaneously in
the mind (ibid., p. 526).
Through this transparent statement, one can glean a meta-
physical kinship of James' psychology of will with the principles of
organismic philosophy. Ideas are not inert elements forever marooned
in a vacuous world of abstraction, and denied intercourse with the
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body. Consciousness is itself "impulsive," directional and accompanied
by intensity.
We d° not have a sensation or a thought and then have to
add something dynamic to get a movement.
. . Our sensations
ana thoughts are hut cross-sections
,
as it were
, of cur-
rents whose essential consequence is motion.
. . . The popu-lar notion that mere consciousness as such is not essentially
a forerunner of activity, that the latter must result from
some super-added will-force.
. . is not the norm (Ibid.).
James points out that the popular notion that "mere conscious-
ness as such is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that the
latter must result from some super-added will-force," is misleading.
Such cases of "will with effort" he explains, are instances where the
main idea is nullified by antagonistic thoughts. When the competing
tendency is removed "We feel as if an inward spring were let loose
and this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act effec-
tively succeeds [ibid.
,
p. 527] ." The feeling of deliberation or effort
of willing associated with an act comes in when the neutralization of
the antagonistic and inhibiting idea is required.
The emphasis in the above quote is to draw attention to
another parallel with the organismic position developed in Chapter One;
not only are such ideas vectoral or impulsive, they are cross-sections
or abstractions of a process; "the mental experience of forms," poten-
tial given reality in the process of expression. Thus, the integral
relationship between mind and body is asserted yet the dipolar nature
of experience (mental and physical) is also recognized.
Ideo-motor action is the kingpin of James' theory and ac-
counts for how ideas function as causal agents in the world. But in
order for this interpretation to be at all meaningful, it must say
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something about the nature of these efficacious ideas; how they arise,
where they come from, and what determines their intensity.
As a matter of fact, James delves rather extensively into
this problem and forages through an impressive amount of experimental
literature to make his point. The "idea" from which action follows is
some "image" or representation (visual, auditory, tactile) of the act
itself. These representations are presumably traces left in the mem-
ory, synthesized from previous occasions of movement:
When we consciously will a certain act, a mental concep-
tion made up of mental images of these sensations defining
which special act it is, must be there (Ibid., 492).
This answers the question of "what one wills." Voluntary
movement presupposes consciousness of the action. The ability to choose
to act one way instead of another first requires one to be able to dis-
criminate between the two modes of action before actually performing
the specific movements. Thus, there must be some mental representation
analagous to each action which becomes the basis of discrimination and
the object of choice. James argues that these representations involve,
among other things, kinesthetic schema,
My thesis is that in perfectly simple voluntary acts,
there is nothing else in the mind but the kinesthetic
idea, of what the act is to be (ibid.
,
p. 493).
Elsewhere, he makes a distinction between two kinds of kin-
esthetic (by which he really means sensorial) impressions- -"remote"
ones generated by visual, auditory, distal tactile stimulation, and
"resident" ones, generated by reafferent kinesthetic and haptic cues
originating in muscles, joints, the vestibular system, etc. Both resi-
dent and remote images can function as the impelling mental cue.
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However, there is a developmental trend. In the initial
stages of learning a complex action, the ’’resident’' cues predominate
one’s awareness but as the sequence of movements is practiced and mas-
tered, these resident or proximal cues slip away and the controlling
ideas become more remote (or distal)
; ”What interests us are the ends
which the movement is to attain.’’ An example of this progression can
be seen in learning to play a piece of music on the flute. The inex-
perienced learner must focus his attention on producing the proper
fingering for each individual note. Following this, he must concen-
trate on producing the correct breath pressure at the proper angle.
Later, individual scales must be articulated with smooth transition,
vibrato must be added, etc. As the learner advances through each
successive step, he is less concerned and less preoccupied with the
immediate proximal requirements of performing and more concerned with
the remote ideal or image of style and interpretation. In fact, if
attention is deliberately shifted to these particulars, they become
a tremendous encumberance to performance.
Here, a parallel will be recognized with Polanyi’s model
of tacit integration, presented in Chapter Two, Section 2. 1.2. 3, p.
59. Tacit integration was used to describe the hierarchical struc-
ture of conscious attention consisting of an intentional focal level
of awareness in turn supported by the coordination of a number of sub-
sidiary levels of awareness. In the present case, the same relation
is exhibited between resident versus remote images. The remote image
corresponds to the focal idea or intentional level of awareness, while
the resident cues correspond with the subsidiary awareness of the
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particulars underlying a focal (remote) aim. Consequently, the control-
ling representation, the sensorial image which is efficacious in Jean-
Pierre Rampal when he picks up his flute and begins playing a Faure "Ber-
ceuse," will be considerably more distal or remote than resident. Where-
as the focus of my attention (I'm not a flutist) will be more taken by
the resident cues, the subsidiaries, of performing the piece.
Although James regards ."attention to the idea" as the pri-
mary process of will, there is a second and distinct phenomenon which
he describes as the "express consent to the reality of what is attended
to." It is difficult to go beyond this description with further analy-
ses except to say, perhaps, that it refers to the intensity with which
an idea is felt. Obviously, it is difficult to deny the reality of
something which one feels strongly, and one is also much more likely to
act on an intensely felt thought or impulse. It is this dimension of
intensity which becomes particularly important in what James calls
"will with effort." Earlier, it was pointed out that many ideas one
entertains never result in action because they are neutralized by com-
peting tendencies. Yet consciousness is extremely complex, presenting
many motives simultaneously. Human beings are faced daily with the
task of resolving conflicting tendencies or interests and acting in one
way versus another. This means that at some point one idea finally pre-
dominates. James accounts for this fact by saying that one may choose
to emphasize and nurture the idea by keeping one’s attention focused
on it and calling up the associated kinesthetic images. As the idea
is intensified in this manner, it gradually comes to predominate the
conscious field and then ideo-motor action follows.
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The above also indicates another important aspect of James’
theory; that the volitional process lies entirely in mentality. This
author can but yield in deference to James' illustrious prose, "The
whole drama is a mental drama.
. . If I may use the word idea .... I
will say that it is an idea to which our will applies itself.
. . Consent
to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement.
Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind
[Ibid., p. 568]." Thus, volition is "primarily a relation not between
our Self and extra-mental matter [as a dualistic doctrine would imply]
,
but between our Self and our own states of mind." Thus, the psychology
of volition ends with the stabilization of the mind as the dominant ob-
ject of consciousness-
-"The willing terminates with the prevalence of
the idea [ibid., p. 560]."
(B) William McDougall. Writing seme 18 years after James,
William McDougall was one of the last experimental psychologists to
hold a major interest in the problem of volition, at a time when psych-
ology was being swept up on the behaviorist bandwagon. McDougall re-
mained an outspoken critic until his death, against the behaviorists
'
attempt to explain human conduct entirely in terms of mechanistic
principles. In its place, he offered an alternative; a full-fledged
experimental psychology, replete with methodology in which the dynamics
of purpose and will played a central role. A comprehensive review and
critique of McDougall 's psychology falls beyond the scope of this effort
and must await another time. Comments here will be restricted to his
theoretical statements on will and volition.
McDougall 's theory of volition can be seen as a natural
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extension of James' pioneering efforts on this subject. For one, he
accepted James' adaptation of the ideo-motor theory as the baseline
case of willing and hence concurred that the essential process of will
is maintaining the continuance of an idea or feeling in the foreground
of consciousness. Secondly, he corroborated James' account of "will
with effort" as a complex case of conation wherein one or more con-
flicting tendencies must be overcome for the main idea to predominate.
McDougall regarded volition as a special foim of complex conation in
which the effort of the will somehow supports or reinforces the weaker
motive, enabling it to prevail over an initially more impulsive (but
ultimately less valued) goal. (McDougall, 1908, p. 199). It was in
explaining the higher levels of will that McDougall went beyond James.
Accepting that the effort of willing boils down to the effort
of attending to an elusive idea, McDougall asks how the attention holds
an idea at the focus of consciousness to the exclusion of rival ideas.
James says that it is achieved by "suppressing or inhibiting the rival
ideas that tend to exclude it [the original idea] ," while the favored
idea remains by virtue of its own intensity. (Ibid.). Hence, volition
is seen as a primarily negative function, an inhibition of irrelevant
and alien propositions. McDougall takes issue with this interpretation.
One must yet explain how the inhibition is effected. The view of voli-
tion as a fundamentally inhibitive operation, he feels, is misconceived.
That inhibition does occur, however, McDougall accepts as a plain fact.
His argument is that inhibition is a "secondary collateral result" of
the primary process, which is a reinforcement (not operant) of the idea
one chooses to will. In support of this thesis McDougall points out
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that there are no physiological data showing any evidence of inhibitory
impulses being sent out by the central nervous system to the voluntary
muscles. These same studies demonstrate instead that control is achieved
either by innervating antagonistic muscles, or by directing attention
elsewhere
.
By concentrating the energy of the mind and nervous systemin one direction we withdraw it from, or prevent its flow-
ing in any other direction (Ibid., p. 211).
Since the time of McDougall's writing, a great deal more has
been discovered about the neuro
-physiology of inhibition and there is
now some evidence which suggests the direct inhibition of neural ac-
tivity be a fact. (Altman, 1966). However, it has also been shown
that such inhibition always occurs as a reciprocal effect of activity
elsewhere. Thus, McDougall's basic hypothesis, that inhibition is a
secondary by-product, still stands.
This formulation has the advantage of parsimony because it
implies that the process underlying the self- initiation of activity also
underlies the self-restraint of action. In the latter case, the in-
dividual inhibits an idea, not by brute repression, but by voluntarily
accentuating an alternate idea. Such an interpretation is also con-
sistent with a large body of clinical evidence (Frankl, 1969; Farber,
1964; May, 1969), and clearly holds some very definite educational im-
plications. (See sub-section in this chapter.)
Another problem taken up in McDougall's analysis of volition,
which exceeds the work of James, is the relation between character and
will. McDougall is adamant in pointing out that the mere presence of
ideals alone is insufficient to realize the ideal; especially when the
192
intensity of an abstract ideal is often relatively weak in comparison
with more immediate appetitions. If the more concrete, but in the long
run, less valued desire (going to sleep) compels one's attention, what
prevents it from completely smothering the weaker but ultimately more
valued ideal? How does the initially less intense goal 1) get its in-
itial foothold in the conscious field to begin with, and 2) from where
does it derive its finally over-riding intensity? For example, Grinker
and Speigel (1945) cite numerous cases of soldiers going into battle
fearing for their own lives, experiencing anxiety and whose immediate
reaction is to remain in safety. Yet, voluntarily these men move into
situations of great personal danger and knowingly risk their lives.
The impulse to avoid danger and the intense anxiety of battle is in-
itially overpowering, yet in the end, this tendency is over-ridden by
more abstract, remote ideals such as "serving one's country," and ful-
filling a personal commitment in line with one's self-image.
McDougall would probably explain that such "Action taken
against the strongest desire" is made possible by the systematic or-
ganization of values and ideals within the personality structure. He
writes,
The essential mark of volition- -that which distinguishes
it from simple desires, or simple conflict of desires--
is that the personality as a whole, or central feature
or nucleus of the personality, the man himself. . .is
thrown upon the side of the weaker motive. ... In the
typical case of volition a man’s self, in some pecu-
liarly intimate sense of the word self, is thrown
upon the side of the motive that is made to prevail.
The empirical self, the idea of his self that each
man entertains, plays an essential part in volition
(McDougall, 1908, pp. 206-207).
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This selection points to the crucial role of self-image, in
the exercise of volition. For McDougall, the structure of self-identity
consisted of a purposive hierarchy of emotion, attitudes and values.
In another passage, he defines the "mind" of any organism as "The sum
of the enduring conditions of its purposive activities [In Boden, 1972,
p. 219]." This led quite naturally to his remarkable observation that
what is called the self is "always an ideal rather than an accomplished
fact," an ideal that is, in various degrees, approximated but never at-
tained. (McDougall, 1908, p. 212). The ideal of the self was called
by McDougall, "the sentiment of self-regard" and presumably functioned as
a central integrating element presiding over the individual's system of
sentiments. The term sentiment was first used by A. F. Shand to describe
"emotional habits," but McDougall modified and expanded the usage con-
siderably, defining it as,
. . .a system in which a cognitive disposition is linked
with one or more emotional or affective and conative
dispositions to form a structural unit that functions
as one whole system (In Boden, 1972).
Whereas emotions and thoughts are passing phases, a sentiment
was seen to be a relatively enduring structure within the total person-
ality. This conception bears close resemblance to a recent modem usage
of "value." (Jordan and Streets, 1972). In these terms, the sentiment
of self-regard corresponds to one's structural and functional sense
of personal identity, those values which involve the sense of self. The
master-sentiment derives its power because it is centered on the idea of
self, "An object perpetually present from which it is impossible to be
separated, one which is inevitably brought to mind in all situations,"
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especially all situations that call for choice of goals and decisions
as regards means to the chosen goal (McDougall, 1908, p. 214).
All this implies that a strong, effective will requires a
strong, well- integrated sense of identity in which the ideal of self is
durable and stable. Thus, McDougall' s definition, slightly modified,
might read: Volition is the supporting or reinforcing of an intention
hy the cooperation of an impulse excited within the system of values
associated with the sense of self.
(iii) Summary. There are few points on which the theories
of James and McDougall are in disagreement. It is one of those for-
tunate instances in the history of psychology where the work and efforts
of one great mind are complemented and extended by the labors of another.
McDougall 's extensions of James' fertile, but sometimes unsystematic
theory articulate clearly the crucial role of character in the develop-
ment and function of will. Although their accounts of the process un-
derlying impulse- inhibition differ, this contrast should not be over-
emphasized.
It will be recalled, for example, how James argued that the
willed "idea" inhibits competing tendencies by gathering intensity and
building up associative connection. This explanation is not too far
from McDougall 's thesis that inhibition is a collateral result of re-
inforcing an alternative impulse.
Although these theories are by no means the only ones ever
advanced, they are probably the most adequate, the most coherent, the
most complete, and the most important to date. It is worth noting that
both James and McDougall published their theories well over 60 years
195
ago (James in 1890, McDougall in 1908). In view of this judgement,
it is imperative that the basic principles suggested by these theories
be critically reviewed in the light of more recent evidence.
Unfortunately, this is not a very simple task since experi-
mental psychology has avoided any serious study of will for the past
45 years. But there are areas of empirical investigation that impinge
upon specific aspects of the willing process; sometimes directly, as in
the case of the studies on perseverance; and sometimes indirectly, as
in the case of studies on determining tendencies and preparatory set.
4.1.3 DETERMININING TENDENCY AND PREPARATORY SET
(SELF- INITIATION)
(i) Determining Tendency. The concept of determining ten-
dency was first introduced by Ach and the Wurzburg psychologists in 1905.
In one of their experimental designs, subjects were instructed to add
two numbers which appeared on a screen or find a rhyme for a word which
appeared. At the time of understanding the task and during the period
preceding the stimulus most subjects were very much aware of the task
and during the period preceding the stimulus most subjects were very
much aware of the task and their intention with respect to it. However,
when the stimulus actually appeared, many subjects experienced no aware-
ness of the task. The response came automatically and the subject only
seemed to be aware that the response was correct. Put briefly, the ex-
perience of intending was not immediately responsible for the action.
The term, "determining tendency" was introduced merely as a descriptive
label for this observed fact that intended behavior or activity may be
separated in time from the actual decision and intention. There are
other examples of this separation in ordinary, everyday activity. One
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may decide to catch the eight o'clock bus, go to the bus stop and begin
to read a magazine while waiting. Then, as the bus arrives, most often
one boards the bus with hardly a thought of intending the act. On oc-
casion, I have been asked to take out the garbage while buried in the
midst of writing a sentence. At the moment of the request, I may decide
that I will do it, but not just at that moment: Then during a pause
some time later, very suddenly I find that I am taking out the garbage
while during the entire operation I may be thinking about something en-
tirely unrelated to the task itself.
The point here is that the experience of determining ten-
dency, as something distinct from conscious intention, is an experi-
mentally established fact and it is this observation which, in part,
justifies the treatment of will as a process which can be conceptually
distinguished from goal- setting. (The distinction must be counter-
balanced with the realization that the two processes are also conceptually
related, i.e.
,
an act of will presupposes at some point, if not immedi-
ately, a prior intention of the act.)
Later, Ach went on to develop a theoretical system and method-
ology for quantifying the strength of the determining tendency. Although
Ach accepted the associationists' explanation that sequences of actions
and/or of ideas were determined by contiguity (i.e., one idea or act
suggested another if the two had frequently appeared together and the
strength of this tendency was proportional to the frequency of past
conjunctions)
,
he posited that determining tendency was an additional
kind of tendency produced by an "act of will" instead of by repetition
or contiguity. The postulation of these two different tendencies provided
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Ach with a strategy for measuring the strength of the determining ten-
dency. He contrived situations in which the intention and its deteimined
activity came in conflict with tendencies attributable to past associ-
ations. The strength of the determining tendency was measured by the
number of past repetitions of the conflicting activity that were neces-
sary to produce errors or interfere with the intended response. To
achieve this condition, Ach would train subjects to respond to a long
list of paired nonsense syllables of three kinds; 1) noimal with random
sequences of syllables; 2) with inverted pairs in which each pair con-
sisted of a syllable and its reverse (tig - git); and 3) rhymed pairs
(tig - mig). Ryan summarizes Ach's method as follows:
1. The subject read lists of paired nonsense syllables
of three kinds: (a) "normal” with random sequences of
syllables, (b) inverted pairs in which each pair con-
sisted of a syllable and its reverse (mun-num)
,
(c)
rhymed pairs (mun-tun)
. The lists were read over and
over in trochaic meter, so that the pairs of syllables
were grouped, and the subject was instructed to learn
the pairs: "You should try to hold the syllables in
memory, but without using aids. You should not use
mnemo-technic supports, just read the syllables and
try to retain them (aufzunehmen) ."
2. After a certain number of repetitions under the
conditions above, the instructions were changed. In
one series of repetitions, the subject would be in-
structed simply to "reproduce," i.e., give the first
word he thought of. In another series he would be
instructed to invert all words, or to give a rhyme for
all words. In the latter two cases, the determining
tendency would be in opposition to the associative
tendencies for some words, and in agreement for others.
For example, if the instruction was to rhyme, the subject
had only to give the same syllables he read before for
those pairs which were rhymed in the original practice
trial. For the "normal" pairs, however, and for the in-
verted pairs, the subject had to give a new second mem-
ber of the pair, different from the one originally
practiced. In addition to the practiced words, un-
practiced words were included in this test series.
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3. By varying the original number of repetitions used
in setting up the ’’associative tendencies,” Ach found
that he could vary the number of errors and failures
to respond when the determining tendency conflicted
with the association. When a sufficient number of
repetitions had occurred, the subject would give the
originally associated syllable instead of the "intended”
syllable, so the determining tendency was weaker
than the associative tendency.
Attempts to replicate this procedure yielded sporadic re-
sults and Kurt Lewin undertook further investigations of Ach's design.
He found that the fr uency of associative contiguity was by itself
insufficient to induce interference. Repeating some of Ach's origin-
nal experiments, Lewin' s subjects often experience no difficulty in
asserting the intended behavior over the associatively conditioned
behavior, even after 300 trials. He then sought to determine the
kinds of conditions under which interference would occur and found
that the critical variable was to establish a trend toward responding
in terms of the original task while the new task is introduced. Such
would be the case if the instruction were "to rhyme” and the first few
test trials consisted of syllables which had been in "rhyming pairs”
during the practice series. These items would be followed by a syl-
lable which was formerly not rhymed but inverted in the practice trial.
In response to this syllable the subject is likely to give the old in-
verted associate instead of a rhyme. Ryan concludes this is because
the order of the test series is such as to shift the nature of the task
from "rhyme” as assigned by the experimenter to "give the old sequence.
Lewin' s results call into question the validity of associa-
tionist principles to explain the interference effect. His studies sug
gest that it is less the specific association of contiguous stimuli
199
than it is the ’’set” of intention to react to the data in terms of some
rule or pattern which sets up a conflicting response tendence. The con-
flict is latent during the initial trials since the responses predicated
by both intentions coincide. The coincidence can subtly change the task
back to the overleamed practice task without any overt consequences
until an item appears for which the responses diverge. It is at this
point that the subject is aware of competing tendencies of intentions
toward the situation at hand.
Unfortunately, very little research has been carried out on
this problem of determining tendency during the 50 years intervening
between Lewin’s work and the present. The only such efforts which I
am aware of are several studies conducted by a group of Russian psy-
chologists and there is currently only one published in English.
Bzhalava (1963) devised an experiment in which his subjects
experienced great difficulty in voluntarily breaking one "task tendency”
or ’’set” in favor of another. He assembled 45 subjects, each fluent in
both German and their native Russian, and provided them with lists of
nonsense words which could be pronounced in either German or Russian.
During the practice series, the subjects were trained to read the ma-
terial with German pronunciation. During the test sessions, the sub-
jects were told to continue reading in German but to read some words,
chosen in advance by the subject himself, in Russian. Only 8 per cent
of the participants pronounced the critical word correctly on the first
attempt. In the other 92 per cent, the pronunication was determined by
the trained predisposition to read German. Nearly every individual re-
ported and exhibited great difficulty in reading the critical word
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correctly. Bzhalava’s own analysis provides little help in explaining
these interesting results. He merely says that, 1) the problem boils
down to the substitution of one "set" for another; 2) this process is
not spontaneous, but must be consciously directed or willed; and 3)
there is a wide range of individual differences observed in partici-
pant’s ability to make such substitutions. But as far as suggesting
how the substitution is accomplished, what the underlying processes
are, he offers no speculation.
Before venturing any speculation here, it seems appropri-
ate to take account of the general findings accrued from the research
on determining tendency: 1) In cases where a consciously (and earnest-
ly) adopted goal contravenes a previously established trend, the inten-
tion will often not be spontaneously expressed in action. 2) In such
circumstances, the individual may experience effort and difficulty in
asserting the intended action over the competing tendency.
On the surface, such evidence appears to contradict the James
-
McDougall theory of will which relies so centrally on the postulate of
ideo-motor action. The studies of Ach, Lewin, and Bzhalava demonstrate
rather conclusively that a consciously introspected intention does not
necessarily and automatically lead to action. Perhaps the "faculty"
psychologists were right after all in asserting "will power" to be a
separate discrete faculty (like vision or memory) existing on its own,
independent of other organismic processes. But such a conclusion would
be to misread both the empirical facts and the theory.
To begin with, James' conception of ideas goes much deeper
and includes far more than conscious abstraction. An idea encompasses
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a myriad of subsidiary sensations and processes which lie beneath the
focal image at the surface of consciousness. The articulated intention
is thus a somewhat superficial rendition of the complex, purposive
hierarchy operating within the individual as he acts toward some goal.
When an intention is actualized, all of these subsidiary schema are
tacitly coordinated so that mental and physical, efficient and final
cause are melded into a single unified expression of the novel, un-
realized form.
In the studies of Ach, Lewin, and Bzhalava, the subjects
approached the altered task with the massive inertia of subsidiary
tendencies associated with the original intention immanent within the
purposive hierarchy. This intentional predisposition, cumulative from
the past, emerges into the present, evoking anticipations at variance
with the novel and perhaps superficially felt intentional schema. A
reorientation of each level of process must take place before, so that
any antagonistic ideas or tendencies interfering with the realization
of the new intention are removed. This readjustment process initially
requires reafferent feedback for the brain to determine the extent
of discrepancy between the motor effects of immanent tendencies and
those effects newly intended. Without any knowledge of this discrepancy
the extent of the organism's reorientation cannot be accurately antici-
pated. An example which illustrates this more clearly is the novice
carpenter who, having hammered a nail with a two-pound hammer, suddenly
changes to a four-pound hammer. His initial strikes will likely miss
the mark, not because of carelessness, but because the coordination of
subsidiary muscular tendencies have not yet been reoriented to the new
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task. With repeated experience in making the transition between harriers,
reafferent feedback becomes unnecessary since the adjustment can be anti-
cipated before any movement actually occurs.
(ii) Preparatory Set. Hich the same interpretation can be
applied to the copious body of data generated by experiments on re-
action time. Measuring the speed with which an organism is able
to respond in some way to a signal was among the very first problems
studied quantitatively by Wundt in his original laboratory and it has
since remained a prominent topic of inquiry. In the typical reaction-
time experiment, the subject is instructed verbally and prepared by
repetition of the response. He anticipates only one kind of stimulus
to be presented and has only one kind of response to perform, e.g.,
to press a button when a buzzer sounds.
If the task involves responding quickly to the signals, the
general intention to push the button when the buzzer sounds is not suf-
ficient. Each time the signal is to come, he also must "get set" to
react, a process so widely observed that it has been given the name,
"preparatory set." The preparatory set is something apart from the
goal which may pervade the whole situation. It is almost as if the sub-
ject had to renew or intensify the specific determining tendency before
the stimulus is apprehended and the response made. In most studies,
the subject is given a "ready signal" just prior to the stimulus, and
if this signal is omitted, the response is always slower even though
the general intention to respond to the signal is still in effect.
One controversial issue surrounding the interpretation of the
preparatory set has to do with the nature of the underlying physiological
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mechanisms. Some behaviorists believe the phenomena can be explained
strictly in terms of muscular tension without assuming any more complex
processes in the central nervous system. There is some evidence to
suggest that muscular adjustment is at least partially involved, but
there is other research which indicates an independent factor of pre-
paredness in the brain. Mowrer, Rayman and Bliss (1940) devised an
experiment in which the subject's task was to perform the same reac-
tion for either of two stimuli, one auditory and one visual. During
the trial, the subject was presented with a series of repeated visual
stimuli followed by a switch to a series of auditory stimuli and vice
versa. The reaction to the first auditory signal, switching from the
series of visual signals, was markedly slower than either, 1) the re-
sponse to the preceding visual cue, and 2) the response to succeeding
auditory cues. In other words, whenever a switch was made from one
signal to another, the initial reaction to the changed signal was found
to be slower. Since the motor preparation is identical for both tasks,
Mowrer argues that the slowed reaction to the changed one must be due
to some central (as opposed to peripheral) process. In an effort to
identify more specifically the conditions responsible for the retarded
reaction, the locus of the signal was changed without changing the sen-
sory modality. It was found that when the task to respond remains in
a single mode, changing the locus of the stimulus produced no change in
reaction time. However, when the alerting stimuli are disjunctive
(either visual or auditory)
,
whenever a change occurs
,
the reaction
time increases.
One possible interpretation of these results is that the dif-
ference between the tasks (i.e., responding to different sense
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modalities) is sufficiently large to require different intentions and
determining tendencies for each reaction even though the motor patterns
are the same. On the other hand, when the signals change in location
but remain qualitatively similar and persist in the same sensory mode,
the contrast is miniscule in comparison. Thus, the intention and de-
termining tendency need little if any alteration when just the locus
of the signal is changed. This speculation extends and emphasizes
another dimension of James' original notion of the "image" or repre-
sentation of the act in the mind. It involves more than just the sub-
sidiary kinesthetic cues and the focal idea of the end-result (press-
ing the button, etc.). These cues are only one aspect of the total
situation on which the intention rests. The other aspect is the ap-
prehension of the signal. The "idea" in ideo-motor includes the in-
tegration of afferent and efferent operations, the total occasion in
which the organism is functioning. The idea that is willed
consists of the signal and action apprehended as an integral whole in
which each is defined in terms of the other.
This explanation amounts to a direct repudiation of the as-
sociationistic or stimulus-response paradigm because it means that the
stimulus and response are not independently constituted variables.
The signal as perceived is not just a sensation, but an act of seeing
in which both the sensation and the coordinated movement are "inside"
the act. The motor pattern is not only stimulated, but controlled by
the seeing, so that the stimulus and response are part of a larger co-
ordination. "Seeing the light" or "hearing the buzzer" is not one self-
contained experience and "effecting the movement" another; the two
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gradually becoming linked together through repeated contiguity. In-
stead, these aspects are agglutinated into a single irreducible thought
or scheme. No longer is the perception mere seeing; it is "seeing- the-
light- that-means-pushing- the-button." 5
(iii) Summary and Comment. The research on determining
tendency and preparatory set are concerned with the way in which in-
tentions are actualized with very brief kinds of activity, e.g., press-
ing a button on the correct cue, giving the correct verbal response, etc.
This aspect of the literature sheds some light on that aspect of will
which involves the autonomous initiation of intentional, goal -directed
action. The next area of investigation to be considered focuses on the
maintenance of goal-directed activity in situations where efforts must be
extended over a period of time. These studies pertain directly to the
second phase of will, perseverance.
4.1.4 PERSEVERANCE
Perseverance has long been recognized in the literature as a
distinguishing characteristic of intentional behavior. McDougall
(1908) cites it as one of the objective features of purposive activity.
Tolman (1932) ranked "persistence -until -ends -are -attained" as a basic
criterion for molar purposive behavior, while Lewin frequently focused
on the endurance of tension between psychological regions of the in-
dividual, which he considered to be a causal factor in the sustenance
of goal-oriented action. Even the behavioristic schools of experimental
5
The basic form of this explanation is based upon John Dewey's
classic critique of Thomas Meynert's attempt to explain learning in terms
of associative links.
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psychology
,
represented by Hull and Skinner, are concerned with the
problem of continuous and persistent behavior, although their conceptual-
ization of the construct is based entirely upon extrinsic environmental
variables and is devoid of any reference to internal organismic factors.
The research upon which the various theoretical approaches are based
falls into three distinct categories (Feather, 1961).
The first category includes those studies which have treated
perseverance as a personality trait which is assumed to be relatively
stable in a variety of circumstances. Typically, these studies have
attempted to determine whether there is a consistency manifested within
the perseverant behavior patterns of a person from one situation to
another. Consistency, where it is manifested, is assumed to allow the
inference of a relatively invariant personality characteristic. The
shortcoming of this approach is that the role of environmental factors
in behavior tends to be ignored since the emphasis is on personality
structures or traits which transcend the situation.
The second group of studies are comprised of those centering
upon the phenomenon of resistance to extinction. Although this large
body of literature is not commonly classified under the topic of per-
severance, some of the research is actually quite relevant since it in-
volves the study of persistence on a difficult task without reinforce-
ment (success) after having been trained on a particular type of re-
inforcement schedule. The number of trials the subject performs before
extinction constitutes the measure of perseverance. Since these studies
deal exclusively with the influence of situational variables, they gen-
erally ignore the possible effect of transnational (stable)
personality differences.
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The third category treats perseverance as a motivational vari-
able that emerges from an interaction between stable personality traits,
on the one hand, and extrinsic environmental factors on the other.
This approach has the advantage of being more complete than either of
the above conceptions and is able to draw together their specific con-
tribution into a larger explanatory context.
(i) Perseverance as a Personality Trait. Among those stud-
ies in which perseverance is conceived of as a trait underlying behavior,
a factor analysis of an investigation by MacArthur (1955) yielded
factors of ’’withstanding discomfort to achieve a goal,” "willingness and/
or ability to endure discomfort,” and "stability of character.” Al-
though there is some evidence that perseverance is a unitary or homo-
geneous trait (Eysenck, 1953), it is important to note that several
investigators have not been able to confirm this. For example, persever-
ance on a physical task (such as a handgrip exercise) does not always
correlate significantly with perseverance on a mental task (such as a
puzzle). Likewise, persistence on a dull, repetitious task (such as
crossing out figures) does not necessarily intercorrelate with persis-
tance in solving a mathematical problem. It is this knowledge, that the
task parameters play an important role in determining whether or not an
individual will persevere, that draws attention to those studies con-
cerned with resistance to extinction.
(ii) Perseverance and Resistance to Extinction. The usual
design is one in which a subject learns that a certain action or response
in a situation produces a desired result of reinforcement. Once he has
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learned the connection, the reinforcement is terminated (without the
subject’s knowledge) and the number of times he continues to execute the
response without the reward is taken as the measure of his perseverance.
Different investigators have introduced changes into various aspects of
this paradigm case in order to observe how perseverance is affected by
altering the situation. Briefly summarized, the findings are (1) when
reinforcement is given intermittently (201-40% of the time), there is
greater persistence than if it is administered very frequently (70% -
100% of the time) -
t (2) when reinforcement during the acquisition of re-
sponse is administered irregularly at varying time intervals, the per-
son shows greater persistence than when reinforcement is administered
during regular intervals. Thus, the greatest persistence is developed
by those subjects receiving variable and intermittent rewards. Sub-
jects rewarded intermittently on a regular schedule exhibit less per-
sistence, and the least degree of persistence is shown by subjects
who were trained on a fixed 100% schedule (Deese and Hulse, 1967).
How are these findings to be interpreted? Why should in-
frequent rewards elicit greater persistence than frequent rewards?
The most plausible explanation is that it is not clear to the subject
when training ends and when extinction begins, i.e., he does not know
exactly when to expect it under normal conditions. This means that his
expectancy of being rewarded in any given occasion may be quite low and
is less likely to change after an unsuccessful trial than if the ex-
pectancy for a single instance were at a high level. Thus, the ex-
pectancy or the degree to which a person believes his continued effort
will culminate in the intended result remains higher after two or
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three unrewarded trials for the subject who is reinforced infrequently
and irregularly and hence he is more apt to continue responding in the
face of difficulty or obstacles to success. Jenkins and Stanley (1950)
found that expectancy during extinction was inversely proportional to
the percentage of reinforcements during acquisition. Expectancy of
success in a particular situation, however, is only one of the factors
bearing upon perseverance.
Another important element is how much control the individual
believes he possesses over the situation, i.e., whether he feels he is
responsible for what happens. If the person perceives the control of
the situation as external to himself, he will less readily persevere than
if he perceives himself to be somewhat in control of the rewards and con-
sequences of his actions. James and Rotter (1958) observed two groups
of subjects perform under both 100% and partial reinforcement conditions.
One group was led to belive their reward schedule was dependent upon
chance while the other group believed skill was a determining factor in
their reward pattern. Under both the 100% and partial reinforcement
schedules, the groups operating under the skill conditions persevered
longer than the "chance" group.
Another situational factor which affects perseverance is the
number of alternative response routes available to the subject. Per-
severance is markedly greater towards goals where more than one course
of action is available following failure of the initial strategy than
in those instances where response is limited to a single activity.
However, the amount of time spent on any one course of action is an in-
verse function of the number of alternative and equally promising
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avenues which the individual knows are open to him in his pursuit to-
ward the goal. When he has but one means of tackling the problem, his
perseverance in that one means is strikingly greater than it is on the
first of two attacks. When he has as many as seven alternatives, he
abandons the first very readily (Robinson, 1940)
.
(iii) Lewin. Lewinian field theory has long recognized the
need to consider behavior in terms of interfacing personality and situa-
tional parameters. Lewin observed that "what is usually called persis-
tence is an expression of how quickly goals change when the individual
encounters obstacles. He saw perseverance in terms of a frustration
situation in which a person in a state of tension is separated by some
psychological distance from a goal. This barrier is the source of re-
straining forces which oppose the positive forces acting upon the person
in the direction of the goal. Lewin was never explicit about the nature
of this psycholgoical barrier but presumably it could take many different
foims, e.g., physical distance, effort, or time. The degree to which
this frustration barrier caused an individual to abandon his original in-
tention and turn toward other goals was postulated to be a function of
the individual's personal history of successes and failures in similar
past situations. Lewin cites a series of studies on young children by
Fajan which serve to illumine this relationship. The findings may be
summarized as follows: 1) While past experiences of failure produced
a decrease in persistence at the task (persistence was taken as a func-
tion of the duration of effort exerted toward a goal) , previous success
experiences produced an increase in persistence. 2) When praise and
encouragement accompanied previous success experiences, there was an
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even greater increase. 3) Fajan found persistence to be inversely
proportional to the subject's distance from the goal, i.e., persistence
became stronger with decreasing distance from the goal.
(iv) Perseverance and Achievement Motivation
. Additional
input to this interactive perspective is offered by several studies in
the area of achievement motivation. The theory of achievement motivation
was developed during the early 1950's by McClelland and Atkinson as a
means of systematically interpreting the observed tendencies in some
individuals to value consistently striving for success at difficult
tasks. The central construct of the theory, "the achievement motive,"
is defined as the tendency to consider activities as involving evalu-
ation of the outcome on some scale of excellence, and the tendency to
find success in this kind of performance as rewarding (McClelland and
Atkinson, 1953). In such a situation successful performance at a dif-
ficult level is highly valued and is generally accompanied by a feeling
of pride and accomplishment while failure at an easy level is negatively
valued and is generally accompanied by a feeling of shame and embarass-
ment. This latter aspect is often called the "motive to avoid failure"
and correlates highly with test anxiety.
At least three studies (Winterbottom, 1958; Thomas, 1956;
French and Thomas, 1958), indicate a strong positive correlation be-
tween the need for achievement as measured by the Thematic Appercep-
tion Test and perseverance. The results of these studies suggest that,
1) the subjective probability or expectancy of success and the positive
(extrinsic) incentive value of success both show a positive correlation
to persistence, 2) the subjective probability or expectancy of failure,
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the negative incentive value of failure, and the motive to avoid failure
(M af) all correlate negatively with perseverance.
The theory predicts that if the other extrinsic factors are
held constant when the motive to achieve success is greater than the
motive to avoid failure, the resultant motivation is to perform the task,
while on the other hand, if the motive to avoid failure exceeds the mo-
tive to achieve success, the resultant motivation is to avoid perform-
ing the task. Likewise, perseverance, the tendency to continue moving
toward a goal in the face of frustration or failure, is manifested only
when the total motivation to perform the task is greater than the mo-
tivation to avoid the task or to do something else else.
(v) Comment. In this brief review of current theoretical
treatments of the phenomenon of perseverance, we have made an effort
not only to extract the useful data offered by each, but also to point
out some of the limitations inherent in each conceptual approach. The
basic difficulty with the first approach is that perseverance takes the
form of "thingness” i.e., as a construct it is presumed to be a rather
fixed, static quality or faculty possessed by the individual which can
be activated to varying degrees according to the specific attributes of
the particular occasion. The other equally unsatisfying position is to
frame the concept exclusively in terns of behavioral attributes manifested
as a function of environmental changes. Either way, the resultant con-
struct is the result of high abstraction which tries to isolate the
property from context. This methodology is presumptuous because it
purports to represent the immediate reality of experience when in fact
it can hardly be more remote from this reality. Nor can a compromise
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of these two extremes (as in achievcmnet motivation) yield a satisfac-
tory solution because neither approach deals with the dimension of
evolutionary construction- -a dimension of crucial importance inasmuch
as we assume the most salient quality of the human organism to be its
participation in a continual process of creative transformation. 'Hie re
can be no separation or abstraction of a thing from its context of in-
terrelatedness with other things in the continual progression toward
novelty.
Perseverance as a process, then, is a natural phase in the
teleological aspiration of the organism toward the unfoldmcnt of po-
tentiality in the act of will. Perseverance is the operation of main-
taining the actualization of purpose when this ongoing process encoun-
ters resistance. Resistance may take the form of distractions (pro-
pensity to engage in activities extraneous to the immediate task)
,
time, obstacles (both physical and non-physical) waning energy level,
and insufficient knowledge. Accordingly, perseverance may be seen as
the pressing force of purpose at the threshold of some novel consum-
mation. Perseverance, as the maintaining phase of purpose, implies an
apprehension of personal efficacy upon one's future, i.e., a sense of
expectancy and control. In addition, the intensity or magnitude of
perseverance depends upon the strength of the underlying intention,
level of aspiration, and the extent to which the organism is able to
attend or focus upon the circumscribed aspects oi the situation (ideal
as well as actual) relevant to the particular concrescence.
It is important that any definition of perseverance be
firmly based upon the conception of its organic nature as a process
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inextricably related to the total process of actualization. To attempt
a description via abstracting and isolating the concept from this con-
text is to completely lose sight of its meaning. It should be clear at
this point that the concept of perseverance simply cannot be reduced to
any characteristic behavioral pattern without resulting in triviality.
For example, perseverance does not necessarily mean mere repetition or
rote activity. In some cases, it may involve giving up or yielding one
course of action in order to come back and try another approach to the
same problem. Perseverance also does not invariably imply incessant
activity. It may mean attempting something intermittently, perhaps
even stopping altogether to await the appropriate time to resume action.
4.1.5 EFFECTING CLOSURE
Almost all the research relevant to this aspect of will comes
from experiments carried out by Lewin's students on Lewin's concept of
task-tension. This metaphor is derivative of Lewin’s field theory
model of motivation. The effect of a task or intention is compared
to some kind of system under tension such as a spring operating against
counter- forces, or the pressure of gas inside a container. Lewin
held that task-tension was more than an analogical expression, but
was a real force operating in the psychological field. Ryan (1970) has
pointed out, however, that the concept of task- tension adds little ex-
planatory weight to the phenomenon it describes, i.e., the tendency of
individuals to follow through adopted tasks to their completion. Since
the construct was never framed in terms of a set of principles which go
beneath the observed facts, it is really nothing more than a convenient
label or synonym. Nevertheless, the idea of task-tension generated a
large body of research on the effects of task interruption upon the
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tendency to recall and/or resume activity on the interrupted task.
Ovsiankina (1928) devised experiments in which she could interrupt ac-
tivity in various ways and observe subsequent behavior to determine
how frequently subjects would resume the uncompleted task. In the vast
majority of cases, even where the activity was relatively uninteresting,
subjects went back at the first opportunity to the unfinished exercise.
However, the tendency to resume the interrupted activity was signifi-
cantly lower when the interruption consisted of starting a new task, al-
though the resumption rate even in this case was still 79%. A number
of more recent follow-up studies have replicated Ovsiankina' s findings,
but more research is needed to ascertain the role of individual per-
sonality differences.
The well-known studies of another of Lewin's students,
Zeigamik, are also worthy of note. Zeigamik (1927) found that when
students were presented with a series of comparable tasks, some of which
were interrupted, they were more likely to remember the uncompleted
rather than the completed tasks when tested. The fact that recalling
the task and the spontaneous tendency to complete it are so concurrent,
suggests a relation between the "idea" or representation of the task and
its actualization. Once again, this empirical relation corroborates
James’ basic thesis that the cause of voluntary action resides with the
direction of one's attention toward the "idea" of what the act is to be.
At the moment, there is painfully little empirical evidence
on specific developmental changes in the "Zeigamik effect" or the ten-
dency to spontaneously resume unfinished tasks. Consequently, it is
difficult to draw any direct inferences from the literature about the
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nature of the process underlying the observed phenomenon. As it stands
now, the facts merely indicate that people in general show a propensity
to consummate unfinished tasks. However, there is one connection which
offers a basis of speculation. The fact that recalling the interrupted
task and the spontaneous tendency to complete it are concurrent sug-
gests a relation between the presence of the idea or representation of
the task and its actualization. Once again, this could be seen as an
exemplification of James’ thesis that the cause of voluntary action re-
sides with the direction of one’s attention toward the ’’idea" of what
the act is to be.
4.1.6 SUMMARY: TOWARD A COHERENT DEFINITION OF WILL
Nearly the entire corpus of research that relates to inten-
tional behavior- -the studies on determining tendency, preparatory set,
resistance to extinction, perseverance, task tension- -can be plausibly
explained in terms of the basic theoretical scheme of will put forth
over half a century ago by James and McDougall. The results of this
research, however, provide added detail and coherence to their basic
conceptual scheme and it seems appropriate to summarize briefly, in
context with the original scheme, the specific contributions afforded
by these studies:
1) The actualization of a purpose follows spontaneously
from unencumbered attention toward the unrealized possibility. The felt
image of the possibility in one's consciousness merges into, and be-
comes the bodily expression. As the intended idea gains prominence in
the phenomenal field, it accordingly evokes an analogous ideo-motor ex-
pression. "Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object."
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2) The extent to which the idea is realized in action will
vary (a) as a function of the intensity of feeling associated with the
idea itself and (b) according to the relative predominance of the idea
over other conflicting tendencies.
3) The structural properties of the willed idea can be seen
as an ascending-descending hierarchy of organismic processes which are
tacitly coordinated by the central presiding purpose. The articulated
focal intention itself is merely the tip of the iceberg beneath with
the myriad of contemporary, kinesthetic, haptic, and sensorial opera-
tions are integrated. In fact, the structure of the willing process is
identical to the structure of attention (described in Section 2.1.4).
The willing of the conscious intention is sustained by a massive number
of subsidiary schema spanning all the way from molecular operations to
the abstract purpose entertained in consciousness. Without the cor-
roboration of the subsidiary processes, the will is impeded.
4) The act of willing involves an integrated coordination
of both afferent and efferent processes which subtends both the ap-
prehension of the relevant data in the external world and the motor
patterns that are finally enacted.
4.2 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
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4.2.1 OVERVIEW: WILL AND THE ACTUALIZATION
OF POTENTIALITY
As one might expect, the research that has dealt directly
with the relation of will to learning is scant indeed. Yet there is at
least one study worthy of mention. Morgan (1941) studied the relation
between level of achievement and perseverance. Two groups of children
equated for IQ and age were given a problem for which there was no final
solution. One group had completed several training sessions in a per-
sistence maze (an exercise supposedly designed to develop perseverance)
.
This? group worked longer as a whole and generated more superior so-
lutions than did the control group. These results are hardly surprising
--it would seem inevitable that all other things being equal, a person
who further extends his efforts toward a task is likely to emerge with
a higher quality solution. Though left without an arsenal of research
data to establish the role of "will" in various aspects of human de-
velopment, there is yet recourse to the sentience of informal knowledge
and direct experience.
If one accepts the proposition argued in Chapter One, that
man is a purposive being, i.e.
,
that the purposes he comes to know and
feel do indeed mold and pattern the fabric of his interactions with the
external world, then the pivotal importance of will, the process by which
intentions are actualized becomes self-evident. However, the relation is
so central as to deserve a more explicit statement, both in the interest
of clarity and coherence. In Chapter One, a fundamental reorientation of
first principles was advocated in which the final reality of an organism
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was defined as a process--a process in which data, potential and actual,
are integrated into a unified novel expression of the organism's sub-
jective aim. In the case of a human being, will is implicated in the
highest level of concrescence. For in the process of willing, the
world of potentiality- -one ' s ideals and aims--becomes integrated with
the world of actuality. Through the infusion of these elements which
lie beyond the concrete immediacy of the world as given, the human
organism is capable of enormous creativity.
Without will, these two vital aspects of the self (ideal and
actual), which mutually require one another, become dissociated; the
aims and ideals do not participate in the construction of reality and
eventually they lose their meaning. Devoid of these higher integrating
principles, the individual's actions may be reduced to mere reaction
towards a situation on the basis of superficial impulses. Such pat-
terns of behavior preclude genuinely creative levels of expression be-
cause they tend to lack consistency, coherence and vision.
The implications of will as a factor in the integration of
personality have also been discussed by Rank (1921) , Frankl (1969) , and
Farber, (1965). These writers provide clinical testimony that the dis-
sociation of ideality from actuality can lead to a disintegration of
the personality structure which, if extreme, may result in various
forms of mental pathology. (See R. D. Lang's The Divided Self.)
There is another implication which can be derived from the
organismic framework. In each occasion of concrescence, potentiality is
suffused with the actual data and something novel is created, i.e., the
whole introduces a new element into the situation unpredicted by the
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component data as separate entities. The resultant concrescence re-
introduces diversity into the system and in turn creates the potential
for a new unity to succeed it. Transposing this model to the human con-
dition we see that when an intention is willed into actuality, the im-
manent basis of the self (the data) has been altered and new possibili-
ties are within reach. The student who labors through exercises in
counterpoint will be able to envision potential compositions which a
student without such practice would be unable to imagine. Thus, will
contributes ultimately to the creative advance by generating poten-
tiality as a result of the actualization process. The potentiality for
space technology rests on the achievement of a highly complex system of
mathematics and the potentiality for calculus and analytic geometry in
turn relies on the attainment, the actuality
,
of basic number relations,
etc.
Turning to a less abstract analysis of the relation between
will and creativity, Whitehead notes that creative process involves
two very different kinds of activity. The first is a free, unrestricted
flow of though and fancy, a ’'romance” of the imagination in which ideas
are bom. The second aspect involves disciplining the mind to begin
elaborating, developing, consolidating and refining the nascent idea to
a mature realization. In this vein, it is interesting that Beethoven
allegedly produced no less than 20 versions of the first movement of
his Fifth Symphony before he came up with what he considered to be an ac-
ceptable result.
4.2.2 WILL AND PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR COMPETENCE
The mastery of a complex learned psychomotor skill often de-
pends upon a great deal of practice. When a child is learning to co-
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ordinate the many muscle movements required for walking, many repeated
efforts are required or else the child would never learn. Similarly, a
virtuoso pianist must practice persistently in order to achieve con-
summate mastery. Such practice requires a tenacious perseverance.
4.2.3 WILL AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT
The aim of moral competence is to develop patterns of relating
to others in ways that foster the mutual release of human potential.
Will is an extremely vital process in developing and maintaining such
constructive principles in one's interactions in a social context.
Willing requires the individual to apprehend and respond to whatever
situation he finds himself, in concordance with the ideals he holds,
even in situations where the immediate circumstances are aversive.
Incidently, this "moral will" is not to be confused with "moral rigidity"
wherein certain patterns of behavior are invariantly enacted. The ex-
pression of a moral ideal will be determined not only by the ideal but
also by the specific circumstances in question. The actualization must
be relevant both to the ideal and to the data.
4.3 DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
At this point it should be clear that the development of will
is inextricably linked with the development of the organism's other ca-
pacities. Thus, it is very difficult to separate conceptually the on-
togenesis of will from the emergence of psycho-motor, perceptual, af-
fective and cognitive function. But this is as it should be, since the
approach taken in organic analysis is to define a process in terms of
its relation with other processes, i.e., meaning is a function of inter-
relatedness. Admitting this position, however, theoretically commits
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the present author to a task the magnitude of which falls far beyond
the bounds of a dissertation. With full acknowledgement of this fact,
the following remarks must necessarily remain incomplete and restricted
to very general statements.
Since will is conceptualized as a specialized extension of
the more general operations of intending and attending, the develop-
mental trends and periods of these processes apply also to the epi-
genesis of will. Since these trends have been outlined in previous
chapters, they need not be repeated here. However, there are some
additional comments and further data which need to be considered.
In comtemplating the issue at hand, my mind is drawn back
to the statement of James that volition is primarily a relation be-
tween "our self and our own states of mind"' that, in willing an act,
there is nothing else in the mind but the kinesthetic idea of what
the act is to be. It will be remembered that the Jamesian notion of
idea is remarkably analogous to the more contemporary concept of set.
In Chapter Two, it was seen how "preperceptual" sets function in the
operation of attention. Through continual interactions with the
environment, the organism develops a structure or schema which is
brought to bear upon incoming afferent stimulation. A preperceptual
set is the cumulative product of previous differentiations and in-
tegrations and when conjoined with incoming sense data the organism
can select, assimilate, and interpret new data almost instantaneously.
Similar sets are developed for the various multitude of routine motor
activities such as walking, writing, driving, etc. These sets consti
tute an essential aspect of the core idea. Obviously, without the
tacit knowledge of the set, the idea cannot be willed. A child who
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has never sat on a bicycle seat will be unable to ride the bicycle on
his first attempt no matter how hard he tries. The problem then arises
of explaining how these sets are acquired and what is the characteristic
pattern of their evolution.
According to James, one can have no a priori idea of move-
ment which one has not already performed. ’’Before the idea can be gen-
erated, the movement must have occurred in a blind unexpected way, and
left its idea behind." This basic thesis has some validity insofar as
it recognizes the prerequisite, "tacit” knowledge of the content of
the action before it can be executed. However, it is untenable to the
extent that it disallows for the real possibility of deliberately novel
action. Certainly, massive inheritance lies behind every increment of
creative activity, but the element of novelty, however slight, is ir-
refutable and cannot be dismissed. Otherwise, one is led to the absurd
conclusion that imaginative and intelligent thought exert no influence
on behavior. Or, one must conclude with equal absurdity that all kin-
esthetic sets are pre-existent (a proposition which James disavowed at
the outset). Thus in the formation of intentional sets, there is not
merely the distilled accumulation Of past experience but also the active
transformation of personal history in terms of possibilities yet un-
realized.
Some of Piaget’s observations provide a documentary of the
ontogenesis of these intentional sets in infancy and early childhood.
(Piaget, 1954). Although Piaget's interest in making these observations
was not so much to study the development of intentional behavior as it
was to trace the antecedents of logical thought in children,
nevertheless, the data are relevant.
224
Between two and four months of age, the child’s activity is
characterized by "primary circular reactions”. During this stage, the
infant s behavior shows nascent signs of purposive initiation. The
ends toward which movement is effected are immediate and very limited,
e.g., watching intently and smiling at an adult, giggling at the sound
of a rattle, systematic thumb sucking. The significant limitation of
this stage is that the intentional reaction can be aroused only if the
eliciting stimulus is actually present.
The "secondary circular reaction" appears during the ages of
four to eight months and is distinguished from the primary circular re-
action in two respects. 1) The unit of intentional action is more
complex. In the previous stage, "seeing the stimulus" and "effecting
the action" are undifferentiated and global, i.e., the appearance of "A"
and the motion "B" exist as a contemporary whole. In the "secondary
circular reaction," "A" and VB" are differentiated and perceived separ-
ately as two things, yet are integrated into a causal relation. The
set "A B" is constructed through mutation and exhaustive repetition.
2) The intentional set is capable of preceding the eliciting stimulus.
This element of field independence signifies a step toward increased in-
ward control of action
The ability to intend situations and actions absent from the
perceptual field is increased between eight and 12 months. The child is
able to voluntarily apply old patterns or sets in new situations.
The "tertiary circular reaction" develops during twelve to
eighteen months and is marked by the tendency to explore novel variations
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of old behavior patterns. Hunt (1965) has also documented a dramatic
shift in the child's interest towards novel situations. For instance,
in babbling, the child will deliberately vary his vocalizations, or, he
will explore many different ways of interacting with a familiar toy.
IXiring this time he shows an extraordinary ability to develop new
patterns of activity never before performed. In healthy individuals,
the quest for novelty remains predominant throughout the remainder of
life, even into old age.
On the basis of the data reviewed in this and earlier chap-
ters, the following speculations on the developmental progression of
will are offered. Note the resemblance of these genetic dimensions to
those of attention and goal -setting.
The "intentional sets" or "schema" (the original impulse on
which will is totally dependent) exhibit in the wake of increasing matu-
ration,
1) greater degrees of "field independence" --that is, an act
may be willed in the absence of the goal object and initiated and sus-
tained in an environment adverse to the attainment of the goal;
2) an advance toward greater novelty, transcending the
boundaries of habit and the familiar. The ground of possibilities plays
an ever more important role in the formation of intentional action;
3) the focus of will (the focus of attention), in James'
words, gradually shifts from "resident" to "remote" cues.
In other words, through experience, the "subsidiary" levels
of a willed act recede from consciousness, thus allowing the individual
to entertain more complex (more distal) actions.
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Two other trends are noteworthy.
A. The tenacity of a child* s capacity to will increases as
a function of his level of knowledge connected with the act. The the-
oretical basis underlying this assertion is that a child who is more
competent has more alternative courses of action available to him when
facing an impasse, and hence he will be less apt to give in than would
someone with fewer alternatives (See 4.1.4).
B. The child's capacity to will is most intense at that
time when he is maximally engaged in the learning process, especially
when experiencing a sense of progress which is leading to the threshold
of mastery. There is some support for this hypothesis in White's no-
tion of competence motivation (1959), and J. McV. Hunt's concept of
"motivation inherent in information processing (1965)." Both stress
the importance of an environment rich in contrasts and incongruity
during the early years. This provides the child with opportunities to
be purposively engaged in a process of discovery and mastery and to be
continually transcending the bounds of his limitations.
4.4 EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
To develop the capacity to actualize a reflectively chosen
goal or intention.
1. To initiate, autonomously, action leading to the ful-
fillment of a goal.
2. To persevere- -to sustain appropriate efforts toward the
realization of a goal or intention when encountering difficulties and
to repeat actions decided upon regularly and for extended lengths of
time.
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3. To consummate the achievement of a goal.
4. To actualize an intention judged to be highly congruent
with one's overall purposes and long-term goal when less congruent con-
flicting impulses are present. The specific expression of this ob-
jective will be determined by the context. Two such expressions are:
(a) overcoming procrastinating tendencies; (b) self-restraint of non-
constructive or destructive impulses, e.g., inappropriate aggressive
behavior.
4.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE
In the broadest sense, instruction can be seen as the process
of arranging learning environments and guiding the learner's interaction
with them in such ways as to maximize the development of his latent
potentialities. Before proceeding to specific learning experiences, it
seems appropriate to mention some general implications afforded by the
literature for fostering the development of will.
A. The structure of most school scheduling systematically
deprives the child of the opportunity to consummate sequences of goal-
directed activity. A specific example of this suppressive dimension can
be seen in the way the school day is chopped up into time blocks which
are incapable of yielding to the child's attempt to fulfill his own
goals and intentions. More often than not a child is apt to be in-
terrupted by the tardy bell while in the midst of some task with the
result that he will be unable to follow through on intentions he may
have set for himself. If such arbitrary interruptions become the rule,
the child is likely to feel his goals and aims are not valued by the
228
institutional community. This will surely influence the way in which
the child himself views his own aspirations. When the continuity of his
efforts to persevere and effect closure are often thwarted, he will find
little reason to continue striving.
However, interruptions, if handled properly, can facilitate
perseverance. Students can be assisted to plan their time and budget
their efforts over long periods, but this requires the teacher to help
preserve the continuity and integrity of each child’s chosen task.
B. The above remarks concerning the management of inter-
ruptions have important implications for fostering a sense of personal
efficacy. To see and feel oneself as efficacious, in control of one's
situation, is a prime requisite in the capacity to will an intention in-
to actuality. This involves much more than a vague sense of self-esteem
--it consists of a unified sense of personal identity at the core of
which is the ideal of self-determination.
McDougall was referring to such a sense of personal causation
when he wrote that the "idea of his self which each man entertains plays
an essential part in volition." Empirical verification of the relation
between the sense of efficacy and the actural degree of striving is
provided by numerous studies on achievement motivation (Section 4.1.4).
These studies also indicate that the sense of self-efficacy and the de-
gree of striving is, 1) facilitated by previous success experiences, 2 )
attenuated by repeated experiences of failure, 3) increased by praise and
encouragement. All of these variables influence the subjective proba
bility of achieving success.
One practical application of these findings would be to
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allow the child as much independence as he can handle in directing his
learning activities. If he feels the outcome of his efforts are beyond
his control, he will probably abort the task when he encounters dif-
ficulty. However, if he presides over the situation with a sense of
personal control, and knows consequences are not externally determined,
he his more apt to persevere at a task even if the result is failure.
On the other hand, caution must be exercised so as not to over-extend
the child’s abilities to manage a situation alone. Unrealistic ex-
pectations can set the child up for guaranteed failure and seriously
erode his sense of self-determination. He begins to anticipate fail-
ure regardless of his efforts and therefore sees no reason to continue
trying. A constructive approach would therefore be to grant indepen-
dence gradually, keeping pace with the child’s expanding capabilities
so that his successes outnumber his failures. Failure in small amounts,
however, can be beneficial because it nurtures the tenacity of will
(and ingenuity in searching for alternate means) . This fact is well
documented in the research on ’’resistance to extinction.” A child who
has never met with failure will never learn how to persevere in the
face of obstacles.
With this in mind, the teacher should occasionally give the
student tasks which are slightly beyond his present range of accomplish-
ment and if he fails or meets with difficulties, the teacher would not
step in and complete the task for the child. It is of much greater
value to encourage the youngster to pinpoint the problem, remediate it,
and make another attempt. If the child is failing because a different
approach is called for, the teacher might reorient the child's
perspec-
tive asking questions as to what other ways the problem may
be solved.
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the teacher could suggest specific strategies or provide clues to a
solution. The point is for the teacher to be as parsimonious (but not
miserly) as possible in administering assistance, giving the child no
more help than he really needs to achieve his goal.
C. A general principle which seems to be emerging out of
these specific considerations is that the dimension of identity as-
sociated with self-determination is cultivated and strengthened by a
personal history of having successfully actualized one's goals and
intentions. This principle in part lends some justification to the
popular and often scoffed at "exercises for strengthening one's will-
power." James, however, took the value of such exercise seriously,
Keep alive in yourself the faculty of making efforts by
means of little useless exercises every day, that is to
say, be systematically heroic every day in little un-
necessary things; do something every other day, for the
sole and simple reason that it is difficult and you
would prefer not to do it, so that when the cruel hour
of danger strikes, you will not be unnerved or un-
prepared. A self-dicipline of this kind is similar to the
insurance that one pays on one's house and on one's po-
ssessions. To pay the premium is not pleasant and pos-
sibly may never serve us, but should it happen that our
house were burnt, the payment will save us from ruin.
Similarly, the man who has accustomed himself steadily,
day after day, to concentrating his attention, to will
with energy, for instance, not to spend money on un-
necessary things, will be well rewarded by his effort.
When disasters occur, he will stand firm as a rock,
even though faced on all sides by ruin, while his com-
panions in distress will be swept aside as the chaff
from the sieve (James, 1900).
The Psychosynthesis Research Foundation (1972) has suggested
several exercises based on this principle most of which involve setting
small specific tasks to which one diligently attends each day, such as
beginning an activity at a certain precise time and terminating activity
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at another predetermined time. The tasks are not difficult and there
is no special intrinsic value in the acts themselves. The benefit seems
to derive from the process of intending the act and then executing it
completely and excellently. This might be done in the case of the common,
daily routines such as getting dressed in the morning. If the various
movements are executed with care and attention, efficiently but not
hurriedly, the experience of having satisfactorily and deliberately
controlled a series of events contributes to an immanent sense of per-
sonal efficacy which is brought to bear upon subsequent experiences.
D. The technique described here is a tentative speculation.
The following learning experience is intended to facilitate instances
Of complex will. Complex will was described in Section 4.1.2 as oc-
curring when the chosen course of action is contravened by powerful
tendencies antagonistic to the goal. Experimentally, such instances
have been studied under the rubric of "approach-avoidance conflicts."
James spoke of such a condition as involving "will with effort" while
McDougall labelled it "volition." In any case, having to engage in
some less than pleasant task, judged necessary, or acting in spite of
fear, anger, anxiety, despair, or fatigue, is a familiar experience
to almost every human being. It is this sort of situation which the
lay person associates with the term "volition." Depending upon the
circumstances, the behavioral attributes of this process may mean
either initiating action toward a valued end or autonomously discon-
tinuing or restraining impulsive action detrimental to the realization
of valued ends. For the purpose of continuity, we will use James'
episode of getting out of bed on a freezing morning as a piototypical
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example (the full account of which appears in Section 2.2.2). It will
be recalled how he traces his inability to get up to the paralyzing am-
bivalence of two conflicting tendencies, "the warmth of the bed and the
cold outside." The crucial turning point which released him from this
ambivalence occurred when the focus of his attention shifted to a
fantasy connected with the coming day’s events. Because fantasy is
a mode of attention and because attention is both unitary and selec-
tive, the tendencies generated in response to the immediate percep-
tual data are displaced from consciousness by the conceptual prehen-
sion of unrealized possibilities. The imagination transcends the
conflict issuing from the organism's attention to the immediate
actuality of warmth versus cold, and releases energies for the spon-
taneous expression of the imagined possibilities. The transcendant
quality of the fantasy is particularly important in resolving the
conflict between the competing propensities, the reason being that
fantasy extends beyond the realm of the immediate present; the sphere
in which the conflict is operative. Once again, the hierarchical
structure of the intentional scheme allows further insight into the
dynamics underlying the resultant action. The fantasized possibility
represents, to use James’ expression, a "remote" (versus resident)
image- -the focus of attention dwells almost entirely in the contem-
plated end-result rather than within the intervening perceptual -motor
processes. James discovered his getting out of bed occurred within
a lapse of consciousness because the act transpired as a tacit, sub-
sidiary expression of his focal attention toward the "distal fantasy.
In this case, the sequence of "getting up" functioned as part of a
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larger coordination of activity.
Thus, the parameters of the technique involve two basic
elements: 1) The first step is to discintinue all ongoing activity
temporarily and induce relaxation. Any means of relaxation available
to the individual may be utilized, closing the eyes and breathing
deeply and slowly. 2) Once the pace of physical and mental activity
is quiescent, the individual should begin imagining the intended
situation. The construction of the image (visual, auditory, kines-
thetic) can accrue gradually but systematically- -every few seconds a
new aspect of the potential situation should be introduced. It is
particularly important that the content of one’s contemplated activity
along with the associated feelings and emotional ambient of the situ-
ation be imaged. At some point, fantasies of actions relevant to the
situation will be generated spontaneously. As these fantasies unfold,
they should be voluntarily nurtured and followed through. Once the im-
agination gains momentum and the impulse to act is felt, movement should
be allowed to follow and no restraints imposed.
In cases where the aim is to inhibit or restrain a strong,
spurious impulse, such as anger and agression, McDougall's insights in-
to the fundamental process behind inhibition have important implications.
Inhibition, it will be recalled, is effected not by a direct suppression
of negative impulse, but by focusing on the facilitation of an alternate
tendency. Such a technique appears to be a promising means for
the con-
trol of emotional behavior. For example, if one is angered
and frustra-
ted with the behavior of another because of slowness or error,
the anger
may be slowed by focusing one's attention on some aspect
of the other
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person’s behavior which evokes opposite feelings of affection and empathy.
Such aspects include, if nothing else, that other person’s latent poten-
tiality, his ideals, aspirations, his reality as a fellow human-being in
search of meaning and fulfillment, struggling with the stresses and
tests of life as best as he can.
In view of what little developmental data exist on attention,
goal-setting, etc., it might seem somewhatunrealistic to expect very
young children to be capable of reacting in tenns of such abstract
propositions. But the capacity for empathy and appreciation does not
rest primarily on the capacity for conceptual abstraction, as anyone
who has worked with mental retardates can affirm.
E. Finally, it should be emphasized that the exercises
prescribed for attention are presupposed and directly transferable
as learning experiences for the development of will.
4.6 EVALUATION
At present there are no standardized tests for the quanti-
tative measurement of will. It is true that the "French Test of In-
sight" and the TAT have been used as measures of perseverance. How-
ever, their use is justified on the basis of their supposed correla-
tion with the need for achievement. Ryan (1970) has given sufficient
reason to question seriously the validity of these applications. Con-
sidering this state of affairs, naturalistic observation probably re-
mains the most valid and the most reliable means for assessing any
changes in the development of self- initiation, perseverance, and
effecting closure.
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One difficulty standing in the way of standardized measures
is that there are no strict and stable behavioral criteria associated
with these processes. Many intentions, such as thought and concen-
tration, involve inner activities not directly observable. However,
the presence of such acts may be inferred from an indeterminate set
of cues. This is why the objectives of Section 4.4 were deliberately
framed in general terns. This difficulty does not mean that accurate
assessment, under limited conditions, is impossible. In fact, such in-
put can be extremely valuable. Such conditions, in which the process
is accessible to observation, include cases where the child's goals and
intentions involve motor activity, i.e., tasks with tangible results
such as building, painting, etc. The child's verbal or pictorial pre-
presentations of his goals, and his performance with respect to those
goals in terms of level of difficulty, frequency of attainment, and
degree of persistence, can be used as a baseline criterion for each child.
Changes expressed in terms of the criterion can provide a rough longi-
tudinal assessment, at least of the directional properties of the child's
development
.
There is one final problem pertinent to evaluation which is in
need of research: that is, whether or not the level of the criterion is
task specific or task independent. If it is task- specific, then the use
of the criterion measure would be invalid. Such results would also call
into question the rationale put forth by the Psychosynthesis Research
for the value of "will exercises." The assumption is that
the strength-
ening of the capacity to actualize intentions on one particular
task will
yield a generalized effect on the ability to realize intentions
in a
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completely different task. CXir own explanation for the anticipated
beneficial effect of such exercises rests on a much different theoreti-
cal basis and has nothing to do with the conception of will as a dis-
crete unitary "faculty” which, like a muscle tissue is presumably
strengthened through exercise (See Section 4.5, "C")
.
5. A FINAL NOTE
The role of subjective purpose in determining the construction
of reality is so fundamental that it has often been overlooked in the
scientific study of human behavior. Within the scope of current method-
ology, psychologists and biologists tend to be attracted to clear-cut and
highly specific sorts of problems. But the problem of purpose is both
pervasive and incredibly polymorphous. For though efficacious in the
physical world, purposes cannot be defined strictly in terms of stable
behavioral variables. Since science in general, and psychology in par-
ticular, have operated upon a metaphysics of materialism, any recogni-
tion of purposive causes as such has traditionally been seen as scien-
tifically unproductive. Chapter One stands as an effort to demonstrate
the untenability of such a position and offers.amore adequate meta-
physical framework within which the concept of purpose might be under-
stood. Upon this foundation, the theory of volition seeks to describe
in a coherent fashion the way in which purpose organizes, directs, and
impels the process of human becoming. Conceptually, volition encompasses
three successively more specialized levels of purposive operation, at-
tention,” ’’goal -setting,” and ’’will.”
The visual analogy was suggested of three Chinese boxes,
each
box contained within a larger box. The outermost box
represents atten-
tion, the most basic expression of purpose. Contained
within the larger
box is a more specialized version of attention--goal-setting.
And with-
in the boundaries of goal-setting the process
of will is generated. The
analogy illustrates how the more specialized
processes depend upon and
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presuppose the more general processes, yet at the same time contribute
an additional dimension of definiteness and actuality, Thus, will pre-
supposes an intention or goal, while goal-setting presupposes attention
toward the realm of unrealized possibilities.
Despite the dearth of direct research on goal-setting and
will, there is a considerable amount of empirical study on topics di-
rectly relevant to these processes and this evidence, along with the
speculative insights of many creative minds, provide enough data to
construct a first approximation of a comprehensive theory of volition.
Because attention is the most fundamental process upon which
the others are based, it is given the most extended treatment. In brief,
attention is defined as the process by which the individual pruposively
selects (differentiates) and structures (integrates) feelings, as well
as the sensory and conceptual data of the immediate present into a unity
of conscious experience. As a process, it is sustained through a con-
tinual transformation of the data which the organism prehends, with the
result that conscious experience is always penetrating into novel realms.
Research demonstrates that if this condition of flux and transition
stalls, if the interaction between subject and data subsides into stasis,
attention and consciousness will disintegrate. This holds some
far-reach
ing implications for the organization and content of
educational experi-
ences. There is substantial evidence that without
attention, many forms
of learning either cannot take place or else proceed
very inefficiently.
The developmental progression outlined in Section
2.3 suggests that the
growth of attention in early childhood depends
heavily on concrete
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sensori-motor manipulation of objects in the environment. Yet, young
children are often subjected to inert infoimation and restricted to pas-
sive instructional roles, reducing both their capacity to attend and
their will to learn. Educational experiences should be geared to foster
the type of interaction between the child and his environment which leads
to the experience of penetration and adventure (See section 2.5 for
learning experiences)
.
Goal -setting--anticipating and selecting future possibilities
toward which one will strive- -requires the individual to bring into clear
figure, alternative courses of action by which the desired goal may be
realized, to project the consequences which the various possibilities
hold for development, to determine the priorities of the possible
alternatives, and to integrate the final decision into a coherent plan
for action. Finally, the individual must develop some degree of com-
mitment to the decision. This is most important since commitment
protects nascent plans and intentions from fragmentation. Drawing from
the developmental hypotheses offered in Section 3.4, educational efforts
should provide experiences which will increase the degree of differen-
tiation and integration of the goals envisioned by the learner, i.e., to
help articulate with increasing specificity, 1) the goal state itself,
2) the discrepancy between one's present condition and the goal being
en-
tertained, and 3) the sequence of actions which must transpire in order
to actualize the goal. In addition, learning experiences should
nurture
the capacity to develop long-range goals with reference to more
abstract
ends (such as higher-order values and ideals).
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Will, the process of bringing a goal into fruition or realiz-
ing an intention in action, follows spontaneously from unencumbered
attention toward the unrealized goal. It is ideo-motor
--as the inten-
ded idea gains prominence in the conscious field, the mental feeling
of the possibility merges into and becomes the bodily expression. The
effectiveness of the process depends on the intensity with which the
idea is experienced and the relative predominance of the idea over other
conflicting tendencies. According to this theoretical account, fantasy
plays a key role in the process of will. We have repeatedly asserted
that attention is at the heart of every volitional process and the
function of fantasy is a case in point: Fantasy is merely a mode of
attention in which the data are potential rather than actual. Being able
to fantasize or project oneself into the intended situation energizes and
motivates one to action. James once pointed out, if an exciting idea is
brought before the mind, action will immediately follow.
In summary, because volition is an indispensable process
underlying the release of human potential it therefore must become a
central concern within any educational enterprise that takes seriously
the task of fostering the creative growth of the full range of capaci-
ties folded within every human being. As Huxley observed, man cannot
relegate the evolution of his individual and collective existence simply
to the external conditions impinging upon him. He is a purposive being
and his sense of purpose is the primary element which enables him to
shape his future. Evolutionary advancement rests on the organism's
ability to transcend the present. Purpose and volition, the basis
of
transcendence, represent at once the fulfillment of the present by
going
beyond it.
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In parting, I wish to re-emphasize the speculative nature of
this dissertation and the need for a systematic program of follow-up re~
search. Until more empirical evidence is available the conceptual frame-
work must be regarded as tentative. Another very important task which
awaits future talent is to generate new practical techniques and methods
from the basic theoretical scheme developed here.
As Whitehead points out, producing a speculative scheme in-
volves imagination far outrunning direct observation, but- -and he writes
with the weight of historical evidence in hand,
The secret of progress is the speculative interest in
abstract schemes of morphology. . . . Except for the
rarest accidents of chance thought precedes observation.
It may not decide the details, but it suggests the type.
Nobody would count whose mind was vacant of the idea of
number. Nobody directs attention when there is nothing
he expects to see. The novel observation which comes
by chance is a rare accident, and is usually wasted.
For if there be no scheme to fit it into, its sig-
nificance is lost (Whitehead, 1929a, p. 72).
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